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THE
SPIRITUAL INTERPRETATION
OF HISTORY

WILLIAM BELDEN NOBLE LECTURES

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THE SPIRITUAL INTERPRETATION OF HISTORY

BY

SHAILER MATHEWS, A.M., D.D., LL.D.,

PROFESSOR OF HISTORICAL AND COMPARATIVE THEOLOGY
AT THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO AND DEAN
OF THE DIVINITY SCHOOL

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THE WILLIAM BELDEN NOBLE LECTURES

THIS Lectureship was constituted a perpetual foundation in Harvard University in 1898, as a memorial to the late WILLIAM BELDEN NOBLE of Washington, D.C. (Harvard, 1885). The deed of gift provides that the lectures shall be not less than six in number, that they shall be delivered annually, and, if convenient, in the Phillips Brooks House, during the season of Advent. Each lecturer shall have ample notice of his appointment, and the publication of each course of lectures is required. The purpose of the Lectureship will be further seen in the following citation from the deed of gift by which it was established: —

“ The object of the founder of the Lectures is to continue the mission of William Belden Noble, whose supreme desire it was to extend the influence of Jesus as the way, the truth, and the life; to make known the meaning of the words of Jesus, ‘ I am come that they might have life, and that they might have it more abundantly.’ In accordance with the large interpretation of the Influence of Jesus by the late Phillips Brooks, with whose religious teaching he in whose memory the Lectures are established and also the founder of the Lectures were in deep sympathy, it is intended that the scope of the Lectures shall be as wide as the highest interests of humanity. With this end in view, — the perfection of the spiritual man and the consecration

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by the spirit of Jesus of every department of human character, thought, and activity, — the Lectures may include philosophy, literature, art, poetry, the natural sciences, political economy, sociology, ethics, history both civil and ecclesiastical, as well as theology and the more direct interests of the religious life. Beyond a sympathy with the purpose of the Lectures, as thus defined, no restriction is placed upon the lecturer."

PREFACE TO SECOND EDITION

THESE lectures were written in the midst of the universal unrest resulting from a world war. They were an effort to re-examine the bases of an inherited confidence in spiritual values. The six months which have passed since their publication have seen enormous changes in social attitudes throughout the world, and in these changes the conclusions which a survey of human progress seemed to justify have been corroborated. Democracy, which seemed two years since an adventure not altogether sure of its quest, has been disclosed as an irrepressible tendency. Russia has overthrown its Czar, and through the screen of war, popular rights are seen gaining new recognition in Prussia and the German Empire, in Hungary and Austria. Even though it is impossible to estimate accurately the results of these movements, and though the forces of reaction should reassert themselves, it is now beyond belief that society will ever revert permanently to conditions as they were before 1914. No more striking or heartening event ever occurred than

the ranging of democracies and truly representative governments against autocracy. Hideous as is the war, it has released forces that will ultimately "make the world safe for democracy."

These months have brought new searching of heart to men and women, who, devoted to the ideals of justice, love, and peace, have yet been forced to approve war for the self-defence of democracy. But we have learned to estimate moral values as something concrete rather than abstract, as affairs of life and progress rather than as words and theoretical ideals. We have learned anew the futility of mistaking what we believe ought to be for what really is. We have dared face supreme sacrifice as not too high a price for the preservation of such measure of spiritual freedom individuals and society have attained. Religious faith has seen its goal and its basis more distinctly.

Had these lectures been written during these months of more intimate participation in the struggle which suggested them, some paragraphs, particularly in the last lecture, might have been differently ordered, but the faith, which the study of human progress in the large has strengthened, would have been even more assured. The call to the championship of a victorious

world-view would have been even more imperative. Whatever sacrifice awaits us, we can with revived confidence await the outcome of that spiritual process which justifies men of courage and loyalty in expecting a nobler social order and a more complete embodiment of the ideals of the Christian religion.

War is a survival we shall yet outgrow. Devotion to ideals and institutions we protect by war will find fuller and more moral expression in the giving of larger social justice.

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THE
SPIRITUAL INTERPRETATION
OF HISTORY

LECTURE I

THE LIMITS WITHIN WHICH THE SPIRITUAL INTERPRETATION OF HISTORY IS POSSIBLE

HISTORY is more than the record of history. It is a phase of the universal process in which we live and of which we are: the continuous stream of human life flowing from times far more ancient than can be known from any written records. It is not composed of "natural men" with social compacts in their ghostly arms stalking from generalization to generalization, but of very real persons who loved and traded and fought. For this reason it is desirable that the interpreter of history should have helped, though only in some small but real way, to make it. Only thus can one thoroughly gain insight into the working of group consciousness. But if such participation in affairs is impossible the historian should continually remind himself that history does not wait upon philosophy. The interpreter of history faces not hypotheses but a never-ending attempt of human beings at the adventure of living.

But what is the adventure of life? Men have busied themselves with this question since first they began to reflect. On the one side life seems atomistic, a mass of

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happenings; on the other it is exigent, a daily struggle for food and clothes and the other things for which the Gentiles seek. Is this, then, all that life means — a mechanistic tropism, a struggle to fill hungry stomachs with food, protect cold bodies with clothes and houses, extract passing pleasures from the senses? Or has life something more: a unity emerging amidst opposing diversities; a becoming rather than a mere being; a movement towards personal values; a world order to be constructed from within as well as from without; a freedom from the world of physical and chemical forces; a kingdom of ends as well as of causes; a world of reason rather than a world of sense; a community of creative love which frees humanity from the limitation of natural egoism; a development away from animalism toward Godlikeness?

Which of these antitheses — the materialistic and the spiritual — best describes life's adventure? Or, if both are to be accepted, which describes most effectively life's general tendency?

Professor Eucken¹ has voluminously given his answer to this challenge, but more in the way of a prophet of philosophical romanticism than in that of the historian.

¹ It is not always easy to discover definitions in the work of Eucken, but as satisfactory a statement of the problem of spiritual life as he has furnished I am inclined to think is given in *Life's Basis and Life's Ideal*, pp. 110-134. See also King, *The Seeming Unreality of the Spiritual Life*, pt. I, especially pp. 3-12.

I set before me no such high task as that of the philosopher. I wish rather to put to actual history this question as to human life viewed in the large: Has it within itself spiritual forces that result in a spiritual tendency? The question, I am sure, we shall all regard as vital and imperative. For not only have our social ideals and hopes of late been strained by war, but there has arisen an attitude of hesitation and incipient despair on the part of many earnest souls. To many a lover of his kind human life seems a miserable mistake, and idealism only an effort to make the best of a bad business. Who of us has not experienced something of this *Weltschmerz*?

If, however, history discloses a general tendency towards spiritual rather than the materialistic ends, we shall have found a basis for something more uplifting than devotion to fellow-victims of a sad and saddening world-order; for a renewed allegiance to our threatened idealism and a revived confidence in the might of right. Religious faith — the quintessence of spiritual life — will have found standing ground amid the interrogations with which it now struggles.

In the present lecture I plan to consider certain views which more or less explicitly belittle or deny spiritual forces in history, and then I shall endeavor to show that after they have been given full weight they overlook or underestimate data for which a spiritual interpretation is demanded as a working

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hypothesis. In later lectures I shall attempt to show that a study not only of these data but of the historical process itself discovers a tendency which compels the recognition of spiritual forces, if not a Spirit, in social development. Thus history, while not reading us "lessons," will furnish an outlook, if not some measure of direction and cheer for men and women who wish their lives to count seriously.

I

Before considering other views, however, I wish briefly to treat of two interpretations of history which do not help us in our attempt to understand social change; the one because it is too neglectful of historical process, and the other because it is too neglectful of objective historical facts.

1. In despair of finding any sort of unity in the stream of life, historians have sometimes insisted that all we need is facts. "What I want," Dickens makes Mr. Gradgrind protest in 1854 when Cobden and Bright were doing their best to introduce the human element into economic legislation, "what I want is Facts. Teach these boys and girls nothing but Facts. Facts alone are wanted in life. Plant nothing else and root out everything else. You can only form the minds of reasoning animals upon Facts. Nothing else will ever be of any service to them." And the historians of the middle of the nineteenth century (and some who have

lived since) certainly sought to produce these facts. Neglectful of social processes, their volumes are veritable dust-storms of facts. Admirable masters of records study the French Revolution as if it were as barren of pedigree as Melchizedek — a mass of geographical, biographical, and political facts. Yet the French Revolution, as Thomas Jefferson¹ and not a few actual participants in the movement, including Robespierre,² believed, was a social and political reconstruction accomplished before what is popularly regarded as the French Revolution began. Such discrepant views of an outstanding epoch show that historical interpretation is not gained by a simple massing of detached facts. These are, of course, indispensable to the historian, but they must be seen to gain meaning from their genetic relationship as tension points in a social process. One might as well describe a journey by sending home a collection of illustrated postal cards as to describe history as an aggregation of events. Society like the individual *is* what it is *becoming*.

2. Another interpretation of history, quite the opposite to that of "facts alone" is the theological.

¹ *Works*, ii, 257 sq., 469. See also Hazen, *American Opinion of the French Revolution*, pp. 30-34.

² On September 29, 1791, Robespierre in an address said "The Revolution is finished." *Archives Parlementaires*, xxxi, 620. Rabaut St. Étienne published his panegyric on the work of the Revolution in 1792.

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Its representatives see little in history except providential and often miraculous guidance by God. By most pre-scientific thinkers, the deity is believed to have had an active interest in the affairs of some section of humanity. As a member of a tribe or of a clan he provided victories for his people up to the limit of his ability. If he was persistently defeated, he was liable to be rejected by a disappointed constituency who preferred a god who not only advocated but exemplified a higher degree of military preparedness. The Old Testament, for instance, has preserved interesting accounts of the victory of Jehovah over other gods, like Dagon, even though his own *sacramenta* had been captured by those who worshipped these other gods.¹ History for the Hebrew prophet and psalmist was a record of the deeds of Jehovah. He had brought his people up out of Egypt, He had guided their fathers through the wilderness, He had led in the conquest of Canaan, He had interfered with the sun and moon in order to let Joshua more thoroughly complete a victory. In the future, they believed, He would continue to guide their national destinies, giving advice through his prophets as to alliances with Egypt or Assyria, and raising up Cyrus as the rod of his international wrath.

The same idea of divine interposition and direction through miracles is to be seen in every religion with which I am acquainted. The Romans repeatedly were

¹ 1 Sam. 4:1 - 7:2.

saved by miraculous appearances as at Lake Regillus; the fate of Troy was set by the Olympians; the Greeks were protected from the Persians by Athena; Gregory of Tours in his amazing book on the affairs of France, finds divine interposition so common as almost to destroy its miraculous character. In other words, these pre-scientific minds held that history was under the control of some deity who did not hesitate to interfere with its ordinary course by way of some miracle.¹ This is the earliest interpretation of history at our disposal. That it contains an element of truth every religious heart affirms; but it is not akin to scientific thought, and indeed does not pretend to be scientific.

A more philosophical view of the divine control of human affairs appears in Augustine's treatise on the City of God. The opening passages in which Augustine states the occasion of the treatise make the ancient world live again vividly. It was written to disprove the charge that the sack of Rome by Alaric was due to the conversion of the Roman people from their pagan gods to Christianity. Augustine sees in the universe two kingdoms: the world, or the kingdom of Satan, and the kingdom of God. Although the latter of these two kingdoms is only partially present, that of Satan is in full operation. The kingdom of God, however, although it gloriously exists, is yet in

¹ Nor need these minds be in the distant past. Recall the angels of Mons, and the explanations given the catastrophe of San Francisco.

heaven, but it has had the Hebrew people and the Christian Church as its outposts in the midst of the world. The antagonisms and adjustments of these two kingdoms constitute history, and are traced from the revolt of the angels through the Creation and biblical history to Augustine's own day. The time approached, Augustine bravely hoped, when the kingdom of God would emerge victorious and the kingdom of Satan with all its agencies, governors and members would be cast into the fire of Hell, there to burn forever. Pending this glorious triumph God had revealed himself partially to the Hebrews and completely in Jesus and the Church, his body.

History was thus to Augustine a transcendental drama, and the sufferings of the present moment were not to be compared to the glory which was to come. Indeed the power of the new kingdom of God was already manifest because during his sack of Rome Alaric had preserved those who had taken asylum in the Christian temples.¹

This interpretation of history with its silence as to economic and other forces makes no appeal to our modern thought, but it is at least a consistent and honorable attempt to give coherency to the course of events that was to bring so tragic results to the

¹ Characteristic passages are *City of God*, bk. i, chs. 1-3, p. 34; bk. xi (in which the origin of the two cities or kingdoms is shown to have been among the angels), bk. xv, especially pp. 1, 2, 4; bk. xviii, xix, especially pp. 7-17.

ill-starred Roman Empire in the fourth and fifth centuries.

Augustine's follower Orosius was not content to leave his master's thought in the field of religious hope. He saw God already punishing his enemies. With the encouragement of Augustine he compiled a voluminous treatise, *Seven Books of History against the Heathen*. In his preface he gives the point of view set before him by Augustine. "Thou hast commanded that I should gather from history and annals whatever mighty ills and miseries and terrors there have been from wars and pestilence, from famine, earthquake and floods, from volcanic eruptions, from lightning and from hail, and from monstrous crimes in the past centuries." Orosius' volumes do credit to his purpose. His record of the miseries and crimes of the Babylonian, Macedonian, African and Roman Empires makes even the modern daily paper tame. These miseries he thought should be commemorated "in order that with the security of God's ineffable judgments laid partly open, those stupid murmurers at our Christian time should understand that one God ordained the fortunes of Babylon in the beginning and at the end those of Rome, that through his clemency we live, although wretchedly because of our intemperance." His interpretation makes history a continuous miracle in that God has so ordered events that suffering follows the neglect of service to himself.

The same theological interpretation appears in practically all historical works written by churchmen of the Middle Ages. By the time of the Reformation, history has become as polemic as a sermon upon the book of Revelation. Cardinal Baronius has no language sufficiently strong and explicit to set forth his interpretation of history as a triumph of righteous Catholics over evil Protestants, while the Protestants were ready to show that God's judgments were already operating in the misfortunes of Catholic states.

This brief treatment must suffice for these two interesting rivals in the field of historical interpretations. Let us now face more fundamental issues.¹

II

1. At the extreme remove from the theological interpretation of history is the mechanistic or more specifically the geographic. Where Augustine could see the operation of God or devil, Ratzel² and Semple³ would find the operations of mountain ranges and plains, rivers and seas, tillable soil and desert. Iso-

¹ For a good summary of various philosophies of history including that of Augustine, see Flint, *Philosophy of History*; Barth, *Die Philosophie der Geschichte als Sociologie*, i; summary in Small, *General Sociology*, ch. 4.

² *History of Mankind; Anthropogeography*.

³ *Influences of Geographic Environment*. See Thomas, *Source Book of Social Origins*, pp. 134-139 (1909) for bibliography. A thorough-going treatment of the older sort will be found in Mougeolle, *Le problème de l'histoire*.

lated habitats like those of Egypt encouraged the birth and precocious growth of civilization. The need of intercourse by land and sea made Venice and Greece, England and New England. Lombroso¹ holds that revolutions generally occur on limestone formations; Von Treitschke, in loyalty to the Germany he apotheosized, taught that the lack of artistic and poetical development which he thought he discovered among the Swiss, is due to the fact that they live among overpowering mountains, while low mountains and hill countries like those of his own land produce poets and artists. Mason says that "hawks taught men to fish, spiders and caterpillars to spin, the hornet to make paper and the cray-fish to work in clay." And so generally; if it were not for the Dardanelles, the Baltic Sea, and Kattegat, Russia would not be so interested in Balkan politics; and if it had not been for the rich unappropriated lands of Africa, Germany would have been less eager for a place in the sun. Prophets and poets come from mountains; art from river banks and monotheism from the desert.

Of course we must recognize that this reliance upon geographical influences to explain the course of history is often supplemented by reference to other forces, including the spiritual.² But the actual impression

¹ *La Crime politique et les Révolutions*. For other statements see Semple, *op. cit.*, ch. I.

² A sane and popular treatment is illustrated in Brigham, *Geographic Influences in American History*.

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given by this emphasis is not friendly to discourse upon the life of the spirit. When Miss Semple says that the early pioneers moved westward because they did not wish to hear their neighbor's dog bark, we recognize a pleasantry rather than a scientific principle; when Marx assures us that "in changing the modes of production, mankind changes all its social relations, the hand mill creates a society with the feudal lord, a steam mill a society with the industrial capitalist," we remember Engels' bill of exceptions, and the third volume of *Das Kapital*. But when Grant Allen¹ says that "the differences between one nation and another ultimately depend . . . simply and solely upon physical circumstances to which they are exposed," and that Greek culture "was absolutely and unreservedly the product of the geographical Hellas acting upon the given factor of the undifferentiated Aryan brain," we recognize propaganda and refuse to be placated even by the concession of the undifferentiated Aryan brain. From such a point of view history becomes an enlargement of Masefield's interpretation of the individual:

"What am I, Life ? A thing of watery salt
Held in cohesion of unresting cells
Which work they know not why, which never halt;
Myself unwitting where their Master dwells.
I do not bid them, yet they toil, they spin

¹ *Gentleman's Magazine*, 1878, quoted in James, *Will to Believe*, p. 237.

A world which uses me as I use them.
Nor do I know which end or which begin,
Nor which to praise, which pamper, which condemn.

"So, like a marvel in a marvel set,
I answer to the vast, as wave by wave
The sea of air goes over, dry or wet,
Or the full moon comes swimming from her cave
Or the great sun comes north; this myriad eye
Tingles, not knowing how, yet wondering why."¹

The progress of history is thus described by Professor Mason.²

In this partnership between man and the earth the progress of culture has been from naturalism to artificialism; from exploitation to cultivation and domestication; from mere muscular power to more subtle physical force of man, of beast, of water, of air, of fire, of electricity; from tools to machinery; from simplest imitative processes to highly complex processes, involving many materials and motive powers and inventions; from short journeys to long journeys; from mere barter to world-embracing commerce; from monotonous and monorganic food and clothing, shelter and furniture, mental and social appliances, to forms as complex and varied as the imagination can conceive. And when the supply gives out, it is not the earth that fails, but it is the comprehension and the skill of men.

It cannot escape attention that even in this type of interpretation of history man is introduced as a factor coördinate with nature. But the thorough-going geographer is only incidentally concerned with man. History is a vast tropism. Nature is working changes

¹ *Atlantic Monthly*, January, 1916.

² *American Anthropologist*, vii, 158.

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in a humanity that apparently has little more initiative than the flower that turns to the sun.¹ It was natural, therefore, that for a time men should think that this subservience of history to the physical universe might enable us to formulate laws which should be twins with the laws of energy. Buckle, Ratzel, not to mention Comte, Spencer, Allen, and Draper, undertook to develop these laws. They are often careful to mention the human element, but because of their emphasis their influence was to depersonalize history. Yet although their thought seems remote from a complete interpretation of the process the causes of which they seek, there is no reason to deny the actual facts they propose. They fail to satisfy our search for some interpretation that gives more weight to the human element, more insight into effects as well as origins, more appreciation of the genetic character of history as a whole, but they have led us to recognize the influence of nature. Hereafter history will be seen to walk on the earth, breathe the air and expand or diminish with the process of the sun.

2. Popular as is the geographical interpretation of history among the representatives of physical science, the economic interpretation is more in evidence among historians, and above all among the sociologists. If

¹ To realize the strength of this conviction see Loeb, *The Mechanistic Interpretation of Life*; Snyder, *The World Machine*; Haeckel, *The Riddle of the Universe*.

geography has slain its hundreds of idealists, economics has slain its thousands. No field of investigation is now being worked more vigorously or with greater assurance than that of economic forces. The key to history is asserted to be man's economic production and consequent antagonisms. Naturally such a view rests to no small degree upon a geographical view of history. The explanation of social institutions and morality is to be found in the fact that nature apparently is more willing to provide inhabitants than inhabitable areas, hungry mouths than food, and cold and heat than fuel and shade. Relative economic scarcity is therefore the incentive to progress and in the effort to solve the problems which arise from such scarcity history is said to emerge.¹

The intermediary between the limitations of nature and the development of human civilization is declared to be social antagonism. The disproportion between human wants and the means of satisfying them results in an attempt to subdue and to establish with nature a harmony which did not at first exist. Out of this lack of harmony between man and nature emerges, however, disharmony between man and man. By this principle of antagonism not only is property explained, but the conflict between the individual and the group, out from which morality emerges, as well as the conflict between classes in society from which comes the state.

¹ See, for instance, Carver, *Essays in Social Justice*, ch. 2.

This economic or materialistic view of history may be summarized in Engels' statement:¹ "that view of the course of history which seeks the ultimate cause and the great moving power of all important historic events in the economic development of society, in the changes in the modes of production and exchange, in the consequent division of society into classes against one another."

This economic view of history is largely the contribution of Karl Marx.² True, just how thorough-going materialistic is the philosophy of Marx is of late a matter of dispute. Engels, writing in 1890, says, "Marx and I are partly responsible for the fact that the younger men have sometimes laid more stress on the economic fact than was necessary. In meeting the attacks of our opponents, it was necessary for us to emphasize the dominant principle denied by them, and we did not always have the time, place or opportunity to let the other facts which were concerned in the mutual action and reaction get their deserts." Furthermore, a

¹ *Socialism, Utopian and Scientific*, p. xix. For this and other quotations from Marx and Engels, see Skelton, *Socialism: A Critical Analysis*, pp. 98-100.

² Marx first proposed this view in his *Critique of Political Economy*, but it appears throughout his writings. A brief summary of his position in history will be found in Le Rossignol, *Orthodox Socialism*, ch. 7; Skelton, *Socialism; A Critical Analysis*, pp. 95-114. Morgan, *Ancient Society*, independently advanced (1877) the view that "the great epochs of human progress have been identified more or less directly with the enlargement of the sources of subsistence."

socialist like Walling¹ would prefer to think of Marx as a pragmatist rather than as a materialist, but the philosophy of history as expounded in much socialistic literature certainly makes the economic factor practically supreme.² The struggle for the economic surplus and its appropriation by a portion of society rather than by the entire group of working men, its alleged originators, lies at the basis of capital and the long succession of struggles between class and mass. The great movements of history according to this view have been shaped by machinery, and the real epochs of history center around the invention of gunpowder, the printing press and the means of transportation. The necessities of production account for the various forms of society and institutions which humanity has evolved.³

But of late the neo-socialist has reversed the argument by saying that all this is precisely what has not happened. Socialism is rather a prophecy of what

¹ *Larger Aspects of Socialism*, especially ch. 5. I am indebted to this volume for several quotations from Marx and Engels.

² See, for example, Kautsky, *Ethics and the Materialistic Conception of History*; Engels, *Socialism, Utopian and Scientific*; Loria, *Economic Foundations of Society*; Spargo, *Socialism* (although Spargo is not thoroughly Marxian or deterministic).

³ Seligman, *The Economic Interpretation of History*, ch. 6, gives a brief summary of various applications of the theory. See also Robinson, "War and Economics in History and Theory," a brief article in *Political Science Quarterly*, xv (1900), 581, and Rogers, *The Economic Interpretation of History*.

will happen when history is perfected, and equitable and effective processes of production shall have been established throughout civilization.¹

How far this reliance upon economic forces for the explanation of social evolution may go among those who are not socialists is to be seen in works of those writers who like Beard hold that the movement for constitutional government in the United States was "originated and carried through principally by four groups of personality interests which had been adversely affected under the Articles of Confederation: money, public securities, manufactures, and trade and shipping."²

Such a view of history seems to me partial and indifferent to the full mass of the actual facts of human life; often as thoroughly *a priori* and dogmatic in its treatment of actual human phenomena as that of the theologians. Economic self-interest and capitalistic manipulation of social forces are certainly not to be overlooked, but when an historian appeals to them to furnish an "ultimate" interpretation of human achievement and finds in them the general tendency of history, he becomes a sort of scholastic Glendower,

¹ So Walling, *op. cit.*, ch. 5, especially p. 106.

² *An Economic Interpretation of the Constitution of the United States*, p. 324. This view as to history is also to be seen in the works of Professor Patten, especially his *Theory of Social Forces* and *The Social Basis of Religion*; although some of his statements of fact in the latter book need to be verified.

boasting that he can summon causes from the vasty deep. It is with no lack of admiration for the solid accomplishments of the representatives of this view of life that we renew the challenge: "But, cousin, will they come?"

III

Professor Seligman¹ recognizes five classes of criticisms of the economic theory of history: first, that it is fatalistic; second, that it rests on a questionable assumption of historical laws; third, that it is socialistic; fourth, that it neglects the ethical and spiritual forces in history; and fifth, that it leads to absurd exaggerations. Such criticisms are obviously of unequal importance and to my mind do not strike the fundamental question which must be applied to theory in whatever field it may emerge. This fundamental issue is one of method rather than of conclusion and is this: Does the theory grow out of a study of the entire range of facts, or is it brought to facts? In particular, Can the economic interpretation of history as actually employed be said to recognize fairly all the elements which go to determine and create the processes in human life?

To the five criticisms recognized by Professor Seligman, I venture to add a sixth: as applied to history, the economic interpretation is too simple.

¹ In his interesting volume, *The Economic Interpretation of History*, pp. 89, 90.

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Such a criticism does not apply merely to the economic interpretation of history. Every monistic interpretation of human life is too simple. It gets its intelligibility by some neglect of fact. A historian with a single explanation of human life is apt to be a sort of academic Procrustes proudly showing his fellows how facts are all of the same length because they fit into his theory, but not very eager to have them notice the pile of *disjecta membra* at the foot and head of the theoretical bed which he has made his standard of measurement. The first step in any historical method is the recognition of history as a genetic *process, not a collection of static facts.*¹ The gathering of facts comes next and not till that is fairly complete, interpretation. Interpretation depends upon the discovery of genetic relationships, both prior and subsequent to any event or epoch under investigation. These relationships must be as far as possible positive and not theoretical, much less a matter of epigrams.

That there is now a tendency toward a less sweeping statement of the economic interpretation of history will be shown in a subsequent lecture, but modifications which have been made in it have been largely in the way of concession. It may be expressed cautiously as by Professor Seligman,² "Economic inter-

¹ See Bury, *Darwin and Modern Science*, pp. 531-539; Robinson, *The New History*, chs. 1-3.

² *The Economic Interpretation of History*, p. 157.

pretation of history means, not that the economic relations assert an exclusive influence, but that they assert a preponderant influence in shaping the progress of society." Yet when even Professor Seligman undertakes to apply his economic interpretation, we find such unqualified statements as this, "It is no longer open to doubt that the democracy of the nineteenth century is largely the result of the industrial revolution; that the entire history of the United States to the Civil War was at the bottom a struggle between two economic principles; that the Cuban insurrection against Spain, and thus indirectly the Spanish-American War was the outcome of the sugar situation; or, finally, that the condition of international politics at present is dominated by economic considerations."¹

Now any real interpretation is a description of actual process revealed in relations between facts rather than a formulated principle, and while, as in the case of the geographic readings of history this economic interpretation may be cautiously framed, the impression given by champions of the theory — and impressions are in effect interpretations — is that economic forces are the really significant features in history. History thus exhibits a materialistic determinism. I know that many economic historians would protest against such a characterization of their views and I welcome their

¹ *The Economic Interpretation of History*, p. 86.

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protestations of belief in spiritual values. But I simply refer objectors to the literature which has been produced by those holding the economic point of view. In fact, some of these publications especially those of certain socialist writers, seem to be less histories than propagandist documents, glorifying such matters as soil, climate, continental peculiarities, crops, production, machines, railroads, and water transportation. He would be a blind observer who did not recognize the share physical nature has had in human life; and to insist that physical forces are to be neglected in the interest of emphasizing spiritual forces would certainly be unscientific. The real issue is one of facts. It is always dangerous for a historian to be a philosopher, but it is a thousand times more dangerous for him to be obsessed by a theory. To such a person the record of human life is liable to become a metaphysics masquerading in references to original sources.

He who would really understand history must go straight to history. He must first of all look at matters in the actual process and as far as possible realize that to understand history we must ask more questions than those as to origin. Efficient causes give no final formula for the student of humanity. Events, persons, institutions, social attitudes, and civilizations compose a cycle of change in which they are causes as truly as they are effects.¹ The inter-

¹ See Small, *General Sociology*, pt. 5, 7.

preter of history must recognize the total range of facts and processes even though it be at the expense of simplicity and at the end produce no convenient phrase which undergraduates can easily remember as the key to the process of the ages.

IV

If, forgetting all theories and for the moment all attempts at interpretation, we look impartially upon the complex current of human life of which we are momentarily a part, we shall see on the one side that humanity walks upon the earth and is conditioned by physical and chemical forces. Man is an animal subject to what we call animal life; he is placed in a world that does not satisfy all his wants except in response to toil and even then with such limitations as to make his relations with his fellows one of struggle. But we shall see something else in history: that man has always felt himself to be something more than a peripatetic chemical laboratory driven by the sex instinct; that social history is the sum of innumerable adventures into strange regions into which star dust and *x*-rays never entered and of which even the most genially disposed animal never dreamed. In brief, to such an observer it will appear that the facts which the best intending economic interpreter of history overlooks or underestimates are quite as important as the facts neglected by historians who dwell among Ideals and

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World Spirits. If to the latter human history is an Hegelian *Weltgeist* culminating in Germanistic *Kultur*; to the former it is a Caliban who has discovered that his mother's god Setebos is only a personification of the economic customs of her primitive ancestors.

I propose to mention a few of these facts which in the interest of brevity I will roughly classify without any severe attempt at scholastic precision.

(1) There is human personality itself. One does not need to be a believer in absolute freedom, a denier of the dependence of humanity upon the universe from which it has emerged, to realize that there is something creative in the human self. Whatever may be our vocabulary with which we express our conviction, a human being never goes into a material situation without impregnating it with some plus element which was not in the situation itself. Marx himself recognizes this in his critique of political economy: "We must," he says, "always distinguish between the material transformation in the economic conditions of production of which natural science teaches us, and the legal, political, aesthetic or philosophical, in short, ideological forms in which men become conscious of this conflict and fight it out." This plus element is the glory of humanity, and it is no accident that men who over-emphasize geography and economics so often speak as if human activities were like those of physics, deal with statistics impersonally, and love to describe

human society in terms of the "pack." Human history would indeed be very simple if it were not for human folks. It is always easier to deal with "natural men," "economic men," and "primitive men" than it is with actual people; yet history is made by individuals like ourselves possessing likes and dislikes, wills and character, rather than by these highly specialized persons who, like Eve, have been taken by their academic creators from real persons by the process of abstraction.

(2) In this same connection it can be said that the economic interpretation of history tends to minimize the significance of great men in history. Instead of being partly creators, they are made wholly creatures. The conditions under which they lived begat them, social situations to which they ministered bore them, but the history which came from their ministration to their age and to their social environment is apparently in no need of them. The chief point of interest is how they came into existence, not what they did after they existed. And yet, as I shall undertake to show later, history has really been to no small degree shaped by the individual experiences of men, and great movements have grouped themselves around great personalities. They cannot be ignored if history is to be treated inductively.

(3) There are the ideals to be seen in social customs. These customs, of course, have economic aspects even

though they be such homely matters as trade in fish for Fridays and turkeys for Thanksgiving and evergreens for Christmas; but the faith to which these economic processes minister has shaped the spirit of nations. The memory of the dead Jesus is not born of fish; the goodfellowship of Thanksgiving is not identical with turkey; the annual devotion of the world to generosity and faith in good-will is no kin of forestry.

(4) So, too, racial pride and jealousy are not exclusively economic and geographical, even in origin. The white races have enslaved the black races and controlled the brown and yellow races. Obviously economic motives as well as geographic conditions are to be seen in the accumulation of international loot which makes so large a part of the white man's burden. But the pride of the conqueror, the fear of the slave are human elements in a world situation not to be ignored. So, too, many a nationality figures in history today because of a pride in its language. An exclusively economic study of the Balkan situation, for example, will fail to account for the national passion of the Bohemian, the Serb, the Croatian, the Bulgarian, the Roumanian, and the Greek, because it overlooks the pride of language.¹

(5) Uneconomic passions like those of parental love, adventure, honor, play, and glory, and that extraor-

¹ See Buck, "Language and the Sentiment of Nationality," *Am. Pol. Sci. Review*, x (1916), pp. 44-69.

dinary social force of loyalty to one's leaders and nation all laugh at economic laws if only they once find general self-expression. Here too belongs the principle of imitation which operates so mightily in the construction of social groups.

(6) Aspiration as embodied in art and literature may be conditioned by geographical and economic situations, but it is something more. If human history were merely a matter of wars and rumors of wars, kings and merchants, there would have been no artists and scholars, philosophers or scientists. The modern world would know nothing of music, nothing of pure science, and poets would have given immortality to warriors but never have thought of skylarks, Greek urns or some lost Paradise. To omit from history these strivings after that which is true and beautiful and good is forgetfulness; to reduce them to mere aspects of the economic struggle is brutality.

(7) History abounds with ideals and beliefs which are both moral and religious. It of course is true that morals and religion are social attitudes to no small degree shaped under economic situations, but after they are shaped they operate as independent forces which are not to be neglected by the historian. The Crusades can never be explained by exclusive reference to economic renascence, nor can the wars of religion be debited only to economic readjustments. As Bryce¹ says, "it is

¹ *Relations of the Advanced and Backward Races of Mankind*, p. 22.

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religion which has created that apparently insoluble problem which we call 'the Eastern Question'."

(8) And finally, any materialistic interpretation of history overlooks the fact that conscious motives, no matter what their ultimate origin, come to function in ways quite independent of such origin. That is an empirical fact which forestalls any reply that these data I have mentioned may be traced wholly to economic origins. Even if such a statement were true—and I heartily deny its truth—to attempt to measure vital forces in terms of their origin is to overlook growth in the interest of simple formula; to depersonalize history in the interests of theory. The study of history does more than run humanity to earth. However much social evolution may be due to geographic influences and economic tension, fully developed motives and values are as truly data for the historian as alluvial soil or economic scarcity.

Here, then, because of those personal human elements in history which other interpretations, while recognizing, tend to undervalue or disregard, we see the need of a recognition of spiritual forces. Only let us define our field. It is no all-inclusive monistic interpretation that we venture. We only insist that a process must be treated as "a going concern"; that the discovery of origins is only a partial interpretation. The interpretation of history is as complicated as history itself. There is no single explanation of multiple

forces. It would be as much a mistake to interpret history in terms of spiritual forces alone as to reduce it to any other single formula. Nor should an over-zealous champion of some interpretation seek to cover his tracks by saying that his interpretation, be it economic or spiritual, is only the "more predominant." The only true interpretation of history is an inductive description of actual movements and tendencies within history. The historian must hold himself as impartially to the task of observation as any man of science. If he is to have any working hypothesis it should be a multiple hypothesis,¹ for it may very well be that he will discover that human history is carried along by a variety of forces which are capable of no synthesis this side of metaphysics — and when a historian enters into metaphysics he has gone to a far country from whose bourne he will never return a historian.

V

Within the limits set by such observation, the question as to whether there is room for spiritual interpretation of history is a question of fact. One can ask at the same time whether and how far the economic, geographical, biographical, biological, philosophical, theological, pragmatic, Hegelian, or any other theory of interpretation of history is warranted. If facts

¹ See Chamberlin, "The Method of the Multiple Working Hypothesis," *Journal of Geology*, November, 1897.

permit, they might all live together happily because each is a description of some movement, fact or situation inexplicable by the others. To answer our question, therefore, as to whether a spiritual interpretation of history is possible, we have simply to ask what impression is made by the process of change through which human life not only has passed in the long course of time during which it has been on the earth, but is passing in the present as well. And the answer will not be made by a study of isolated, static facts, or of their origin alone, but by the evidence that what we call history is a genetic, socio-psychological process. Astronomy is no more a study of movement and change than is history a study of a process in which situations are not to be analyzed but seen as dynamic, synthetic units.

But the question of movement inevitably leads to the deeper question of direction and tendency. Not that the historian should assume such a tendency; much less that he should seek to forecast its precise goal. Here is indeed a danger. At the door of every one who believes in the presence of spiritual forces in human life there always crouches the temptation to see a destination, and estimate the progress of human life by sighting across it to this destination. But who of us is wise enough to know the destination of history? We may not with the pessimism which finds such beautiful expression in William Vaughn Moody's

Gloucester Moors, deny a port beyond the mists of the present, but when a historian dogmatizes as to the precise location and organization of a Utopia, he is experimenting as a prophet, and must stand examination as to the source of his inspiration. What we can do and what, in view of the facts already mentioned, we must do is far simpler; namely, patiently watch the forces and the general tendency in history. Therein lies, if not *the* interpretation, *an* interpretation of history. We can understand events only by placing them in the perspective of their origin and their effects. The perspective of process is the outstanding reality of history. In its light we can prophesy at least the general direction of the future.

Thus we can define the limits within which the recognition of spiritual forces in human life will be legitimate: first, after due recognition of physical environments, the tendency of history and of epochs in the large; and second, those changes and tendencies in more restricted fields which are due to forces which are not traceable directly to any economic or impersonal causes. If we analyze this statement, we shall see that it is both negative and positive. Negatively, any spiritual interpretation must arise from the discovery of a tendency in the complicated operation of social evolution to carry men away from dependence on impersonal causes, away from the state of society which they once shared with the animals; and posi-

tively, there must appear tendencies in history which, within the limits set by physical and economic forces, and in accordance with the general direction away from what is mechanistic, economic, and animal set toward that which is personal and ethical. If these tendencies be found, to speak of an economic interpretation of history as "ultimate" is out of the question, although economic situations must be recognized as furnishing origins, motives and occasions of human action. For such tendencies will compel the conclusion that within limits set by the real world within which men live, personal forces operate, and that whatever explanation may be found for individual events, the general process of social evolution is directed from within by spiritual forces toward that which is ever more personal.

The spiritual interpretation of history, accordingly, must be found in the discovery of spiritual forces coöperating with geographic and economic to produce a general tendency toward conditions which are truly personal. And these conditions will not be found in generalizations concerning metaphysical entities such as the older psychologists assumed, but in the activities of worthful individuals finding self-expression in social relations for the ever more complete subjection of physical nature to human welfare.

LECTURE II

SPIRITUAL TENDENCIES IN HISTORY AS A WHOLE

If we are to study history from the point of view of genetic process rather than from that of events or even origins, we must bear in mind that tendencies and directions are to be seen only when consideration is given to long periods of time. The study of events detached from the entire sweep of their relations may give very mistaken explanations. Therein the study of human life differs radically from the study of physical or even biological laws. Heat is produced today as in the dimmest past, and light is what it always has been. In chemistry the actual operations of elements do not need to be traced through the past to see the meaning of an experiment. The combination in certain proportions of an acid and a base always has and always will give a salt. If we had an infinite number of such combinations there could no tendency or process be discovered. But it is otherwise with life. History is not of necessity indifferent to the individual experiments of some single life; it may even undertake to explain how this event rather than another came into existence, but history as history is process as truly

as a mass of events and must be so studied. We are interested not only in points of arrival and departure, but also in the passage from one point to the other. It is quite impossible for us to judge what may be called tendencies and directions in history except by the examination of long periods.

A second characteristic of history is that it is social. We shall later have something to say about the relation of the individual to the course of human events, but history is distinct from biography in that the unit with which the student is engaged is not the individual, but some group, large or small.

The social character of history seems all but self-evident to us, and yet it is among more recently acquired points of view. There have been times when history was regarded as little more than the deeds of great characters like Themistocles and Julius Caesar. There have been other times in which historians have had to deal with generals and armies. We have come now, however, to see that the history of a nation or people is not only complicated in that it is the never-static combination of many forces, but that it constitutes some sort of social unity and cannot be fully understood by simply studying individuals even though they may be heroes worthy of Carlyle. A monistic interpretation of history is impossible because social movements are not reducible to a single force. This fact it is which at present is causing the attention

of scholars to center upon social movements. So far indeed has this gone that there has arisen a sort of modern docetism like that of Drews¹ according to which a Christian movement created Jesus rather than was founded by Jesus.

When we come to combine these two elements of history in the one concept of social progress, the need of extensive rather than intensive observation is apparent. True, such observation runs the perilous risk of rhetorical generalization. The extent of history it covers prevents the minute portrayal of special facts and brief periods. But wide induction of outstanding facts need not of necessity be superficial. At all events he who would really interpret history rather than produce monographs on the details of history must consent to run the risk of being regarded as a sort of cross-section of errant omniscience. And he can plead as his *apologia* that history like an ocean liner needs space if its direction and its rate of progress are to be appreciated.

I

Having thus, I trust, at least partially forestalled the criticism of those who apparently think that history-writing is the production of an infinite number of doctors' theses united by a card catalog, let us consider what may seem to be a wilfully insulting insistence that before the progress of history is interpreted in

¹ *The Christ Myth.*

detail it must be judged as a whole. My excuse for such historical *naïveté* is the danger of not seeing history because of historical investigations. Just as children studying maps more readily see the names of towns than of continents do we easily see events but fail to see history in its perspective. Yet it is through perspective that history is to be interpreted.

1. Even if one does not regard history as the collection and description of static events, in which processes culminate and cease, and looks at events as tension points in a continuous stream of changing human experience, it is by no means unlikely that such a student will take too short a view of the processes he observes. Bishop Usher, as we all know, figured out that creation was completed on a Friday afternoon in 4004 B.C. But if we are really to understand history, we must go back not 4004 years, but scores of thousands of years before Christ. Just how far, in fact, the historian does not know and must needs inquire of the geologist, and to the geologist a thousand years are as a day. Yet if we make proper allowance for geological prodigality in its gift of a prehistoric past, there is no denying that long before humanity produced records, human life was creating history. Nor were these prehistoric people by any means so unimportant as the absence of record might indicate. Just when and where the first reasoning man emerged from the *mêlée* of animal evolution we do not know,

nor is it of importance that we should know. To the scientist, of course, the descent of man is a matter of vital interest, and we may very well mingle gratitude with discrimination as we listen to the attempts to reconstruct history for which there is all but no evidence. For the historian, however, the significance of these early men and women is not to be found in discussing how they are connected with the preceding animal life, but how they are connected with the subsequent human life. To him the ascent of man is of more importance than the descent of man. The beasts of the forest started on a geographic and economic level with man. Why has the history of these fellow denizens of social chaos been so different? The beast is as he was — historyless. Man has made a growing civilization. The measure of this difference is the measure of non-economic, personal forces. Even prehistoric man began to progress.¹ He it was who bequeathed us the fundamental things of our civilization. His real significance lay not in what originated him, but in what he originated. Mankind was what it was becoming. It is sobering to compare even our most amazing inventions with those elemental discoveries upon which our life depends, but of whose originator we have no record. What early Edison discovered that fire would ward off cold? What Mary Lyon discovered that children could be taught? What

¹ Osborn, *Men of the Old Stone Age*.

primitive Madame Curie discovered that heat made raw flesh more digestible and that yeast would make a mixture of pounded grains and water more palatable? What man — or woman — first of all living beings on the earth sought to get personal help from that outer world upon which life was seen dependent, and thus gave the world religion? Certainly it is too heavy a draft upon our imagination to think that human beings were taught the various elements of civilization by animals, even though the animals did and still do some things not unlike habits built into our social evolution. Yet the foxes still have holes and the birds of the air their nests, but the sons of men have built themselves cities.

When one proceeds to compare the modern world with that of his ancient ancestors who hovered along the edge of the great ice cap, leaving no trace of themselves except an occasional chipped rock or a bone or two, the differences are startling. In their day as in ours, the frost, rain, snow, and the hail mellowed the soil; the humble earth-worm built up the tillable lands; birds scattered the seeds of plants; animals gorged and slept and gorged again.

In a word, physical nature as a whole was essentially the same then as now. But who can picture the brutality, the nakedness, the savagery of these early humans? Yet the vast distance which separates humanity of our day from these prehistoric times is a

denial that history is ultimately determined by physical forces alone. If mankind had possessed no spiritual energy, we should still be following the ways of Ab the Caveman. But the caveman refused to remain the caveman and became "primitive."

If, as must be confessed, what has just been said is based more upon conjecture than upon positive data, our conclusions are more defensible as we pass into the stage of human experience revealed in recent studies of primitive customs. Anthropological investigations enable us to estimate more certainly the difference between our modern civilization and that of existing primitive peoples. These peoples as they now exist are, as Thomas says, cases of arrested social development. No one knows how many centuries or millenia may lie back even of the civilization of the Black Fellow of Australia. Barring superficial differences, humanity remains physically about the same the world over. The widespread study of these primitive people makes it appear that human progress tends to become standardized. In the same conditions, different races arrive at much the same state of mind relative to totems, the dead, magic, women, and the physical mysteries of birth and puberty. Most of the resulting customs have been furnished by speculation with economic or geographic ancestry, but even if we were to grant that all of the hypothetical origins were exactly as some anthropologist might state — and his

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fellow-anthropologists be pretty apt to question — we should still face the epochal fact that some of these primitive folk did not stay primitive. Within the period of traceable human history upon the earth — say the few thousand years that have elapsed since the days of the lake dweller in Switzerland — human nature has accomplished what it has accomplished and is ever more rapidly accomplishing. Evidently primitive man must have been something more than a mere machine responding to physical forces and conditions. Nature and animals are today essentially as ten thousand years ago. Man has changed.

If one asks how this plus element in humanity came to bring about such results, the answer is to be found not in academic speculation, but in the actual study of the process itself, as it has developed in physical conditions. We find, first of all, that humanity has always been social but that the geographic element has had a distinct influence upon the shaping up of social customs. Contrast, for example, the life of the Eskimo and the Hottentot. This geographical environment has worked in human nature through its effects upon the food supply, water, forage, climate and other physical conditions which made the economic life of one sort more successful than another.

Out from these physical conditions emerged economic tension, — but only with men. Primitive man and woman soon became superior to the animals with

whom their ancestors apparently started on equal geographic terms. And for this reason: the economic tensions resulting from the scarcity set by physical nature were neither merely economic nor geographic, but personal as well. Animals have only analogies to true economic problems. Group antagonisms made men more reflective and purposeful. Out from the midst of the resulting primitive societies emerged groups possessed of peculiar intellectual ability to use nature as in tilling the soil or to get the better of other people through the barter. Thus there developed still other groups of interests, centering about the control of the agents of economic production. When this stage was reached humanity began its more recent history. The processes of production and consumption became more complicated. Tribal wars remade the original groups. The enemy who was captured was no longer killed, but put to work. Groups intermarried. Women were respected as those who assured the tribe new members and furnished it vegetables as the men furnished it meat. Civilization was at hand.

It will be granted, I think, that in this rapid sketch of the inception of our modern world I have given weight to economic and geographic conditions. I do not see how any man who calls himself an economic or materialistic interpreter of history could fairly find fault with this recognition of anthropological and economic facts. And yet these formulas leave obscure

the one element in these successive situations which made this progress possible; and that is the emergence of non-economic interests and non-economic psychical forces. Human personality has been not a passive but an outstandingly creative co-factor in these changes.

So important a fact as this will bear consideration. As soon as we begin to trace the actual operations of human personality we find that it regarded itself to a very considerable extent creative and farthest possible from passive under the stress of the economic and geographic elements in some situation. It substituted final causes for nervous reactions. Survival values began to control the use of physical environment. Religion began to shape itself and to cast its own independent force into social evolution either by way of initiative or inhibition. Pride of language, of paternity, group loyalty developed. Humanity began the conquest of nature and asserted itself in ways which no person living in an earlier age could have foreseen. Which of its members could have expected that within primitive society lay the university, the poet, and the mass of culture which we take as a matter of course? Who could have forecast from the ways of primitive man that rational planning would replace custom, that the family would cease to be the economic social unit and be replaced by the relations of individuals; that elaborate social organization would mediate between nature and human needs; that there

should appear an altruism in which men look upon the needs of others as well as upon their own, caring for the unfit as well as the fit; that men should come to see in social solidarity something more than an opportunity for economic advantage; that men should come to believe in a Father Almighty, maker of heaven and earth? The painter before his canvas, the musician drawing harmonies from his instrument, the architect building his dreams into cathedral and palace, the philosopher seeking ultimate truth, the saint worshipping his God, the scientist challenging nature in his experiments, whatever may have been the occasion of their devotion, have only to be compared with the maker of arrowheads, the beater of tom-toms, the carver of totem poles, the master of initiations, the guardian of the tribal fire, and the dancing medicine man, to show clearly that man has developed in the realm of the spirit.

II

The evaluation of history as a whole in such a sweeping fashion as this which we have adopted, is of course open to the criticism of being a revel in generalities. Yet it may be controlled by applying a similar method of interpretation to special epochs. The chief caution to be observed in such procedure is twofold: "We must not," to use the words of Harnack,¹ "let

¹ *History of Dogma*, I, 33.

the wish to understand history check the effort to obtain a true knowledge of it"; and we should avoid selecting epochs where data are few, the process of development is obscure and interpretation is consequently liable to subjective influences. There are, however, many epochs sufficiently homogeneous and rapid to be free from such temptations. Let us consider the Greek world, the rise of Christianity, and the Reformation. Each of these periods has of late been more or less "ultimately" interpreted from the economic point of view.

i. Greek history lacks political unity. Yet the Greek cities on the Asia Minor coast, in Greece proper, and in the Greek colonies present a tolerably uniform character. One would never mistake a Greek colony for a Venetian. These traits which tend to appear thus universally have been and may properly be said to imply geographic conditions. Few Greeks were born far distant from the sea, and their rugged land, beautiful as it is, was never adapted to general agriculture, while its location and its numerous harbors constantly suggested over-sea commerce. Strabo long ago referred many of the characteristics of his native country to the effect of geographic isolation and climate, and later studies have served to confirm his judgment. Had Greece possessed great rivers and alluvial soil, the history of Greek culture might have been something very different from that which we

possess. If it had had less coast line, it would probably have developed a greater political unity and a capacity for foreign conquest through huge military establishments which nations of broad river valleys have frequently shown. But Greece, while not strictly an island, had much the experience of island communities. The fact that it was mountainous made it a group as it were of geographical compartments within which were little independent states which united temporarily for common defense or as subjects of Macedonia and Rome, but never for the purpose of developing a genuine Greek state.

This recognition of geographic forces at work in Greek¹ history must be supplemented by a recognition of the economic. Greece developed commercially and thus accumulated the means on which the arts could thrive. Situated between the Orient and Europe with colonies both in the East and the West, the Greeks found whatever unity they possessed beyond short-lived hegemonies and leagues in commerce. Whether or not it be historical scandal, the money with which Pericles adorned the Acropolis is said to have been gathered for the purpose of waging a war against Sparta for the preservation of Athenian supremacy among the Greek cities and islands. If this were the case, it is a sort of parable of Greek

¹ For more unqualified statement of geographic influence, see the words of Grant Allen, quoted on p. 14 above.

history, for the Greeks — the middlemen of the ancient world — bequeathed to the world no great example of statecraft, but ideals which, like the Parthenon, give their civilization its real position in human history.

Another parable, if Gilbert Murray's conjectures be correct, may be seen in the development of the Greek religion.¹

The three great festivals of Greece, according to this view, were originally without the presence of the gods of Olympus and centered around sacred animals,— the Diasia about the snake, the Thesmophoria the pig and Anthesteria the bull. In the two latter festivals there is the suggestion of an economic origin. This is not altogether a mistaken conjecture if both pig and bull represented physical forces of reproduction; for the early Greeks certainly wished harvests and increase in their herds. But such an interpretation at best is only partially in accord with facts. Elemental customs may have made a sacramental feast a means by which

¹ See especially Farnell, *The Cults of the Greek States*, *The Evolution of Religion*, *The Higher Phases of Greek Religion*; Murray, *The Four Stages of Greek Religion*; Harrison, *Prolegomena to the Study of Greek Religion*, and *Themis*. In the opinion of some leading students of Greek religion, the latter three books are too quick to give weight to the hypotheses of Durkheim as to totemism, and too prone to interpret actual Greek literature from this point of view. Professor Murray's interpretation of Plato is called in question and the accuracy of his quotations challenged, while Miss Harrison's views are even less accepted. A characteristically thorough and scholarly discussion of the views concerning the pre-literary religion of Greece will be found in the last edition of E. Meyer's *Weltgeschichte*, vol. iii.

the worshipper gained the *mana*, the vital power of the animal. Be that as it may, such festivals were elevated by the introduction of the higher gods and goddesses of later days. From Homer onward the advance is to be seen from a religion possibly phallic to one that is less passional, cleaner, warlike in the heroic sense, looking to inner freedom.

Whether or not this presentation of early Greek religion will ultimately be adopted by the proper authorities, the tendencies from Homer onward can easily be seen by a study of Plato's views as to the deity, and, in particular, his idealization of Socrates who had raised Greek religious thinking from the skepticism born of the intellectualism of the Sophists. From Socrates on through Plato and the Stoics there is a growing tendency to make philosophy into a religion superior to, although not explicitly supplanting, the anthropomorphism of Homer. That such a religious mood should have tended in the later imperial days toward agnosticism on the one hand and towards Asiatic mysteries and the mysticism of Neo-Platonism on the other, is not strange. The Greek spirit had mounted above the control of physical forces and economic interests.

Similarly when we approach Greek life from the point of view of social life in general. With its helots and slaves the democracy of Greece seems at the best imperfect. It may have arisen with the development

of economic classes, but the pride of citizenship which marked Greeks of the best days was something more than that of wealth. It was a pride in intellectual leadership, in supremacy in the arts, in the drama, and in philosophy. Even when the Greek succumbed to Roman power he still endeavored to think into the mysteries of existence, and out from the ruins of the Greek democracy as from the stump of a fallen tree, there sprang numerous branches of educational and idealistic interests.

Whoever studies the course of Greek civilization as a whole is impressed with the fact that other forces than economic are to be credited with its achievements. After one has recognized the influence of geography and commerce, there still remains the Greek soul. Men like Socrates, Plato and Aristotle, Aeschylus, Sophocles and Euripides, Pericles and Demosthenes did as much for Athens as Athens did for them. The Greek spirit was not passive, shaped by the forces in which it exerted itself and by which it was stimulated to self-expression. However evoked, it contributed itself to the social evolution. Philosophy, ethical idealism, political and scientific theory, logic, the drama, music, painting, sculpture, architecture: all these the world has come to recognize as the gift of the Greek spirit. It is predilection for doctrinaire precision which would seek, consciously or with neglected concessions, to reduce this fruitage of the inner life to

the economic circumstances which made such life possible. In interpreting Greek history, the historian asks no favor of the economist, but he at least demands that all of the historical factors, personal as well as impersonal, shall be recognized in an interpretation of the marvellous folk who have given us so many of the standards of our modern life. And especially does he demand that the tendency of Greek culture toward the things of the spirit be duly weighed.¹

2. It is almost a mark of sophistication nowadays to find the origin of Christianity either in some form of mystery religion or in the struggle of proletarians for recognition. With regard to the first of these two objects of interest, I do not care to speak beyond expressing my conviction that whatever may have been the rôle of Mithra and Isis in the second century, little more than highly conventional and unimportant connection has been shown between these mystery religions and the origin of Christianity. For the latter we must look to Judaism and Jesus.²

That Christianity began as a class struggle born of economic inequalities³ is, if possible, even more open

¹ Eucken in his *Problem of Human Life*, pt. 1, has traced this spiritual tendency.

² See Kennedy, *St. Paul and the Mystery Religions*; Case, *Evolution of Early Christianity*. More radical views will be found in Reitzenstein, *Poimandres*; *Die hellenistischen Mysterienreligionen*. Cumont is more cautious. Cf. *Les religions orientales dans le paganisme romain*.

³ See Kautsky, *Geschichte des Socialismus in Einzelendarstellungen*

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to skepticism. Undoubtedly there are facts in the Christian movement during the first and second centuries which lend the color of probability to the theory. Christianity made a strong appeal to those classes who had few economic and social rights in the Roman Empire. Judea was a subject nation, dominated by an Empire in which the privileges of capital were well integrated with political power and this Empire rested upon the industry of a vast slave population, to whom the message of a coming kingdom was indeed a gospel. The various *collegia* with their esoteric practice of fraternity by slaves, freedmen, and citizens of all classes, undoubtedly had distinct influence on the formation of Christian communities. It is very likely that some of their customs were embodied in the practices of the church. But to think of the Christian movement as a proletarian restlessness in search of economic equality and democracy only to be brought again under the control of a new aristocracy, the priesthood, is to misrepresent ascertainable facts.¹

i, pp. 16–40; Kalthoff, *Die Entstehung des Christentums*. A popular but not thoroughly historical presentation of this view is given by Bouck White, *The Carpenter of Nazareth*.

¹ It is a mistake in view of our present knowledge of Roman Christians to think of the churches as essentially proletarian. Even Paul's description of the Corinthian church (1 Cor. 1: 26–28) implies that others than the poor were among the adherents of the new faith. See for interesting details, Orr, *Neglected Factors in the Study of the Early Progress of Christianity*. See also Harnack, *The Expansion of Christianity*.

To understand the Christian movement one must see it as related to the stream of Jewish life which shaped a new ethnic epoch in the first quarter of the second century before Christ. Economic forces as well as geographic were evidently at work in Hebrew history, for the location of the country between trading military states on the north and Egypt on the south as well as between the sea and the desert inevitably made it the isthmus, as it were, of near-Eastern history. The Jewish people had been a shuttle-cock between its mighty neighbors on the north and south and the economic condition of Jewish life had grown desperate. The spread of Hellenism alienated the relatively few persons of property from the farmers and shepherds who lived on the hills where once their nation had built its towns and cities. The resulting struggle between these classes reached its culmination in the revolt of the Maccabees and the consequent establishment of a city-state which for a few years maintained a semblance of national integrity with Jerusalem as its capital. But Palestine long before the time of Christ had been incapable of supporting all the Jews, and the stress of economic need had scattered enormous numbers of Jews throughout the entire world. On the whole, these Jews of the Dispersion sympathized with the less privileged classes of Palestine and constituted a body of men and women possessed of much the same social mind and enriched

with the same national ideals as those of the common people and the Pharisees in Palestine. The great hope of divine deliverance which nourished them sprang from the economic and political situation into which foreign nations had forced them. The Jew believed that economic and political repression were to be replaced by wealth and world-wide sovereignty. Jehovah would once more establish his nation in even more prosperity and power than was known to Solomon in all his glory. Such a consummation would be impossible without miracles and the Jew did not hesitate to expect miracles. A redeemed nation at the head of a conquered world, giving laws to those who had abused them, seeing all its enemies cast down into hell while all its dead fellow-citizens were recalled from Sheol to enjoy the new epoch — this was the hope which blazed out in the Apocalypses and Zealotism and upheld the Jews everywhere.¹ If this hope

¹ On the Jewish messianic hope see Drummond, *The Jewish Messiah*; Mathews, *The Messianic Hope in the New Testament*, pt. I; Schweitzer, *Das Messianitäts- und Leidensgeheimnis; The Quest of the Historical Jesus*, ch. xix; Wrede, *Das Messiasgeheimnis in den Evangelien*; Baldensperger, *Die messianisch-apokalyptischen Hoffnungen des Judentums*; Charles, *Eschatology, Hebrew, Jewish and Christian*; Bousset, *Anti-Christ*. The actual feeling of the non-political messianists was genuinely social as well as religious. The *Book of Enoch* is the most complete presentation of this attitude of mind, but see also the *Apocalypse of Baruch*, iv Esdras, and the *Psalms of Solomon*. Josephus is also of great value in estimating messianic expectations among the Jews, although allowance must be made for his friendliness.

were to pass into the hands of those who, in addition to being nationally depressed and restrained, belonged to an economic underclass,¹ it might easily lead to proletarian agitation; but this, so far as we know in the entire history of the Christian or non-Jewish Messianic movement which spread through the Jews out to the Roman Empire never occurred. There is not an intimation of economic radicalism in the letters of Paul.² When the apologists catalog the charges which were brought against the new religion, they never refer to its being a source of economic disorders, but on the contrary plead that they are good artisans, tax-payers, even members of the imperial army.³ It is

toward Roman authority. I have endeavored to sketch the development of the Jewish state in New Testament times in my *History of New Testament Times in Palestine*. The great authority is Schürer, *Geschichte des jüdischen Volkes im Zeitalter Jesu Christi*. Also in English translation of earlier edition, *The Jewish People in the Times of Jesus Christ*.

¹ As seen, for instance, in the Zealot movement with its attack upon the capitalist and aristocratic classes in Jerusalem in the early stages of the revolt of A.D. 66. See Josephus, *Jewish War*, ii, 17: 6, 9; iv, 5; 3: 6-8; 5: 5; 6:1.

² The practical problems of social life, such as marriage, civic duties, employment, customs, were treated by Paul from the point of view of the approaching return of Jesus and the end of the present world-order. How far his teachings were from those of a "reformer" I have endeavored to show in *The Messianic Hope in the New Testament*, 163-223. See also Kennedy, *St. Paul's Conception of the Last Things*; Wernle, *Beginnings of Christianity*, i, ch. 13.

³ Cf. the apologies of Justin Martyr, Aristides, Melito and the *Letter to Diognetus*. Augustine's argument in his *City of God* repre-

these elemental facts rather than theories with which the interpreter of early Christianity must deal. The early Christians were not concerned with labor reform or any other sort of reform.¹ They believed the world was coming to an end and that in the new kingdom which was to be established they would sit on thrones judging angels. Economic and political distress had long before Christ led the Jews to distrust their own abilities and to rely wholly upon God, and when the new faith and hope of the coming deliverance through Jesus the Messiah, was organized, it was fundamentally transcendental. By the time it became one of the world movements throughout the Roman Empire it was recognized by its adherents as neither political nor economic, but that thing which so many

sents a later phase of apologetic but is equally free from any attempt to defend Christianity from revolutionary economic tendencies. Wernle, *Beginnings of Christianity*, ii, chs. 7, 13, 15, treats this matter at length. See also Glover, *The Struggle between Religions in the Roman Empire*. A classical illustration of the Christian attitude to social life will be found in Clement of Alexandria, *Pedagogue*.

¹ That is, of course, reform in the modern sense of the word. The early Christian writers, notably Clement of Alexandria and Tertullian, abound in exhortations to individuals to avoid the sinful customs of pagan society. Ambrose and Chrysostom are the outstanding exceptions to this non-social attitude. Each of them attempts to apply Christian principles to economic life. But they represent Christianity after it had become the religion of the state and had fixed authoritative limits to doctrinal speculation through dogma. For a sketch of the ethical attitude of the early church see Hall, *The History of Christian Ethics*, chs. 3 and 4.

"materialist" interpreters of history fail to estimate justly, a supernatural religion. And it was¹ as a religion avowedly supernatural that Christianity moved out into history and wrought its changes. Here again it is possible to see a spiritual tendency as a social movement breaks away from the conditions which give it rise and becomes on its own account an independent cause.²

3. The Protestant Reformation is an epoch for which just now an economic interpretation is being sought.³ Ever since the Crusades there had been a rapid development of commerce and manufacture. This tended to give rise to commercial cities and to those first accumulations of wealth which lie beneath our modern capitalistic system. Men began to use money as a commodity and interest was distinguished from usury. Thus there gradually developed what

¹ Sohm, *Outlines of Church History*, p. 11, states the matter precisely: "To the Christian the Highest was, before all, *not of this world*, for his longing was fixed upon a better." See also, his acute estimate (p. 15) of the motive of the persecution of the Christians as those who were disloyal in *thought* rather than in *deed*.

² Professor Royce in *The Problem of Christianity* presents an interesting psychological study of Paul, making his faith center about loyalty to the Beloved Community. The Pauline Epistles seem rather to make this loyalty bind Paul to a Beloved Lord. The supernatural rather than social element is basal with him.

³ Here socialist writers are, as might be expected, most in evidence. See Bax, *German Society at the Close of the Middle Ages*; *The Peasants' War*; *The Anabaptists*; Kautsky, *Communism in Central Europe in the Time of the Reformation*.

might be called a new but untitled aristocracy with far more wealth and consequent power than the feudal aristocracy of the knights. This new commercial group found itself opposed to some extent by the church in its preaching, but even more because of economic rivalry; for the church was the great capitalist of Europe. It was not only possessed of enormous endowments and landed estates, all exempted from ordinary taxation, but many of the clergy began to enter into some forms of trade even becoming innkeepers to the scandal of their competitors. The princes of the empire and the highest ranks of the old aristocracy had still sufficient power to deal effectively with the new economic conditions, but the peasants and the knights were suffering. The peasants were forced into the very depths of poverty; the knights grew landless and otherwise impoverished while the church was forced to pronounce its blessing upon capitalism. Further, these Germans of all classes disliked to see a continuous stream of gold setting from Germany to Rome, particularly as German towns in the sixteenth century had become relatively rich because of manufactures and commerce.¹

¹ Germany was at the same time passing through a period of legal confusion because of the attempt to supplant the original German law, which was to a very considerable extent unwritten and uncodified, by the Justinian Code. This attempt was to the benefit of the great princes, but it subjected the people to a serious loss. To the common man the lawyer became as much a beast as the robber knights. In

Such over-emphasis of the economic origin of the Reformation knows of Martin Luther, but he becomes about as important as a modern college professor in the socialist party. The economic situation is the one emphasized and the spiritual ferment and particularly

fact to Sebastian Brant in his satire *The Ship of Fools* the lawyer seems to have been in a more despicable state than the robber knight for at least the robber knight exposed his body to the storm. "The other hides behind his ink-well." See Vedder, *The Reformation in Germany*, Introduction (not extreme) and the review by Harvey, *American Journal of Theology*, (1915), p. 129. Harvey in his article "Economic Self-Interest in the German Anti-Clericalism of the Fifteenth and Sixteenth Centuries" (*American Journal of Theology*, xix (1915), pp. 509-528) cites the following as among the sources of the economic causes for hostility to the clergy: compulsory tithing, rents, services, death taxes, fees for religious services such as baptism, masses, extreme unction, burial, surplice fees, voluntary contributions insisted on at intervals, purchase of candles, widespread begging on the part of the monks and nuns in addition to the friars, the endowment of anniversaries and similar services for the dead, charges in connection with relieving souls from purgatory, the indebtedness of many to ecclesiastical foundations which charged interest notwithstanding usury was forbidden by the canon law. This article by Professor Harvey should be read by all those who wish to get in touch with a mass of information seldom mentioned in general histories. Harvey, however, refuses to conclude that the Protestant Revolt was essentially an economic movement. "It is more sane," he says, "and more in accord with all the facts, to affirm merely that the economic factor was much more widely and generally operative in the success of Protestantism than historians have, heretofore, been able or willing to concede." On the relation of Calvinism and Capitalism see Engels, *Der deutsche Bauernkrieg*, and especially Weber, *Archiv für Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik*, xx, xxi, xxx "Protestantische Ethik und der 'Geist' des Kapitalismus"; and the criticism by Troeltsch, *Die Soziallehren der Christlichen Kirchen und Gruppen*, i, 607-794.

the theological ferment tend to be regarded as incidental. Luther becomes the product of German bourgeois unrest, Calvin the child (or father) of Capitalism, and Protestantism the belief of dolichocephalic men.¹

When one studies the documents of the Middle Ages as found in the great collections, it is at once apparent that however important were the economic forces in establishing conditions by which the church was so largely shaped, long before the Reformation there were constantly emerging not only among the ecclesiastics but among the masses, motives and ideas which are distinctly non-economic. The church could not of course escape from an economic world, but it did the best it could to prevent economic as well as political forces from becoming supreme in civilization.² Protestant historians have perhaps given a relatively too prominent position to Luther, and it is still very difficult to make the average man believe that the Reformation did not give everybody religious liberty — the one thing above all others which the Reformation did not give. It must be admitted also that the economic forces at work to produce the storm and stress of the sixteenth century have been overlooked by the older historians of the Reformation. But after one has made all of these concessions — and for my

¹ Taylor, *Origin of the Aryans*, pp. 247-249.

² See for instance the efforts of Puritanism in Cunningham, *The Moral Influence of the Church on the Investment of Money and the Use of Wealth*.

part I am in genuine sympathy with those who would recognize the influence of these economic conditions to which I have referred — there yet remains the mass of historical material which shows that the Reformation movement, imperfect and full of bitter social antagonisms as it was, lacking though it did any true sense of religious tolerance and destined to plunge itself into the protestant scholasticism of the seventeenth century, was none the less marked by religious hopes as well as nationalistic aspirations. He who would interpret the Reformation must know something of theology. He must be able to sound the depths of passion which lies in such words as "sacramentarian", "crypto-Calvinist", "good works", and which blazed forth in the Anabaptists, those democrats born out of season. It is hard for the historian who has always fought shy of religion and of the church to understand these formulas. Therefore he is tempted to ignore them or give them a condescending foot-note in his scheme of economic forces. But in the same proportion as he yields to this temptation is he a poor historian, for they represent some of the driving forces which actually shaped up modern Europe. If it had not been for the religious convictions of these seventeenth century leaders, history would have taken a very different turn. We might never have had the Dutch Republic, the Puritan Commonwealth, the colony of Massachusetts Bay, the Social Contract, the

French Revolution, or the Hohenzollerns in Prussia. Really to understand history, one must see that this Reformation movement, which to such a large extent rooted itself in the economic conditions of Europe, really got its fighting idealism from religion. Imperfect as that religion was both within and without the Roman Catholic Church, it was far better in its human appeal, in its recognition of moral values and its sense of the Divine presence than any the Middle Ages had known. Luther, Melanchthon, Farel, Calvin, Sir Thomas More, Cranmer and William of Orange were not driven solely or chiefly by economic motives but by that inner spirit of life which was springing up in all Europe and which gave to what otherwise would have been mere political and economic revolution a moral grandeur which still makes the period an inspiration for our day.

III

Facts such as these, gained by a consideration of the process of history either in whole or in great epochs, have had their influence upon the supporters of the economic interpretation of history themselves. I have already quoted Engels' statement regarding the over-emphasis laid by himself and Marx upon the economic factors in history. To this should be added his words in a letter written in 1895.

"According to the materialistic view of history the factor which is *in last instance* decisive in history is the production and reproduction of actual life. More than this neither Marx nor I have ever asserted. But when any one distorts this so as to read that the economic factor is the sole element, he converts the statement into a meaningless, abstract, absurd phrase. The economic condition is the basis, but the various elements of the superstructure — the political forms of the class contests, and their results, the constitutions — the legal forms, and also all the reflexes of these actual contests in the brains of the participants, the political, legal, philosophical theories, the religious views . . . — all these exert an influence on the development of the historical struggles, and in many instances determine their form."

Nietzsche objects strenuously to the belief that "all human actions and impulses are subordinate to the process of the material world that works unnoticed powerfully and irresistibly," and has emphasized in his own characteristic fashion the futility of the conception of history as a mere series of causes from which one may generalize. In this he certainly touches upon a mistake in method into which socialists have fallen in their use of history. Although working for the welfare of mankind they have too often shackled human progress by a materialistic reading of the past. The emphasis put by all economic historians upon the

matter of origins as well as the supremacy of production is in itself an indication of a failure to look upon human life as essentially human. The proper approach to an understanding of the economic elements of history is through the consideration of the problems of consumption. It is the wants of men that bring progress and wants are not to be identified with their occasion or even with forces from which they grow.

This fact is becoming more generally recognized even among those who would magnify the economic elements in history. Professor Ross says truly "Nothing can rescue us from one-sided theories save a knowledge of human wants and a recognition of the great variety of the springs that incite men to action."¹ Discontent with existing conditions is the source of many of these wants, and discontent is something more than a hunger for bread and circus. It involves the desire for justice and the recognition of human rights. Powerful as these conceptions are they are too frequently minimized. And is it not a striking fact that these wants (like pessimism) are often in disproportion to economic advantages? It is as men taste the good things of life that they particularly realize the injustice in others' privileges, which, because hitherto regarded as inviolable, have become rights. And this induced feeling is certainly not to be identified with the desires for better economic conditions by which it is occasioned. It is just as truly a spiritual hunger.

¹ *Foundations of Sociology*, p. 181.

Furthermore, consumption is something that can be controlled by idealistic legislation, as is illustrated by prohibition in America and in Russia. Economic wants are always being determined by non-economic ideals furnished by the school, the state, and the church. This too is recognized in the newer type of socialist thought which is breaking away somewhat from the materialistic orthodoxy attributed to Marx. With it the economic interpretation of history is secondary to a view of the life process which strives vigorously to find pragmatism rather than history in the writings of both Marx and Engels. Professor Urwick¹ has admirably said, "We conceive of the social process as a constant push and pull of diverse factors, all related to one another as factors in a single movement directed to *some* end, which though always indefinite, we are nevertheless compelled to regard as a moral end." Teleology, however, must not be too precise. It is the sense of direction that gives the *élan vital*, to use Bergson's almost too happy term, its spiritual value. So much we can see clearly and positively. Further we must "faintly trust the larger hope" thrust upon us by the process of human social life.

In the end doubts will be laid and rival interpretations will be determined by the perspective of those genetic changes within the psychical as well as the outward life of humanity which constitute history.

¹ *A Philosophy of Social Progress*, p. 213.

As we stand on the bow of some great steamer hurtling itself across a trackless ocean, we feel only the rush of change, the toss of waves and the buffeting of winds. But as we stand on the stern of the vessel we see the wake, boiling out even as we watch, stretch unswervingly behind us. Then we know that we are held to a course. We cannot see our port, but we know we are going some-whither because we have come some-whence.

The past is the wake of history, the argument for direction, the prophecy of an equally rational tendency **in the future.**

LECTURE III

THE SUBSTITUTION OF MORAL FOR PHYSICAL CONTROL

IN the preceding lecture it was argued that the general movement of history whether viewed as a whole or in some of its chief epochs is away from the less personal forms of life in which the action of men is directly determined by the geographic and economic conditions under which they live. We know that humanity has left its earliest harbors. Can we tell the direction of its voyage? In reply we will consider certain data which suggest direction rather than origins.

By direction I do not mean a miraculous control by God just as Augustine taught, or the strict teleology of Herrmann, or the *Weltgeist* of Hegel. It will be necessary later to recur to this topic and consider how far the fact of process from the less to the more personal conditions may be held to evince the presence of a supreme Reason in social evolution. In the present and the two succeeding lectures I wish to examine three inductions which rise from the study of social evolution. These I would express in a threefold thesis; namely, the course of social evolution tends to set from materialistic

situations toward (1) the substitution of the authority of inner sanctions and inhibitions for appeal to force; (2) the increasing appreciation of the personal worth of the individual; and (3) the transformation of the fight for rights into a giving of justice. If these inductions are legitimate there is discernible in history a basis for interpreting social development as a passage not only from the simpler to the more complex form of social organization, but also from occasion and control by impersonal forces and economic wants to the spiritual freedom which lies in inner self-direction toward spiritual ends.

In the present lecture we consider the first of these three inductions: the substitution of the authority of inner sanctions and inhibitions for that of outward force.

I

If one moves up the current of history, it is amazing how every tributary and even the main current itself lead the investigator into the region of force. Whether or not, as the great disbeliever of Rome insisted, fear made the gods, it can hardly have failed to make social customs. "Spare the rod and spoil the child" is an educational apothegm now decidedly out of favor, but at one time it was the domestic epitome of social control. Primitive society abounds in brutalities which are both purposeful and merely customary, but even

the habits of primitive peoples must mark an advance over those of prehistoric persons who, first of their race, defended self, property, and child against attack, and made the physically less vigorous, servants or wives. The "blonde beast" of Nietzsche ruled his weaker brethren until by combination they ruled him by force.

Down through the really historic ages, reliance upon force has always persisted. One has only to look at the monuments of Egypt, the tablets of the Assyrians, the arches of the Roman Forum, the Arc de Triomphe in Paris, the victory monuments of London and Berlin, to see how often political power has rested ultimately upon the ability to conquer and hold in subjection other nations. "I tell you," says Thrasymachus in the *Republic*, "justice is simply the advantage of the stronger."¹ The kaleidoscopic changes of history in the Near East from the days of Alexander the Great to those of Mahomet were due largely to the fact that both by temperament and by history the nations of that part of the world were untrained to support a social order which was not enforced by the soldier—a lack of education manifest today more tragically than ever. Rome, it is true, went far in the development of peaceable social control, but when Rome succumbed to bad economic policy, political ineptitude, and Teutonic restlessness, Europe again reverted to a social

¹ Plato, *Republic*, (Jowett's trans.) I, iii, 15.

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order perilously near that of the time from which the “undifferentiated Aryan brain”, to use again Grant Allen’s term, had emerged.

But this is by no means all of the story. The history of these same countries is also a commentary upon the futility of all efforts to base politics permanently upon external force. Not one of the military empires of antiquity exists today, though unwarlike China still flourishes despite its incoherent politics.

From the point of view of logic, it might indeed appear that national energy and order can be built up by establishing an attitude of fear. This is the real essence of the “will to power” about which so many radicals swarm. This was the desperate program of the doctrinaire mediocrities of the Convention in France during the year 1793-4. And it must be admitted that terror is effective as a momentary incentive. When once the Convention had voted “terror was to be the order of the day,”¹ a new efficiency immediately appeared. Assailed by practically an entire continent in arms, with its best general gone over to the enemy, its armies defeated, its monetary system based upon an all but valueless paper, its king and queen conspiring with *émigré* nobles who wished to retake their lost privileges and, supported by foreign armies, sought to punish the new state, with provinces in revolt and traitors suspected on every street corner,

¹ The motion was made by Barère, September 5, 1793.

France was certainly at the very point of disintegration. The Reign of Terror was not only a genuine political experiment, a "despotism of liberty" as Marat said; it brought France back to national health. But permanent government could not be built upon it. Human nature in France triumphed over force. The collapse of the Terror and the Terrorists was an indication of returning national stability and sanity. The nation was not only renewed economically by the distribution of the church lands and inspired by the unaccustomed pride of proprietorship in government, it was also possessed of a new spirit. The Reign of Terror in a few months had furnished¹ the *reductio ad absurdum* of direct action in politics. Robespierre and his fellow philosophical terrorists served humanity well; for they showed the fallacy of the theory that the ultimate basis of society is fear. It was the *Code Napoléon* with its recognition of coöperative citizenship and not the Terror that became the model for European states. Law is indeed something more than codified fear.

¹ I have discussed the political significance of the Reign of Terror in *The French Revolution*, chs. 16-18. Stephens, *The French Revolution*, II, chs. 9, 10 has a much fuller treatment with references to literature. The great authority is Mortimer-Ternaux, *La Terreur*. See also Hamel, *Histoire de Robespierre*; and the works of Aulard.

II

Let us look in more detail at the general course of this developing social control as it moves away from reliance upon physical force toward inner self-control.

Social history may be said to begin with the rise of social customs. Human society is doubtless genetically joined with that of animals, but at the outset the human was distinguished from the animal group by language and thought; and these in turn may be traced back to the original differences between men and beasts in power of mental associations. This mental capacity of the new race soon expressed itself in the development of customs which made the life of groups more possible and purposeful.¹ The various members of social groups fell into ways of action which became fixed and were inherited as social habits. Just how these habits grew up it is impossible to say; but in their development, so far as can be observed in the most primitive existing social life, that of the aboriginal Australians and the negroes of Africa, imitation had no small share. Like language and thought this principle tended to perpetuate efficient activities by extending them from neighbor to neighbor.

¹ Arthur J. Balfour has a brief but admirable discussion of the difference between animal and human morality in *Theism and Humanism*, p. 108 sq. A more elaborate discussion of the animal basis of morality may be found in Sutherland, *The Origin and Growth of the Moral Instinct*.

bor, from father to son, from old men to those being initiated into the status of manhood, until the question of their origin was no longer raised and men performed them simply because they were ancient.

The individual as a part of society became subject to these customs, and independence toward which individuality tends was restrained by folkways. The economic situations into which rival groups were brought laid special limitations on the individual, who in the very nature of the case became a sort of organ of the group by which he was controlled. Our knowledge of primitive customs makes it probable that at the start, and to less extent subsequently, force must have been used to compel the conformity of the individual, but the pressure of the economic needs of the group which were shared, of course, by its individual members, tended to solidify custom into a conservative force which prevented the development of the individual life on the one side and the progress of the group on the other. Primitive civilization, though arrested, no longer depended on force alone.¹

New customs, however, arose in some of the tribes. Just what may have been their source we can only conjecture, but not impossibly they were due to changes in habitat, new economic pressure because of

¹ The great authority upon this aspect of history is Westermarck, *The Origin and Development of Moral Ideas* (with full bibliography).

changes in population, and the absorption of members of other tribes into a tribe or phratry through capture and exogamy. The legends and traditions of many nations also preserve the other and significant fact of the appearance of leaders possessed of unusual insight and vision. But whatever the cause of the disintegration or distrust of custom, antagonisms between champions of the new and of the older order followed and new social ideals emerged. Appeal would again be made to force, and out of the struggle emerged law, the product of the conscious social mind.

A familiar example of such antagonism may be seen within the Hebrew people. There the struggle was between customs which the Hebrews had brought from their desert wanderings and those *mores* which they found possessing the new land into which Joshua led them. To a considerable extent these were interwoven with different economic experiences and policies. The customs of the Canaanites were more those of urban and commercial people than were those with which the Hebrews were acquainted.¹ The struggle between these two groups with their different economic and cultural aims had, however, an outcome akin to that which is always found when such struggles arise between groups controlled by economic and social

¹ See Wallis, *Sociological Study of the Bible*; Smith, *The Prophet and his Problems*, although not from the same point of view or with the same presuppositions.

customs belonging to different stages of social evolution. Under the guidance of their religious leaders the Hebrew people reorganized and idealized their own customs and social standards, to some extent enriching their inherited religion with elements from the practices of the Canaanitish peoples. Thus there developed a new type of social control, the law of Jehovah, which, although never fully operative, was to have its influence upon their entire subsequent experience as a nation. Reliance upon force was supplemented and, at points, was even supplanted by other forms of social control.

When conquered nations are subjected to the cultural processes of their conquerors, we can see that after the first appeal to force the influence of education and of social inheritance is sufficient to establish the authority of the new customs. Greece could give culture to its Roman masters, although the customs of masters also became the manners of subjects. The influence of Normans upon the Anglo-Saxons was never complete, but the English language is testimony to the transforming power of a common national life. Alsace and Lorraine, conquered by Louis XIV, became thoroughly gallicized; reconquered by Germany, the application of military and police force changed language and customs which were typically French. Less than fifty years later, in those sections of the territories which have reverted to the control of

France, social life goes on about as it was. And it is altogether probable that if the much-desired territory is retained by France it will require little force to make it possible for the inhabitants to re-assimilate French ways of living. Imitation and national pride will be sufficient influence.

III

In this rise of customs is to be seen the social origin of that powerful master and director of human life, the conscience. But conscience itself evolves from emotional attitudes due to the fear of physical vengeance or of divine punishment in this life or the next, to a conscious regard for righteousness whatever may be its content.

There seems to be as much uncertainty as to the exact point in the development of civilization at which the moral sense emerges in a people as there is doubt concerning the same matter in the case of an infant. Westermarck¹ holds that the origin of the moral judgments in men is emotional and due very largely to the fear of vengeance which under the pressure of social custom has been associated with certain actions. Doubtless a large element of truth is to be seen in this conjecture, but one needs to recall that the fear of social retribution is not always attached to the same

¹ *Origin and Development of the Moral Ideas*, especially in vol. i, chs. 1-3.

object by different people at the same time or by the same people at different times. The most that such fear can engender is that the commission of an act which is under the disapproval of society should be discovered and followed by punishment. If, however, social disapproval is not expressed, the commission of such an act carries with it no sense of guilt. Thus there is always an opportunity for growth or retrogression as regards the sense of guilt for the same act. The fundamental element in moral action is decreasingly the act itself and increasingly the attitude of men towards society. Compare the difference between and yet the fundamental identity of honor and honesty. That the same act is given different moral worth in different societies and in the same society at different stages of its development, is a commonplace in social progress. Thus among the Bilochs there is the saying "God will not favor a man who does not steal and rob."¹ Compare the proverb "All's fair in love and war." But even in these two fields where anarchy tends to reign, there has been decided progress in social control.

The attempt to find any objective criterion by which to decide whether a given act is right or wrong has pretty generally failed, and we are driven to give ultimate importance to attitudes toward personal values as generally embodied in religion. For social control

¹ Spencer, *Ethics*, i, p. 470.

always carries with it an idealistic element which urges men away from the realistic to the spiritual, be it never so crude. Therein lies the dynamic of moral evolution.¹

In all societies moral sanctions and inhibitions are generally given by religion. Here again the first stage of control is the fear of punishment. Practically all the ancient codes of the Semitic peoples, for instance, are set forth like the Hebrew as expressions of the Divine will, expressing itself in blessings or curses. The code of Hammurabi, the sixth king of the first dynasty of Babylon — something about two thousand years or more before Christ — in its epilogue states that the gods Ilu and Baal have called Hammurabi to create justice, to destroy the wicked and to make men happy. The king then proceeds to give his legislation which he fortifies by curses.² But long before the Babylonian king had thus made his god the basis of legislation, primitive man had learned to expect some sort of misfortune to follow from the violation of whatever type of law a particular deity had established. Sometimes this divine law dealt with cult alone, at other times with social crimes. Thus one native tribe of Borneo has a god Batara, who created the world, approves of industry and honesty, but punishes thefts, injustice, adultery and immorality

¹ Durkheim, *Elementary Forms of the Religious Life*, p. 420 sq.

² See Harper, *The Code of Hammurabi*.

among the unmarried. And while this may be a somewhat higher conception of the divine legislation than is found among other primitive peoples, it is certainly by no means unique.¹

Among many primitive people as well as certain of the more civilized races, though not among the pre-exilic Hebrews, the practical difficulty of proving that the gods did work vengeance because of violation of their laws led to the postponement of such vengeance to after death. We have at our disposal a very considerable mass of such beliefs many of which obviously are the extension into the world to come of the types of vengeance permitted in this world. Most generally such divine justice seems an extension of ideals of social justice not practicable in this world. Thus among the natives of Central India a murderer in the spirit world is a slave of the man he murdered. With the Pentecost islanders the murdered man tells the ghosts to whom he goes who killed him and when the murderer arrives he is not permitted to join respectable ghostly society. Where torture has become a characteristic method of social vengeance, this is also expected after death.

In more developed religions this forcible control of humanity by the power of the divinity found expression in the belief in a Day of Judgment. Religion

¹ For discussion see Westermarck, op. cit., II, chs. 48-52; King, *Development of Religion*, pp. 287-305.

has always derived its interpretative concepts from social experience in general, but particularly from the field of politics. The state constituted the most extensive and supreme expression of power which a pre-scientific age knew, and it was natural that the most elaborate religions should utilize the political concepts in exposition of their teachings. The various beliefs in a coming day of judgment for the world must be regarded both as a part of this extension of political experience into religion and as a new and increasingly powerful factor in social control. And the tendency of its influence was always in the direction of substituting social experience for physical force. The relations of the gods or of one supreme God to humanity were conceived of as analogous to those of kings to their subjects. As civilization advanced the judicial power of rulers became increasingly prominent and even came to surpass their military power; indeed military campaigns and the terrible sufferings inflicted by monarchs on rebels became an expression of the justice of the ruler—a philosophy of war not yet outgrown. In the same proportion that the judicial grew superior to the military functions of the state, did the relation of men to God become crystallized in terms of a general assize in which sentences of bliss or suffering were passed. Various nations, however, viewed this judicial aspect of the Deity in accordance with the general develop-

ment of their own political ideals and practices and consequently with differing distinctness.

The Egyptian religion undoubtedly furnishes the earliest conception of an actual judgment of the dead, but the origin and early stages of this belief are unknown. When we are first able to discover its constituent elements, it partook of the relatively high development of the Egyptian civilization. In the earliest sources of the Old Kingdom we find alongside of the state religion, a distinct conception of immortality altogether unusual among oriental religions. No civilization, not even the Peruvian, ever made such elaborate provision for the life after death.¹ The

¹ The Egyptian believed that the "Ka," or vital force which was a sort of counterpart of the body, was to continue in life after death although its exact relation to the body and the soul were never systematically developed. The lower world to which the Sun God went every night was to be inhabited by the departed spirits, who were conceived of as traveling to it generally in a ferryboat with its ferryman, less often as carried thither by one of the sacred birds or by the aid of some friendly spirit. The ferryman ("He who faces backward") in a certain sense played the part of judge for he would take in his boat only the man of whom it could be said "There is no evil which he has done" or "Who was righteous before heaven and earth and before the isle."

This belief was further developed by union with the Osiris myth. Osiris had come to be regarded as not only the king of the dead but also as one who had been slain by his brother Set and who had, according to one version of the story, been acquitted after being unjustly accused of obtaining his throne by deceit. Those who entered into the nether world were regarded as destined to share in this vindication of Osiris, but in early Egyptian faith this element was undeveloped.

religious faith of the Middle Kingdom increasingly identified the destiny of the dead with the triumph of Osiris, but only on condition that they, like him, had been able to undergo the judgment which followed death. The ethical import of this judgment became much more pronounced. The heart of the dead man was weighed against a feather, the symbol of Truth, while he pled "not guilty" to forty-two different sins. The gods Horos and Anubis made the test, and the god Toth wrote down the result of the trial and carried it to Osiris the judge.

Aside from character, protection for the dead was found in charms, and magical formulas were put inside coffins and grew into what is commonly known as the Book of the Dead.¹ This magical deliverance is not to be identified, however, with the ethical test, which in the course of time, under the influence of the priesthood, seems to have disappeared in the magical. But in both cases the power of the gods was subject to non-physical control.²

¹ Renouf, *The Book of the Dead*.

² The sacred beetle was cut from stone and was buried with the dead. On it is inscribed the words "Oh, my heart, rise not up against me as a witness." This, as well as other contents of the tombs would serve to argue that while the conception of judgment continued, it was believed that the judges of the nether world could be made propitious by magic. During the second period of the empire the religious ideals still seem further to have degenerated toward magic on the part of the common people and toward an esoteric state-religion of the Pharaohs and the priesthood. The future life still had a religious

While, thus, belief that the happiness or the misery of the future life was dependent upon moral status was never fully developed, the idea of judgment grew less one of force and served to maintain standards, customs and other forms of social control.¹

In the Babylonian religion² we have many penitential prayers in which Marduk and Istar are asked to forgive and to grant good gifts to the repentant soul. There is in these prayers, however, no expectation of *post mortem* judgment day, but the interest seems to be centered upon temporal blessings. At the same time there were in the Babylonian religion elements which were later to have a bearing upon the doctrine of a judgment day. That the Babylonian religions believed in the realm of the dead is evident from the story of the descent of Istar to Hades, as well as other myths. But to the Babylonians, as to the Hebrews, the realm of the dead was a realm of shades over which the gods of the upper world had no control. The fate of the

influence in mortal life, to judge from the monuments, but anything like a genuine judgment has all but disappeared, to be replaced by the use of charms, worship of animals symbolical of the gods, and other non-ethical elements of religious practice.

¹ See Breasted, *Development of Religion and Thought in Ancient Egypt* (especially valuable for the period of the Pyramid Texts); *History of Egypt from the Earliest Times to the Persian Conquest*. Good brief treatment in Moore, *History of Religions*, i, chs. 8, 9.

² See for general treatment Jastrow, *Aspects of Religious Belief and Practice in Babylonia and Assyria*. Excellent brief exposition in Moore, *History of Religions*, i, ch. 10.

dead was apparently not all the same. Those, for instance, who fell in battle, were apparently somewhat more happy than others, and the condition of the dead could be also affected by offerings from their surviving relatives. There is also a sort of rudimentary judgment passed by the *Anunnaki*, the "great gods" of the underworld, upon the dead as they entered the underworld. But on this particular point there is great obscurity. The dead were classified, i. e., drank clean water or eat refuse, according as they were properly buried or left unburied. This fate was fixed by Mamaneter "who fixes fate."¹ These various Babylonian myths, although their part in social control is obscure, contain elements which subsequently had an effect upon the Jewish belief in a day of judgment. These are to be seen particularly in the story of the struggle between Marduk and Tiamat in which Tiamat is destroyed. While this is a part of the Babylonian creation cycle the struggle between the good God and the representative of evil influenced the development of the apocalyptic portrayal of the final struggle between the Christ and the anti-Christ which formed a part of the conception of judgment in Jewish and subsequently Christian teaching.²

¹ *Gilgamesh Epic* x, 6: 35-38.

² For other illustrations of the early belief in a judgment see Moore, *History of Religions*, pp. 67, 140, 348 sq., 364-402. An interesting argument from the belief in Rhadamathus and Minos will be found in Justin Martyr, *I Apology*, ch. 8. The terrible pictures of hell so fre-

The influence of the concept upon social action will be better considered in connection with the entire matter of religion as a phase of social control. Before passing to that highly important matter, however, I would once more recall the tendency in these ancient societies, from force to custom; from custom to divine sanction and punishment; from unrestrained divine punishment to the power of magical or religious control of the gods themselves; and then to the extension of more highly developed social practices to the divine government.

IV

The development of religious sanctions might almost be said to move parallel, although somewhat tardily, with social practices and ideals. In it the same movement is traceable from outer control to inner direction. Religion not only thus reflects the growth of inner as opposed to physical authority, but throws light upon the interpretation of social evolution.

Religion is coming to be regarded as a phase of the life process of humanity. Life is ever seeking to derive protection and help from the environment in which an organism finds itself. A personal life like that of mankind seeks to get such assistance personally from personal environment. Such personal environment as is furnished by society is, of course, evident, and many quent in Christian literature after the *Apocalypse of Peter* were of Greek origin.

religious customs of later times may well be traced to social customs of the ancient world. Such matters as the *tabu* can very probably be regarded as some standardized custom interdicting certain acts at the cost of divine and human penalties. But the human soul has not been content to leave religion in the field of inhibition. It is constantly tending to extend its social experiences into that superhuman region within which it finds itself located, and to those cosmic forces upon which more or less intelligently it believes itself dependent. Religion thus becomes an idealized social order. In entering upon this great and epoch-making venture of faith in the possibility of establishing personal relations with elements of a universe which did not appear personal, the proto-religionist of prehistoric days transcendentalized his social experience. He treated that upon which he was dependent as amenable to the laws of spiritual relations as he knew and practised them. Thus he derived, crudely enough of course, the fundamental religious conception that man's relation to the universe is not only impersonal, but may become personal as well. To establish friendship with and so to derive help from superhuman forces in a personal way became a characteristic human interest. Thereafter as social life developed there remained only the task of ever more complete reinterpretation of this personal relation, and of vindicating the reasonableness of faith in the existence

and helpfulness of the personal elements in the universe.¹

It is not my purpose to discuss the development of religion as such² but I cannot fail to call attention to the fact that humanity today as truly as in prehistoric times is facing the alternative whether it shall move into the impersonal or the personal attitude towards the universe. If all that there is about us is mechanistic, the operation of physical and chemical forces, then religion, even though it be Picton's religion of the universe and Comte's religion of humanity, is doomed. All the mass of learning of the anthropologist and the historian of religion will not avail to save faith if once men take the position of materialistic determinism. The universe becomes a machine and human beings creations of physical and chemical forces.

On the other hand, if one take the religious position, he must choose ultimately between two tendencies: the impersonal pantheism of Brahmanism, or the social theism of Jesus with its call to an altruism born

¹ This search for reconciliation with the personal elements believed to be in the environing world is something far more important than the forms in which it has been expressed. The failure to recognize this distinction lies beneath much of the agnosticism which masquerades as anthropology.

² Those interested I would refer to my articles "The Evolution of Religion," *American Journal of Theology*, 1911, pp. 57-82; "The Social Basis of Theology," *American Journal of Sociology*, xviii (1912), 289-317; "Theology and the Social Mind," *Biblical World*, xlvi (1915), 201-248.

of a recognition of man's likeness to a good God. But whichever decision the man or the group makes between these two possible personal relations towards the universe, the history of Hinduism and Christianity alike show that there will result a new group of inner sanctions and inhibitions far superior to those of external force. Both religions look beyond the natural order for the supreme vindication of their claims. In both alike we must look beyond religious practices of the masses. For if Hinduism has its devil-worship, superstitions, subjection of women, caste and vast idolatry, it has also the promise of absolute peace in Brahma. And Christianity, although it, too, has its secondary forms, its veneration of relics, quasi-magical rites, asceticism and worship of saints, has ever before it the advancing ideal of the Son of Man who brought men the message of deliverance from sin and death at the cost of the Cross. I am not now comparing the ultimate values of these two rivals in religious thought and practice, although as to the relative worth of the two ideals of the destruction and the endless development of individual personal worth there can be no question. The real point of emphasis is that both of the two religious movements — and Buddhism may well be a third — tend away from reliance upon even transcendentalized physical authority.¹

¹ The social effect of Buddhism upon a subject people is a matter worthy of careful study. For instance, what share has Buddhism had in Chinese history?

True, the use of force to annihilate people who hold religious convictions, and so to destroy their religion, is not altogether out of the range of possibilities, but religious convictions themselves have seldom been exterminated by fear of force. The literature of times of persecution shows this emphatically. Thrust into the choice between such convictions and suffering or death, faith has the more consolidated itself in opposition to doubt and denial. This loyalty to religion has, one might almost say, been in proportion to its spiritual quality. While men of one national religion have often massacred those of another, Christianity has furnished most of the really religious martyrs of history, and, speaking generally, these martyrs have always suffered at the hands of those who were spiritually less intelligent and more brutal than themselves. Yet force has never yet succeeded in replacing the sanctions of Christian faith, although in the case of the Waldenses and the Huguenots there has been widespread destruction of the Christians themselves.¹

Within the development of religion the passage from submission to outer, to the acceptance of inner authority has been marked. If Durkheim be correct² the first powers of which the human mind had any idea

¹ A more thoroughgoing destruction of a religion through the destruction of its adherents is to be seen in the policy of Japan in the sixteenth century. But the persistence of Christian ideas in Japanese religious thought is not impossible.

² *Elementary Forms of the Religious Life*, p. 366.

were those which societies had established in ordering themselves, and these powers have been the basis of religion. I have serious doubts as to the historical accuracy of Durkheim's conception of the nature of religion, but that primitive society compelled religious conformity by more than threats of heavenly penalties seems undeniable. But primitive religious conformity was doubtless in the region of the *tabu* rather than in that of doctrine, although that too was protected by the practice of initiation. Higher religions do not rely exclusively upon force even when some of their representatives have been persecutors. Transcendental discipline tends to replace earthly. The influence of the priest, or whoever has been held to exercise divine control in human forces, increases. When priestly control is broken by the growth of intelligence, the individual seeks to place himself directly in dependence upon spiritual forces. In the case of Greek religion the gods who conquered the giants—fit symbols of materialistic forces—were themselves seen to be subject to Fortune or Necessity. In the case of Hinduism, saints and gods disappear in unconscious Being. In one or the other of these two forms of despair men have stopped except as they have grasped partially or wholly the Christian's God of Love who is also the God of Law. Unfortunately this progress has by no means been constant, and wherever religion has been institutionalized, the danger of its

losing its spiritual quality must be admitted. The elaborate standardization of Hebrew religion by the rabbinical teachers, the development of a spiritual empire in the Roman Catholic Church, the combination of theological precision and spiritual inertia in the Greek Catholic Church, the surrender of the Reformation movement to the Protestant scholastics and state control of the seventeenth century, not to mention many another but less familiar example; all show how easy it is for even high religions to pass from the life of the Spirit to submission to the authority of organized leadership.¹

But while all this must be granted, it also must be granted that wherever a society to any appreciable degree participates in progressive intellectual movements, spiritual sanctions tend to replace ecclesiastical. More nations than the English have had their epoch-making Nonconformists and Separatists. The most serious charge that can be brought against religious conservatism is that it overestimates the supremacy of ecclesiastical customs, doctrinal formulas and religious survivals backed by outward, if not physical authority. It thus questions the finality of the spirit. Even the chiliastic Christian, like his predecessor the Jewish messianist, hardly dares to trust God's ability to bring about spiritual results by spiritual means, and looks to cosmic catastrophe. But materialism,

¹ See Sabatier, *Religions of Authority and the Religion of the Spirit*.

whether it be refined or brutal, is never final in religion. Whether they are Roman emperors throwing Christians to the wild beasts; Spanish inquisitors pursuing the Jew or the Protestant; French politicians preparing for St. Bartholomew's eve; German Lutherans prosecuting crypto-Calvinists; Russian orthodox sending Evangelicals to Siberia; English churchmen enforcing acts of conformity or burning Unitarians; New England Puritans exiling Quakers and Baptists into the forests; persecutors are working against a spiritual force which is bound to undo their very success. They represent social atavism, not social prophecy, and in the long run, in religion as in other phases of life, external force gives way to the inner compulsion of duty and faith. Orthodoxy, however truer it was than its contemporary heresies, was established by the state and enforced by policeman and soldier; in modern days it must maintain itself by proving itself more truthful than its rival systems. When it entrenches itself in petty persecutions it finds itself threatened with the loss of all those who value enforced conformity less than the search for truth.

The final attestation of religion is the religious life. Reliance upon miracle, historical criticism, biblical promises, all tend to yield place to the inner authority of the experience of God within humanity and one's own inner life. Just as the old nature religion of Greece yielded to the Olympians, they in turn to the

Oriental gods who promised inner salvation, and these bowed before the Christ of sacrifice, is there today the struggle within the citadel of the spirit as to whether the law of love shall be regarded as a sort of slave morality, or actually is in accordance with the fundamental principles of the universe itself. Here the modern world particularly needs the steady influence of a proper interpretation of historical tendencies. Mencken,¹ insists that no one has ever successfully controverted Nietzsche's view that if Christianity were to become universal, and every man in the world were to follow Christ's precepts to the letter in all the relations of daily life, the race would die out in a generation. Nietzsche, therefore, holds that the human race should abandon the idea of self-sacrifice altogether, and submit itself to the law of natural selection, to the end that the race of super-men may appear. Here as in no other contrast do we see the distance between the conception of the ultimate spiritual worth of life as the sacrificial social-mindedness of Jesus, and as the super-moral will-to-power of Nietzsche.

Our opinions as to the direction in which religious history is tending will be very largely at the mercy of temperaments, unless we seriously consider the actual course of social progress as it is reflected in religion. I believe it will appear that the entire movement of

¹ *Philosophy of Nietzsche*, p. 144.

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history, and particularly recent developments within the more intelligent civilizations, establish the fact that sacrificial social-mindedness, that is to say, the love embodied and taught by Jesus Christ, is not only becoming more widely professed, but is actually exercising a more considerable influence in religion, and through religion upon social life than ever before. Is it not true, for instance, that our generation has developed a far more ethical conception of God than ever obtained even in Christian teaching ? The origin of this better conception is to be found in many quarters, but one thing at least is undeniable: our social experience in passing from the imperialistic to the monarchical, and thence to the democratic conception of the state; our new sense of the worth of the individual, which has tempered our penology; are both effect and cause of a keener appreciation of finality in the ideals of Jesus and therefore of a more spiritual and moral conception of God. And if, in a world like ours, where the moral sense is growing more intense, and our hatred of sham, like our hatred of vice, so often prompts us to revert to some hasty appeal to force, we can thus move forward in our conceptions of God, we have clear evidence of a tendency which is not merely the ideal of this or that great master-spirit, but is an expression of actual social evolution which today, as in the days of the past, reads itself over into its religion and so may be judged by its religion. Indeed, a civili-

zation can be judged by no truer standards than the ideals of its religion. For in its views of its gods a civilization expresses its supreme social values and controlling conceptions. Gods at first regarded as autocrats governing by force are replaced by infinite Wisdom and Love. You can measure the progress and the tendencies of humanity by comparing Moloch and Jesus.

V

As in growing social life and religion, so in an equally distinct fashion does the general tendency for society to rely upon inner rather than outward control show itself in the development of law. It is with hesitation that as a layman I enter into this field, yet with some assurance I would call attention to general tendencies in this important field of human activity.

The origin of law is probably to be found in the existence of social practices, at least such practices are pre-supposed by the legislation we know. That these customs grew up peacefully we have already indicated to be unlikely.¹ But in this antagonism between rival social practices generic principles gradually are perceived. Primitive times in which these customs developed were not academically peaceful, as our earlier codes clearly argue. The Twelve Tables of Rome which lie beneath the entire structure of Roman

¹ The assumption of the contrary is the error of what is Savigny's otherwise correct argument that customs precede organized codes.

jurisprudence are obviously announcements and declarations of procedure and practice with which the people were already familiar. They were not based upon general theory, but upon a careful study of Roman and, through one of the first legal commissions of history, Greek procedure. Yet they reflect the brutal literalness of early practice, even to the extent of permitting the actual division of a defaulting debtor among his creditors. The very legal term of the Roman law for property, *mancipium*, indicates a social practice based on physical force. Property by the very derivation of the word is seen to be that which one has taken *in his hand*, that is, of which he is in actual possession — a bit of philology that may possibly throw some light upon the difference between the Roman and English law of Sales.

But law transcended authoritatively codified custom. As the Romans ceased to be a local body and gained through the extension of their arms a knowledge of the laws of other nations, they discovered that general principles underlay the variety in execution in different nations. This fact was thrust home on them also as the number of those who were not strictly Roman citizens and entitled to *jus civile* increased in Rome. *Jus gentium*, the law which developed among all peoples because of common needs, and is the teaching of a common reason, then became one of the bases of the later Roman law.

But it would be a serious mistake to overlook the fact that the rise of law through legislation in Rome or elsewhere was never peaceful. The codification of what the social will regarded as the proper limitation of individual or group action, was conditioned by struggle and reliance upon the power of a group to enforce its legislation. As to the fact that¹ the enforcement of legislation depends in no small degree upon the ability of a group to enforce its formulated decisions in case of lawlessness, there can be no fair question. The records of the past are too distinct to be mistaken. The policeman and soldier have always stood beside the judge; the scales of justice have always been guarded by the sword.

We shall later return to the question of rights and justice, but in the present connection attention must be centered on the immensely important fact that this reliance upon force ceases to be in the forefront of social consciousness. Here again Rome (as later England) furnishes us needed evidence of an advance in social attitudes. The perception of a certain philosophy of practice and of general principles lying beneath the variant practices of Roman and other nations led the great lawyers of the Empire to attempt the process of codifying the enormously extensive legal

¹ This is the truth so vigorously argued by Ihering in his well known essay *The Struggle for Law*. Law, according to his view, whether it be outward (that of the state) or inward (legal right of the person) meets with opposition and is obliged to fight for its existence.

material of the Roman state in the interests of unity. There thus developed not only the great codes, but as it were, a philosophy of legal principles which were to be extended by judges into all cases similar to those lying within the various codifications.

At this point Roman becomes typical of all legal history. The emergence of the law-abiding spirit is superior to fear of punishments. By the time of the Antonines and even more by that of Theodosius and Justinian, the administration of law had become so ingrained in the life of the Empire as to be itself a source of social control. The instinct to imitate which had once operated in the formation of customs now operated quite as truly in the field of law. By degrees the Roman law spread itself over the various national laws of the more civilized nations which formed the eastern half of the Empire and thus gave rise to an attitude of mind which became a basis for a very elaborate civilization.¹

In the west, law was built into the very development of society in Spain and Gaul where Roman influence was peculiarly creative. So thoroughly was the law-respecting attitude of mind ingrained in the Roman world of the west that the Teutonic invaders themselves were forced not only to use the Roman codes in governing their conquered peoples, but gradually themselves came under their influence.

¹ See Mitteis, *Rechtsrecht und Volksrecht in den östlichen Provinzen des römischen Kaiserreichs*, especially chs. 4 and 7.

Nor was this all. The church came under the control of the same conceptions and there grew up within the church the canon law which shaped up the administration of the great institution which perpetuated the ideals and the administrative methods of the Empire which *de facto* although not *de jure* disappeared.¹

In England the conception of law has been as in the early days in Rome a matter of practice. The common law is really an authoritative record of the way men have decided cases in the light of previous practice.²

This growing body of common law in England was closely connected with the growth of general customs on the one side and judge-made law on the other. From the earliest times of English monarchy the king's judges knew better than the men of any particular city or county what the custom of the realm was. Whatever may have been local usage, they would be the

¹ Taylor, *Mediaeval Mind*, ii, 268 sq., points out that in the Middle Ages there emerged the use of the Bible as the *jus gentium* of theology. See also, Gierke, *Mediaeval Political Theories*, pp. 172.

² The Roman law is markedly much less in evidence in England and the United States than on the continent of Europe or in Louisiana in America where the *Code Napoléon* has been the basis of most legal codes. Yet it has undoubtedly had some unnoticed influence upon the development of common law, although the latter has never been thoroughly codified except in California and a few western states where the codification of the common law by David Dudley Field was adopted. Georgia has a local code which has all but never consciously deigned to look to its older rival for assistance or direction in its development.

only ones who had knowledge of what the general usage could have been. Common law, therefore, rapidly became, as Pollock says¹ "a specialized branch of learning worked out by rule as the common-law writers say. Much of the usage which determined its form was by the nature of the case professional and official usage." But in common law as in the early Roman law the tendency was observable to see beneath customs certain principles and to extend those principles into regions where custom was not yet organized. Thus legislation re-embodied the course of fundamental law. In England as elsewhere in the hands of both judge and legislator there was a distinct tendency to build up a conception of law as something other than a mere massing of precedents. True, the emergence of new laws always resulted in struggle — sometimes in revolution. But peace and spontaneous action have resulted in an increasing law-abiding attitude of mind. A good citizen is not kept from breaking the law by fear of the penalty, but by the moral inertia of his mind. That is to say, the concept of law itself has developed as a source of control within human life quite independent of the state as a body with punitive powers.

Thus again is to be seen the tendency away from conduct which at first is determined by outward authority ultimately based on force towards an inner

¹ *First Book of Jurisprudence*, p. 243.

and habitual action in accordance with principles.¹ Customs themselves cease to be tyrannical and are judged in the light of new principles expressed in legislation. The social mind, accustomed to such legislation, becomes its own master. This, of course, is not to say that any social order has reached a position in which even on the part of its better citizens there is no need of outward control. The agitation in the United States, for example, for the control of trusts is an indication that even among men who in many matters are regardful of law, there is need of a certain degree of force. But here as elsewhere the tendency is toward less reliance upon coercion and larger reliance upon general regard for law as a basis of social coöperation. It is in this sphere undoubtedly that the final answer must be given to the question of civil liberty. If the individual can be trusted to develop a respect for the social will, he will act from social-mindedness rather than from fear, from social instinct rather than from conscious submission to external authority.

In a way this same tendency is to be seen in the concept of law itself. From the days of Spinoza, there have been those who would regard law as ultimately resting on force, either Divine or strictly social. But such views are no more complete than is the view that law is, as

¹ Ihering, *The Struggle for Law* (Lalor's trans.), p. 12. "The idea of the law is an eternal Becoming."

it were, an expression of calm, impersonal nature. Theories of utility have also had their day, but they in turn have given way before the conception of law as the immanent will of the state expressed in legislation and born of a community of human experience. Indeed one might almost say that since the days of Grotius there has been an increasing tendency for the development of law to take a new direction. Instead of relying solely upon catalogued custom or duties, when once it is thoroughly worked into the social mind, it becomes the expression of a consciousness of social interest in social ends and personal welfare expressing itself in legislative enactment, obedience to which is enforced by public opinion and self-respect.

The influence of religion in this development is an evidence of the same tendency. This is to be seen not only, as has already been indicated, in the primitive habit of seeking divine sanction for social customs and legislation, but also in the fact that religion has constantly tended to extend its noblest ideals into the social will. "If there were not a God," Voltaire once said, "it would be necessary to invent one," that is, for the purpose of furnishing the unintelligent masses with a basis of control. Indeed so large a share has religion had in shaping public morality expressed in law that one of the charges brought against religion by radicals of various schools is that it was invented by the strong men to keep the poor and the weak people

in order. Undoubtedly it has played this rôle, but whoever looks at the history of society with the anti-religious presuppositions of Nietzsche is certain to underestimate the constructive capacity of the idealizing influence which religion contributes or, if social psychologists be right, is immanent in actual social customs.

In the Middle Ages, for instance, the influence of the Church was very decided in substituting these inner sanctions more or less supported by religion for the appeal to force. The Truce of God, for example, tended to offset the Trial by Arms which played so large a rôle in the earlier feudal society. In fact it was in large measure due to the influence of the Church that such rough and ready methods of establishing right were abandoned. In our modern world, the influence of religion upon the attitude of regard for law is obvious enough to any one who is ready to look upon human action as anything more than tropism under the influence of economic and impersonal forces. It was something of that idea, I think, which led an Indiana politician to remark in my hearing that he would not want to be a minister, but he would not want to live in a town where there was no church. Whatever may be his theological view, a student of history cannot deny that the substitution of inner sanctions taught, evoked and enforced by religion, has made the operation of law far more effective. There

could hardly be a more profound sociological statement than that of Paul that love is the fulfilling of the law.¹

This attitude of regard for law which possesses a value independent of the force which is behind it has, however, only imperfectly extended across the boundaries of states. Whatever may be the judgment of the future as to the rise of nations, it can hardly be doubted that nationalism has involved mutual enmities. Patriotism until it is Christianized will be a fighting virtue. Even yet a patriot will die for his country more readily than he will pay taxes for its support. The border between nations has too often been a line of cleavage in morals. Up to the frontier men are to love each other as fellow-citizens, but men across the border are to be regarded as potential enemies. Law is far enough even yet from formulating with any effectiveness the rights of enemies and a really moral way of dealing with them. True there has been progress made. The laws of war mentioned by Josephus² were hardly more than a modification of the general permission for massacre, robbery and all forms of violence. But the laws of war at the present time attempt to limit the operations of military force and to protect the lives and welfare of non-combat-

¹ This is most evident in states founded (or attempted) by religious groups like the Anabaptists in Germany, the Quakers in Pennsylvania and the Nonconformists in New England.

² *Ant.*, iv, 41, 42; *Ag. Apion*, ii, 30.

ants. The fact that they are so readily suspended by recourse to reprisals should not obscure the facts as they actually exist. The tendency is increasing to limit military operations to actual combatants and the only thing upon which such policy can be based is the sense of moral values on the part of the nations involved. No Christian nation would adopt the terrible policy followed by the ancient Assyrians and by the Turks in their dealing with the Armenians.¹

However far we are from having organized a universal code of international law it cannot be denied that from the days of Grotius to the Hague tribunal and the Drago doctrine, there certainly has been advance. Out from the welter of conflicting nationalities there have emerged certain ideals of national coöperation. It requires courage to make such statements in days when we are told that treaty-making is futile unless a nation has sufficient military strength to compel other nations to keep their word, but he has a very imperfect view of the relations of nations even in the present tragic moment who thinks that the rule of force is always to be the ultimate court of appeal. Little by little the conviction is developing that a moral principle which is fit to control legislation governing

¹ A contemporary discussion of this matter will be found in McDonald, "Has International Law Failed?" in *Proceedings of the Conference on International Relations* (1916), pp. 1-24. See also Hobson, *Towards International Government* (1915); Hill, *World Organization as Affected by the Nature of the Modern State*.

individuals and social classes is also fit to control the relations of nations. The present discussions of submarine warfare make it plain that nations have already come to recognize the observance of certain limitations of military and naval activities as demanded by international respectability.¹ Despite our disappointments and our temptation to say in our haste that all men are war-lovers, we must recognize the under-current of public opinion² which is setting towards the recognition of the same regard for coöperative expediency in the relations of nations as among people within national boundaries. In the presence of that tendency we cannot altogether lose faith in the coming of international justice. Such a Utopia may not come in our day. Even to plan for it may seem futile. Be that as it may. In any case it is better to plan for Utopia than for Hell.

VI

As we look back over this epoch-making movement in which humanity has struggled out from the brutality of early civilization into the incipient ration-

¹ A summary of some of these international agreements is given by Pollock, *Cambridge Modern History*, XII, ch. 22.

² Since 1828, 233 arbitration treaties or constitutions have been enacted. Of these 229 were in force in 1914. One hundred and seventy-five of these have been adopted since 1904. The United States had 28 (not including the so-called "Bryan treaties"), Great Britain 17, France 16, Germany 1 — with Great Britain which expired July 12, 1914. The tendency towards such treaties is especially marked in South America.

ality of our present coöperative life, we are certainly justified in reasonable hopefulness. Human nature is certainly not without its capacity of spiritual control even in the midst of surroundings which constantly tend to make it revert to lower practices. It is at least a suggestion of better days to come that each nation now at war claims that some other began hostilities; and even more hopeful is the criticism of Christianity for not having prevented the conflict. For such criticism implies a new sense of what Christianity really is. It is indeed a far cry from the Crusades and from Wars of Religion and creeds that contain no hint of Christian brotherliness to this new sensitiveness as to war's incompatibility with the gospel preached by Jesus. The very shock given by war to our faith in spiritual forces has compelled us to re-examine the meaning of our religion. And we are seeing that this is vastly more than ecclesiastical regularity. For the heart of a real Christianity is faith that God is Love and that therefore moral perfection is to be loving. Therein is the finality of the Spiritual Order. The cross may be foolishness to the militarist, but it is the sign by which civilization is to conquer. For it is the symbol of a sacrificial social mind.

There once came into my office a young negro from Africa bearing on his cheeks the tribal gashes of primitive savagery. He had never seen a white person until he was eight years old, and then he had come in con-

tact with the missionaries and had been educated. He had called upon me to ask about courses in advanced Semitics. In his brief lifetime he had passed from primitive savagery to an inner life fit to enter a graduate school of a university. Such an experience is an epitome of what history has actually accomplished in human society. In society as in the life of this young man, altruism, righteousness, education, social control, and religion, imperfect as they yet are, have proved more potent than appeal to force. They and not savagery mark the destination of social evolution. History has moved away from submission to physical nature, economic pressure and control by appeals to men's fear of human or divine vengeance, and is possessed of a new sense of personal values which society must forward. Such a tendency is as truly a fact as the events by which it is so frequently obscured. And as a projection of the past it is truly prophetic. For from the ever-growing primacy of personal values will be built the Kingdom of God, the society of the sacrificially social-minded.

LECTURE IV

THE GROWING RECOGNITION OF THE WORTH OF THE INDIVIDUAL

THE tendency for reliance upon inner authority to replace submission to physical force in the course of history has always involved the question as to the worth of the individual. Is he a cog in a social process, of no more significance than the wolf in the pack ? Or has he an independent value which the course of history is seen to recognize ? The answer which we give to this question must be drawn from history rather than metaphysics. We must break across the artificial barriers of definitions and syllogisms if we are really to find freedom. In historical tendencies is more revelation than in debates over free will. For we seek not what can be thought but what has been lived. And this history can show us.

Whatever may be the position taken by radicals among those who magnify the materialistic interpretation of history there are few who would champion anything like genuine determinism. And this hesitation is eloquent of a belief that history is the complex of the doings of real persons. Now in the life of a real person there is always what he regards as at least some

freedom of action. Philosophers may argue that such freedom is a delusion. If they are correct, delusion itself is creative in history. Else what would mean the series of appeals, discussions, threats, persecutions by which men have attempted to change the opinions of others? Why did martyrs choose to die, monks to leave the world, women to become nuns rather than wives? The reply in its simplest terms is that they wanted to; for they believed they had a power to choose and reasons for this choice. All the deterministic philosophy in the world cannot take from human nature this conviction of some sort of freedom. Even the determinist chooses to disbelieve in spiritual freedom.

Nor need we fear lest personal values will disappear in the Dark Tower of statistical averages. Convenient tools as they are of life insurance companies, stock brokers, and habitués of Monte Carlo, averages indicate only partially the limits within which actions of individuals are to be studied. True, history is made by social groups, but there is a vast difference between group action and mathematical averages of the actions of individuals. In group movements individuals are no more lost than rays of light are lost in white light. They can always be rediscovered. Even an army can be analyzed into men by the spectrum of defeat. But the general curves of statistics are not composed of individuals. They are only the fences on

each side of the road we individuals travel at our own pace, and they in no way prevent some of us every now and then from jumping over the fence.

The place of the individual in the development of a social group is often obscure, particularly to the student who prefers figures to folks and consequently is keen to magnify the impersonal forces which condition humanity and which offset individual activities. But even thus, if we look back far enough over social evolution, we shall discover a general tendency to recognize the worth of the individual as a real person rather than as a mere economic factor. Let us then pass between the lions of metaphysics and statistics into the house of history.

I

At the outset we meet the age-long question of the relation of great men to history.

Herbert Spencer¹ insists that "you must admit that the genesis of the great man depends on the long series of complex influence which has produced the race in which he appears and the social state into which that race has slowly grown. Before he can really make his society, his society must make him. All those changes of which he is the proximate initiator have their chief causes in the generations he descended from." But is this not to deny that the great man is a person and to

¹ See *Study of Sociology*, pp. 33-35.

assert that he is merely a "great somewhat"? If he were truly a person he might have something to say about what he did. But being gripped in the sequence of causes which run back through social institutions and economic disharmonies to physical causes, he is not really a person. He is, as that appealing character of Professor Lewis's in *Those about Trench*, Saadi Shereef, would say, a "gaseous vertebrate."

Such a view seems to me to be not history but sociological dogmatism. If we watch the process of history we shall find plenty of facts hard to understand but we shall no more have explained them by referring them to social evolution than the biologist has explained life when he refers it to a "vital principle." Unfortunately the search for causes sooner or later descends from the limbo of conjecture into the netherworld of dogmatism. The positive method of science, whether physical or historical, is to watch actual operations rather than go backward to conjectural causes. You can always trust the Mississippi to help you find its mouth, but if you go up-stream to seek its source you may find yourself in the Missouri or even in the Chicago Drainage Canal.

Professor James in his well-known essay upon "Great Men and Their Environment"¹ with characteristic lucidity defines a genius as "a social ferment." "The community," he says, "may evolve in many

¹ Republished in *The Will to Believe*.

ways. The accidental presence of this or that ferment decides in which it shall evolve." Just what the relationship of the individual to society may be philosophically I do not propose to discuss but would refer those interested to the older discussions of Carlyle¹ and Spencer² and the more recent thought of Royce.³ The historian need only insist that the formula — which will be later discussed — is not "the individual *and* society," but "the individual *in* society." And the historian can safely lay down the thesis that social situations do not produce great men; they give a great man the opportunity to exercise and develop his powers by doing great things. For, from the point of view of history, it seems careless thinking to confuse character and ability with achievement. By way of illustration I turn not to masters of poetry and philosophy, for their influence as spiritual factors may well be admitted. Rather let us look at cases which just now are passing through the fires of economic determinism.

If we say that Luther could not have been the Luther of history had he lived at the time of Huss, we are not saying that Luther the individual was produced by his times. What produced Luther was the human matings that finally culminated in a miner's family in

¹ *Heroes and Hero Worship*.

² *The Man versus the State*.

³ *The World and the Individual*.

Eisleben.¹ But once born with his capacities he found stimulus and opportunity in a chain of social situations, both economic and socially psychological, unlike those that conditioned Huss (assuming that Huss was the equal of Luther). In and because of these situations he found such self-expression as to direct the course of events as well as to have his actions shaped by them. He thus precipitated the new historical situations which assure him his present place in German and universal history. Similarly in the case of Napoleon.² The extraordinary rise of that super-man within ten years from a sub-lieutenant in the French army to the ruler of the nation was due as much to his innate capacity as to the extraordinary social circumstances into which he entered and which offered opportunities peculiarly adapted to his powers.

Great men happen neither biologically nor historically. They are both creatures and creators. They can be understood best when they are regarded as personal forces in situations which are themselves creative but which great men are to some extent able

¹ How much social situations affect the ancestry of an individual biologists seem unable to unite in saying. The tendency seems general to minimize the transmission of acquired characteristics. The unknown dead of Gray's Churchyard may have bred "great" men. See the quotation from Child, *infra*.

² Johnson, *Napoleon, A Short Biography*, p. 4, puts this sharply. So Fournier, *Napoleon the First* (ed. by Bourne), p. 59: "Fortune did not make a slave of him, he understood controlling it and making it serve his ends."

to direct. They are individual dominants mating with social dominants to produce social — and rarely individual — descendants.

Whatever period of history we examine might have been markedly different if it had not been for certain individuals. It is, for example, easy to speak of the spread of Hellenism under Alexander the Great as if Alexander was the figurehead of a vessel driven and guided by social forces along trade routes. But did ever another man of the galaxy of soldiers and adventurers who have attempted similar conquests succeed? And would Alexander the Great have spread Greek civilization if there had never been an Aristotle?

Or take the relation of Jesus to the Messianic idealism of his time. Jesus was indeed, as the creeds have stoutly maintained, one with us as regards his humanity; that is, he was integrated in the social currents of his day. It would be indeed difficult to think of him as developing his particular message of divine salvation in the midst of any other surroundings than those of the Jewish people. But after the hopes and prayers of Pharisaism, the passions and beliefs of the Jewish piety of his day, had passed through his own individual experience, they became something new. Scattered parallels, similarities in words between Jesus and the philosophers of Greece or the master rabbis of the Jews, are beside the mark. They no more account for Christianity than chemical

elements out in the sunlight account for acorns. Acorns are made of such elements after they have been manipulated by some tree. Jesus contributed himself and his individual experiences to history and historical forces were recombined in him. He was indeed the Vine with branches.

Recur again to the Reformation. Luther and Melanchthon partook of essentially the same social mind, and were subject to essentially the same economic, geographical, and social forces. But had the one attempted the work of the other, the difference of their reaction would have produced a different historical movement. For they themselves were different persons. If Luther, for example, had possessed the broader tolerance of Melanchthon, Protestantism might have been spared many a conflict. Similarly, when one compares Calvin with Luther and Melanchthon on the one side, and, let us say, Erasmus and the English Humanists on the other, one can see the contribution which his own personality made to history. What a different world would that be in which we now live if the fugitive Calvin had not happened to call on Farel that night when he stopped for a few hours' rest in his journey across Switzerland. What other man than Cromwell could, without hypocrisy, have mingled a reign of saints, a Commonwealth without a Parliament, a massacre of Drogheda, a passion for biblical quotations and pious letters to a daughter?

How much of the later vacillation of that strident social mind in France which, as Jefferson lets us see, was already shaped up in 1789, was due to the fact that in Mirabeau it had a first-rate mind ungoverned by moral scruples, and in Robespierre moral scruples dominating a mediocre mind! A military empire is liable to develop in any transitional stage when a nation obsessed with abstract ideals is forced into war; but who would say that Europe at this moment is not reaping some of the results of Napoleon's personality as it is also reaping the results of the titanic individuality of a Bismarck who dared change the wording of diplomatic messages in order that Prussia might cement a German Empire with the blood of France! How much modern England owes to the philosophy preached through half a century by Jeremy Bentham! Or finally, take our own country. How far its destinies have been directed by the individual temperaments of Jefferson and Jackson! How much was contributed to its history by Abraham Lincoln, and for the past few months how repeatedly the course of our political and international development has been affected by the personality of Woodrow Wilson!

Such illustrations as these could be duplicated indefinitely. It is as futile to make history a succession of social processes as of Carlylean heroes. We have to deal with concrete men and women who through institutions, inheritances, political organiza-

tions and similar passions, increasingly work together, but always under leadership; who prefer death to disloyalty; who are stirred to passion by appeals of demagogues and fanatics; and who are given approximate sanity and adventurous outlook by philosophers, poets, and prophets. If acorns come from oaks, oaks also come from acorns.

II

To recognize the place of the great individual in history is, however, not to proceed very far into the interpretation of the tendency of history itself. As we have seen, great men are great within the limitations set by the conditions and forces of the social order to which they minister and their individualities tend to extend themselves into social forces. A second and more practical question is whether the general tendency of human life has been to give larger worth to the less outstanding individual. Does he exist only as a contributor to the well-being of society? Such a question may be raised more intimately. Ever since August, 1914, we have found it facing ourselves. On the one side has been democracy like England "muddling through" its difficulties as best it could, and on the other side the marvelous efficiency of the Prussian state. The difference is radical. On the one side is the belief not yet thoroughly systematized, not fully trusted, but definite and sincere, that the chief end of

society is the personal welfare of real individuals for whom the state exists. On the other side is the equally sincere belief that the nation is the true unit and that all individual welfare must be secondary to it. Does history give us any intimation as to its tendency toward the one or the other goal? What is the end toward which it moves — a highly organized paternal state, or individuals reaching larger self-expression in a democracy?

It is of course difficult to answer such a question, particularly in a moment in which it is a burning issue. But none the less as one looks back over the course of history, particularly of the last century, there are several great fields of social experience in which a definite tendency can be seen toward the democratic ideal because of a larger recognition of the worth of individuals.

i. Individuals are no longer regarded as the property of other individuals. Slavery was born of economic needs and was normal in ancient societies¹ and continued even to our own day with the approval of broad-minded and religious souls. It has been maintained by arguments from the Bible and by the

¹ This fact is so universal that references are superfluous. A good popular account of the lower classes in the Roman Empire will be found in Davis, *The Influence of Wealth in Imperial Rome*, pp. 194-247. The works of Ferrero also deal fully — although in rather a journalistic fashion — with the economic structure of Roman society, particularly in the period of the Republic.

development of vices like the use of liquor and opium. It has been justified as a means of religious conversion as well as by biological casuistry and appeal to economic theories.¹ But it has disappeared. The process of its disappearance has varied in different nations. Sometimes it has gradually been advanced to serfdom, sometimes it has yielded, as in British possessions, to peaceful emancipation, and sometimes it has been abolished in the tragedy of civil war. But it has disappeared. We have not always been wise in the treatment of emancipated slaves; we have been sometimes too harsh and sometimes too optimistic in the programs by which we have sought to make them into citizens. But the social conscience of Europe and America and Japan has refused to permit human beings to be regarded as property. This much civilization in these latter days has settled. Problems of education and social integration, confusion as to the relations of advanced and backward races, experiments in economic stability and efficiency still face us, but the slave has become a person.²

¹ Reference might well be made to the policy of the Spanish conquerors. As to the actual extent to which religious motives operated among slave-holders in the American Colonies, see Jernegan, "Slavery and Conversion in the American Colonies," *American Historical Review*, xxi (1916), pp. 504-527.

² In view of subsequent events it may not be without interest to recall that Great Britain by the Treaty of Utrecht (1713) was given the monopoly of furnishing slaves to Spanish colonies, and that in 1750 by the Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle she was allowed an indemnity

2. Women have been taken from the position of property either of the father or the husband and have been advanced into the field of persons. This tendency while incipient in such a high civilization as that of the Roman Empire is even yet by no means universal. The women of many societies of Asia are not far in advance of their condition a hundred years ago; African women still are mere drudges and child-bearers; but in all countries where the ideals of what we call Christian civilization have come, the position of women has immediately become more personal. An over-zealous Chinese Republic ventures upon limited woman suffrage and Japan which sees hundreds of thousands of women operatives in its new factories projects protective legislation and founds women's colleges. The struggle in Europe and America to bring about the treatment of women as actual persons has been long and in some localities they are still regarded as charming members of the legal trio, the other two members of which are idiots and infants. But in all civilized countries the tendency is steady towards emancipating the wife from the control of her husband, of giving her the right to manage and bequeath her own property as well as pay taxes upon the same. The extension of suffrage in Finland and

of £100,000 for surrendering this right. The enforced slave trade was one of the grievances urged against Great Britain by the Virginia colonists in 1770.

the United States is a further indication that society is coming to feel that not only are women persons, but that they must bear the responsibilities of persons. That such tendencies will be given impetus by the new industrial status of women in the nations now at war is one of the hopeful elements in the present reign of scientific violence.

3. Equally pronounced is the growing tendency to recognize the personal rights of childhood. A Child Welfare week turns the attention of an entire nation to the betterment of neglected children. The wisdom and indeed the legitimacy of the act of a physician who refused to try to save the life of an infant born deformed, and destined, if permitted to live, to illness if not worse, enjoys the attention of a nation. The fact that there should be condemnation of such a decision marks very sharply the advance in our attitude toward children as compared with that of both ancient and modern non-Christian peoples. Few indeed have been the civilizations — some of them even as high as those of Greece and Rome and China — where parents have not been justified by public opinion in refusing to bring up their infants and in exposing them, especially if they be girls, to death or in selling them as slaves. The change is not one of mere sentiment, but it is based upon the fundamental conviction that the child has worth as an incipient person. This recognition of the personal worth of children doubt-

less springs in part from the biological impulse which all life has in a new generation but it is already something far more idealistic.¹ Genetic psychology makes it probable that many of our social customs have a biological basis, and Westermarck² may be correct in holding that marriage is an inheritance "from some ape-like progenitor." Be that as it may; there can be nothing disgraceful in such origin, for origins are points of departure, not of arrival. Marriage in Christian civilizations is not a mere permanent mating but is a co-partnership of persons sanctified by the noblest ideals of religion itself. Really to appreciate the growing sense of the worth of the child we need only compare its place in the best organized animal society we know with the modern regard for eugenics, education and general social oversight. The care of permanently mated animals and birds for their offspring, and this modern spirit of care for children are as far apart as instinct and morality. For the child has more value than that accorded it by the family, high as was that value in older societies.

We are barely entering upon this newer estimate of infants and children, for the transition from the con-

¹ John Fiske is now generally recognized as the first to call attention to the influence of the prolonged infancy of human beings upon the development of civilization. See *Darwinism and Other Essays*, p. 45 sq.

² *History of Human Marriage*, ch. 3; *Origin and Development of the Moral Ideas*, i, pp. 364-489.

ditions of family life set by simple economic organization to those developing in our present industrial order has come upon us so suddenly that we are only beginning to realize that since society has disorganized the old it must reorganize new conditions in which the family as an institution must function. And this reorganization is already in process. The social regard for the worth of children is beginning to give content to society's obligation to the family itself. Though we are as yet hardly more than experimenting in this field, we are not reverting to impersonal social control, but to a new adjustment of social influences to personal rights both of the living and of the unborn. True, it is almost startling to see how modern society is organizing itself upon some of the lines of Plato's speculation as to the bringing up of children. They are now taught and sometimes fed during school hours at public expense. The unique solidarity of the home which marked the earlier phases of tribal and even of our earlier democratic civilization is being rather clumsily and often tragically personalized, but society, even though it permits increasing freedom in divorce and is often bewildered by the over-frank super-individualism of the "emancipated" woman who claims to want a child but not a husband, has not forgotten its obligation to children as persons. It is astonishing to see how both politically and by voluntary action, society is endeavoring to furnish protec-

tion for boys and girls for whom the family circle in this period of transition can or will do little. The modern boy may very thankfully say, "When my father and my mother forsake me, then the Boy Scouts will take me up." From such experience as I have had, I am convinced that the motives leading to these new organizations for the care of children are more intelligent even than those which led the Roman emperors to establish orphanages. In them is disclosed a new appreciation of children not only as future citizens but as future persons. Therein is the secret of our sacrificial determination to guarantee the rising generation some degree of proper social direction.¹

4. The same attention is now being given to old age. Primitive social groups have sometimes honored their old men and women, but quite as frequently have they killed those who have passed the age when they can help supply the two elemental demands of the tribe, children and defense. Lexicography argues that even the Greeks, at least in their earlier days, distinguished sharply between the stages of human life, childhood, manhood and old age.² As compared with the helplessness of childhood, that of old age is more pitiable. In an industrial age like ours when any semblance of patriarchal authority is denied the old laborer, it is

¹ A wealth of material bearing on this new regard for the young will be found in Forbush, *The Coming Generation*.

² The man of years was not the *ἀνήρ* but the *γέρων*.

society alone that can assure his support as a true person when he has been deposed from industrial value by a more efficient because younger successor. And society is facing its task. Old Age Pensions are only one provision by which the new sense of the rights of the aged are appreciated. The crude methods of the poorhouse and charity are being replaced by institutions, allowances and charities, which respect the domestic rights of the aged, as men and women who have rendered society real service and are to be treated as persons rather than as worn-out machines.

5. Similarly in the case of the unfit. The laughter of the Gods of Olympus as they watched lame Vulcan waiting on their table was an echo of the ancient world's attitude toward the unfit. For them there was little hope of livelihood except in beggary. But our modern world is growing distrustful even of charity and looks toward a better order of things in which society shall give the unfit larger opportunity for such personal development as they are capable of attaining, while at the same time they are prevented from propagating their unfitness as a perpetual source of individual misery and social weakness.

III

Such facts lead us to appreciate the even more significant subordination of the economic efficiency of individuals to their personal values. This is a char-

acteristic of the developing social order too often overlooked in the study of group action.

1. The earliest type of such subordination is undoubtedly that of self-preservation. A man will give almost anything economic in exchange for his life.¹ When this attitude of self-preservation becomes nationalized, it is transformed into patriotism. Such a transformation introduces new struggles between the economic and idealistic elements in history. But even here the personal asserts itself. Few nations fail to identify their self-preservation with a sense of idealistic mission to the world. One of the paradoxes of life then ensues. Ethical ideals, however abstractly formulated, when once in the consciousness of a nation not only spur that nation to self-expression in the contemporary form of its highest social efficiency, but they become the justification of wars which culminate in economic advantage or loss. Thus, when the French nation became a devotee to political liberty, it not only threw the bodies of nobles and kings into lime-pits, but it undertook to carry its new gospel by force to the entire world. The Philistine mind, especially if cynical, is tempted to pronounce the speeches of the French generals, and particularly of the young Bonaparte, as French armies started out upon conquest of surround-

¹ For a paradoxical presentation of the thesis that "the rights of property are more important than the right to life" since if "property is secure, it may be the means to an end, whereas if it is insecure it will be the end itself," see More, *Aristocracy and Justice*, pp. 127-148.

ing nations in the name of liberty, as hypocritical buncombe. But such judgment is unjust. In those early expansions of the French Republic — I am not speaking now of the later wars of the Napoleonic Empire — in which a nation intoxicated with the fresh draughts of liberty undertook to compel the world to share in its joys, France was as sincere as it is given to a nation to be sincere. Mistaken of course it was, but no more mistaken than a nation which in seeking self-preservation justifies military efficiency in the name of a call to spread its culture, or than a nation which would make foreign missions a phase of national expansion. The attempt to enforce ethical ideals upon unwilling races resembles a story told of Frederick William I of Prussia, who at one period of his life was fond of walking up and down the streets of his little capital. In these wanderings he was accustomed to discipline his subjects without waiting for courts, and his cane became an object of dread. One day as he was walking he met a man coming up a cross-street. When this unfortunate saw that it was the king he was about to meet, he turned to run, whereupon the old king seized him by the collar and gave him a thorough thrashing, shouting out between the blows: "You miserable rascal, why did you run away? Don't you know I want my people to love me?"

But this analogy tells only half the facts. Whenever a national sense of personal values and ideals precipi-

tates war, it is clear enough that economic motives, however they may have operated in the shaping up of a situation, are subordinated to the non-economic. That wars have been fought confessedly and without disguise for land and trade requires no arguing, but there have been many other wars in which men have run counter to all rational economic forecast, fascinated by a sense of their mission to the welfare of humanity. Recall the usual vindication of the wars waged by the Hebrews in the name of Jehovah. National self-preservation leads to wars of defense; but a sense of mission to other nations makes nations fanatic — not averse, it is true, to being repaid for altruism by territory and indemnities — but none the less fanatic. How else shall one describe our war with Spain — not to mention a more recent exponent of militaristic idealism ?

Yet it may be replied that such motives do not include the welfare of individuals and that at the best the justification of war by professions of sacrifice for others is national hypocrisy. In many cases this will have to be admitted. War is certainly destructive of individualism because of the exigencies of discipline. But this is only temporary in modern warfare. Not only have nations in addition to economic or political necessity genuinely imagined they fought to bring education, religion, and liberty to the individuals of other nations, or parts of nations, but such additions

to individual well-being have often resulted, directly as well as indirectly. Recall as only one illustration the spiritual renascence of Prussia after the Napoleonic conquest. This addition of a spiritual motive to the pressure of economic needs does not detract from such impersonal needs, but is not this multiple motive to be seen in the wars of France and the United States I have just mentioned, as well as in the case of Gustavus Adolphus, the assistance given by the French court to the American colonies in their war with Great Britain, the Civil War in the United States, and in the imperialistic plans for Africa organized by Cecil Rhodes?¹ Economic causes lay back of these wars beyond doubt; but a conscious desire to further individual well-being was there as well.

2. Clearer evidence of the subjection of economic efficiency to personal values may be found in recent non-military history. Conscientious scruples have led many a nation to sacrificial acts. Take the case of slavery. Slavery is one of the methods by which men have undertaken to provide a dependable labor supply. The supply of slaves was originally furnished by the slave trade. When the moral sense of Christendom rose against slavery and the slave trade was abolished, the economic situation of many tropical lands was seriously menaced. Particularly was this the case in the

¹ The argument by which Cecil Rhodes based British control of South Africa upon the existence of God is too well known to need repetition.

British West Indies and in the Dutch possessions in Java. The new conscience of England led in 1834 to the abolition of slavery and the substitution of a form of contract labor, which while by no means ideal, recognized in theory the personal worth of negro laborers.¹

In Java slavery persisted somewhat longer, but there, too, it was technically abolished, only to cause serious economic difficulties. The emancipated native had so few wants that he would not labor. To meet the difficulty there was worked out a method (in part suggested by British policy in Jamaica) of compelling the natives to pay a tax in kind to the government. The government indicated the fields on which certain commodities were to be raised as well as the amount of those commodities that should be raised, and the natives were compelled to bring their quota of produce sometimes from long distances across the mountains and the forests. Under this administration the Dutch colonies in Java were prosperous, but the condition of the natives grew miserable. In the course of time the Dutch conscience was touched and it recognized the iniquity of a condition equivalent to slavery but without even the few advantages which slavery grants its victims, and the system was abolished.²

¹ The fact that "Slavery" is not contained in the index to the final volume of the *Cambridge Modern History* is eloquent tribute to our new conscience.

² See Day, *The Dutch in Java*.

More notorious was the treatment of the natives of the Congo Free State by the representatives of the various companies mostly controlled by King Leopold of Belgium engaged in the rubber traffic. The method there employed was very similar to that which had been adopted in Java, and it is to be found even yet in force in certain Portuguese possessions. Natives were compelled to bring in to the government a certain amount of produce, particularly of rubber. When such returns were not forthcoming, punitive expeditions were sent against the native villages. The situation became so terrible as to appear an international scandal, and after no small agitation the Belgian Government took over the king's private share, and since that time the Congo Free State, while hardly to be described as a Paradise in which human personality is supreme, has had its economic efficiency at least tempered by a respect for the welfare of its negroes.¹

Possibly the most outstanding element of the moralizing of an economic process on the large scale is the treatment accorded the Philippines by the United States. We look back across half a generation since we somehow found ourselves possessed of the Philippines as the outcome of a war which has been variously regarded as the height of altruism and the depth of national hysteria. These years have certainly wrought a notable change in the attitude of the American

¹ See Harris, *Intervention and Colonization in Africa*, pp. 20-64.

people as regards the holding of lands in the tropics, but no man can now charge the United States with insincerity in its protestations that it would undertake to educate the inhabitants of the Philippines into a capacity of self-government. In all the history of the dealings of white races with tropical peoples, there is nothing comparable with the development of education through the American school system in the Philippines. The United States has not looted the Islands. In fact, in the minds of many people it has been singularly indifferent to their extraordinary economic resources. However imperfectly and waveringly the duty has been faced, the United States has undertaken to build up among the Filipinos ideals of personal value and indeed of individualism. What the future holds for the Islands none dares forecast in detail. But of one thing I think practically every American is convinced, namely, that a democracy cannot have a colonial policy after the fashion established by Great Britain and attempted by Germany in the nineteenth century. But this conviction is not of economic origin. It springs rather from a recognition of the worth of men and women which a democracy must recognize on the basis of equality rather than of subjection.¹

¹ In this estimate of the attitude of the United States toward the Philippines I am not unmindful of the rôle force has played in the establishment of order in the islands. The main point of my contention concerns the attempt to give the Filipinos something more than

3. Illustrations of similar subordination of economic efficiency to personal values are also to be seen in the new spirit developing in our modern industrial world. Thus the tendency to rise from estimating industrial conditions by formulas of price and production to a recognition of the personal well-being of the workman appears in recent legislation in the United States. I will mention only one of the many phases of this important matter.

During the last ten years we have been rebuilding our nation on the basis of the power given Congress by the Constitution to regulate interstate commerce. Not to mention the legislation dealing with trusts and combinations, who of the fathers could have imagined that on the basis of this power of Congress we should have legislation compelling railroads to put safety devices on their freight cars, insuring the proper inspection of meat, punishing gentlemen poisoners who dealt in foods made attractive by dyes and poisons, imprisoning procurers, and restricting the amount of labor which children should be called upon to give in various factories? Evidently we are

the status of prosperous subject peoples. The control of a backward nationality by an advanced state may give social stability without ultimate independence and self-direction. Examples of this sort are too numerous to mention, but the policies of Great Britain in Egypt and India and of Japan in Korea are in point. Particular attention may be called to the publications of the imperial government of Japan describing the immense economic progress made in Korea.

beginning to recognize that human welfare is more important than profits.

There are also new movements within the commercial world itself. Competition, once the unquestioned life of trade and economic theory, is by no means decadent in American life; but whereas competition between manufacturers was once regarded as a form of war in which it might have been charity, but certainly not business, for one competitor to share his efficiency methods with another, there is developing at the present time a coöperative attitude among competitors. Whatever may have been the motive which inaugurated the free interchange of experience and conclusions among executives engaged in the same lines of business, there is no doubt that, as one of them says, such interchange of trade secrets not only fails to injure each other's business, but it certainly makes competitors "feel better towards each other." "To feel better towards each other" is not far removed from kinship with the Golden Rule.

However much men may hesitate to plead altruistic motives for business policies, it is nevertheless true that there is developing in our economic life a new sense of the worth of the man in business as distinct from the business man. Even those who would justify the installation of welfare work in their factories by the plea that it is good business know in their hearts that they are altruistic sheep in economic wolves'

clothing. They know their employees have rights as men and women.¹

Finally, when we estimate the entire drift of the labor-capital struggle, it will appear that even though it has not yet wholly emerged from the semi-barbaric stage of violence, the tendency on the part of the movement as a whole is towards the *humanizing* of industrial relationships. Organized labor with all its defects has been educating the industrial world to regard workmen as co-producers. Our economists are less keen than formerly to regard labor as a commodity. That in itself is a gain because as soon as labor is seen to be a personal element in production comparable with that of the *entrepreneur*, a long step has been taken toward the recognition of justice in the distribution of products. Indeed the passage is already begun from an exclusive estimate of production, an impersonal process, as the proper approach to the struggle between labor and capital, to an emphasis on consumption, a personal process.

This long struggle in the midst of which we now find ourselves, began in an age which was unwilling to look upon the workingman as having rights or even real personality. The leaders of the then "dismal science" always began their work with the naïve assumption of economic men starting off society anew on desert

¹ For a very complete presentation of this entire matter see Henderson, *Citizens in Industry* (with good working bibliography).

islands. In the pursuit of their deductive method economists forgot that they were dealing with real folks when they talked about laborers. Naturally such depersonalized thinking had its counterpart in ignorant antagonisms and the destruction of newly invented machines. That attitude, of course, has by no means disappeared, and among certain leaders of labor is being erected into a sort of philosophy. Yet even syndicalism, particularly in France, is insistent upon the personal rights of the laborer himself, thus introducing into the economic struggle spiritual values which are bound to be increasingly recognized by those who will have nothing to do with syndicalism.

The humanizing of the laborer is being recognized as a phase of social justice rather than of charity. To appreciate this fact we no longer need to make our point of departure slavery or serfdom, the peasantry of the eighteenth century, or even the legislation of Bismarck. When one compares the state of mind regarding labor unions during the middle of the nineteenth century with that, let us for the sake of moderation say, of the National Civic Federation, it will immediately be seen that there has been a very radical change in the mode of approach as well as in the elements into which the labor-capital struggle is being analyzed. In other words, we are finding personal values in our economic processes. Compensation Acts,

for instance, are no longer a novelty, but they involve a new view of law. The injured workingman does not have to prove negligence on the part of the employer. The fact that more than a majority of injuries are not due to negligence on the part of either employer or fellow-workmen has made it obvious that it is a duty for society to see that necessarily hazardous employments shall provide compensation for their victims.¹

The marked tendency of our economic thought itself is in the direction of recognizing personal values. It would be impossible nowadays for any economist to get a hearing for the philosophy of his early-Victorian fellows. The industrial order has been found to be full of other than economic motives. The men who have to make their living have their loves and hatreds, their desire for leisure and play, the impulses born of family responsibility and the ambition to have their children get more out of life than they themselves have possessed. Socialism has far larger range than economic life. At all points, it is true, personal desires touch the economic realm, but they are in every case independent factors quite distinct from the world of machines which the workmen wish to control. A thorough-going socialist of the modern type like Spargo can even speak

¹ Boyd, "Important Constitutional Questions, New in Form, Raised by the Texas Workmen's Compensation Act," *Yale Law Journal*, xxv (1915), pp. 100-121.

of the spiritual aspects of Socialism and the Christian elements in Marxian Socialism.¹

Such conditions as these are not merely biographical. They are genuinely social and therefore historical. They not only make plain the tendency in life away from the primacy of economic conditions which occasioned if they did not originate human activities, but they show positively that in our modern social life with its interplay of social forces, humanity passes into a new stage of self-estimate. Men are less prone to look upon themselves, or even upon their fellows as cogs of an economic machine, and despite the injustice which still exists, whether consciously or unconsciously, they are increasingly giving weight to the personal values of the individual which emerge in the economic process.²

This recognition of personal values is producing a morality and a reliance upon character which is more than economic astuteness. True, there are those who are ready to lift society into too high an eminence and to accord it disproportionate importance in our present efforts at reconstruction of social affairs. But such belittling of individual values is already correcting

¹ An interesting collection of sources bearing upon "human beings as economic factors" is contained in Marshall, Wright and Field, *Materials for the Study of Elementary Economics*, pp. 105-156.

² A discussion of this tendency in its most difficult and recent phase, the employment of women, will be found in Abbott, *Women in Industry*, especially chs. 12, 13.

itself as we gain a more accurate understanding of human life. If, as must be admitted, society is something more than a mere aggregation of individuals, it is not something apart from individuals. Nor does it tend to destroy their worth. Rather are we coming to see that it enriches as well as directs their self-expression. Here as always the concrete practice and tendency of history is of more weight than the literary exposition of theories or philosophies. And except in moments of crisis, both in legislation and social practice, group action looks increasingly toward the welfare of the individual. War alone, that enemy of individualism, forces the group to act directly and exclusively for its own good. Nationalism, which in segregated units preserves the old anti-individualism of an imperialistic state, is, however, yielding, though slowly, to the regard for higher individual values.

Similarly the class struggle—so much akin to national militarism—reduces the worth of individuals. But solidarity as an ultimate good is decreasingly to be seen except in moments of struggle. Then it may find expression in an unquestioning class loyalty. In normal conditions class consciousness is subordinated to individual welfare. Therein we can trace the same progress as in the development of government. Group action¹ is for the personal welfare of the members of a

¹ Thus a socialist like Walling, *Larger Aspects of Socialism*, p. 113, says, "Socialism like sociology is forced, first of all, to meet the great

group. The individual is emerging as a self-conscious end, daring to criticize and, if need be, to antagonize his group even while he sees his life is bound up in the bundle of lives of others. The labor movement as it has grown intelligent has become a movement of laborers, and, despite its temptations to take up the rôle of master which the capitalist is beginning to abandon, it cannot escape the force of the historical movement. The woman movement is recasting the position of women in family and industry as well as in politics in the interest of larger personal freedom. What the future has in store for our industrialized society we do not know. But of one thing we can be sure; society is not headed toward slavery or even the economic subjection of machine-workers to class movements or machine owners. The progress of the future we may well expect will be written in terms of persons, not of mere producers.

This tendency of history is history in the making.

underlying question: how is the freest and fullest development of the individual to be secured while society is doing more and more of the things which were formerly done by individuals?" And (p. 138) "Socialism demands that every individual born into the world be given equal opportunity and a function in society corresponding to his native abilities." Walling's entire chapter 6 on "Society as God" seems to show that the individual in society rather than society is ultimate. See also from not strictly socialistic points of view, Hobson, *The Crisis of Liberalism*, and Nordau, *The Interpretation of History*, especially pp. 76-81. Reference also should be made to the various programs in which socialistic idealism is set forth.

With that conviction we may look confidently for a still further extension and enrichment of the social process by which individuals in society are regarded as capable of becoming of more individual and social worth. Civilization itself is growing less impersonal as economic values yield to the recognition of immaterial goods which lie in the non-economic realm of individuality and spiritual freedom.¹

In this tendency is to be found not only an explanation of the rise of new rights and duties but also an appeal to every earnest soul for coöperation. In its light political economy instead of being the "dismal science" of Carlyle becomes an exposition of humanity's unquenchable ambition to live not by bread alone. The development of economic efficiency is being slowly transformed into a new opportunity for expressing the fraternity of the spirit.

¹ Reference may well be made here to Lamprecht, *What is History* (especially lectures 1 and 4) in which the socio-psychological character of history is set forth.

LECTURE V

THE TRANSFORMATION OF RIGHTS INTO JUSTICE

THE third positive tendency to be seen in history and particularly in the more highly developed states both ancient and modern, is the outcome of the two tendencies already discussed; it is the substitution of the giving of justice for the struggle for rights. The data at our disposal here are more obscure and less recognized than those indicating the rise of inner authority and the increase of regard for individuality, but they are none the less in evidence.

The two words "justice" and "rights" are frequently used without careful distinction. Their differences may be said to be not so much in their content as in their approach to a situation. "Rights" is a term of acquisition and "justice" is a term of extension. We seek our rights; we give justice. To give justice is to recognize the other man's rights, and among such rights is that of having justice done him — that is to say, of having his rights recognized.

But what are rights? About this question has centered controversy ever since men began to think.¹

¹ For a general statement from the legal point of view see Lightwood, *The Nature of Positive Law*, especially chs. 5-7. Maine,

In the minds of some persons, particularly the philosophers of the eighteenth century and their successors, there are such things as natural rights — that is, the rights which a man enjoys as man independent of society. These rights came into being in a state of nature which is supposed to have existed prior to the organization of society. Since they are independent of society they cannot be destroyed by society, although the state of nature has suffered at the hands of those, who, acquiring control of their fellows in one way or another, have deprived them of their natural rights.

That this hypothesis is not without its truth may be admitted, but when the historian asks for the evidence of the existence of such a state of nature before society he gets no answer. And with good reason. As far as anthropological research can show, humanity always was social and to search for a state of nature in which a man had rights antedating society is like an attempt to find a state of light rays before the existence of light.

What we call rights are the creatures of a mixed ancestry. Their basis is the impulse of human life to express personal worth so that it may become greater in the process of a social life itself possessed of personal values. But rights themselves are not their basis or their philosophy. They are not things, but expressions of concrete social attitudes. A right emerged when a

Ancient Law has been to some extent replaced by more recent examinations of primitive societies.

group recognized as inviolable some advantage enjoyed by one or more of its members.

Rights may have originated in economic advantages which emerged in elemental societies when the supply of tillable land or other useful things was not sufficient to supply all the needs of a group. Whether or not Professor Carver¹ be correct in maintaining that economic scarcity is the chief basis of moral values, scarcity is very probably the mother of property. The right of individuals to breathe the air has never been questioned because it is one of those things in which the element of scarcity has never figured. When things that were useful were also scarce, there developed by custom, doubtless protected by force, the recognition as inviolable certain advantages enjoyed by one man but not enjoyed by another. How this man acquired these advantages it is idle to speculate at this late day, although philology suggests that he got them by his good right arm. But however gained such advantages were admitted by the group to which their possessors belonged and whoever attempted to deprive a man of them felt the vengeance of the social group. As Westermarck points out, this character of inviolability was included in the concepts of rights among primitive peoples.² Such an explanation, however, in the nature of the case is speculative rather than his-

¹ *Essays in Social Justice*, ch. 2.

² *Origin and Development of the Moral Ideas*, I, 139.

torical, and it may very likely be that the origin of what we regard today as rights was something very different. Yet whatever their origin, rights involve a social recognition of the inviolability of exclusive control of some natural agent, some economic, political, social or other advantage.¹

Here as so often in history the occasion of development in history is economic and impersonal. But just as true is it that the human element is the factor that makes history, refusing to serve in some Egypt of inherited privilege. Any new social idealism questions that inviolability which precedent and practice have recognized. To learn the secret of the rise of democracy one needs to study this skepticism as to the finality of social sanction which makes monopolized advantage inviolable. For in it lies the explanation of that sharing of rights to which we give the name Justice.

I

When we pass from the question as to the origin of rights to what men have claimed to be rights, it is clear that we have to do not only with concrete advantages but with human motives and reasons. For rights can exist as such only as men's attitudes toward the inviolability of advantage persist unchanged. The growth

¹ Ihering, *Geist des römischen Rechts*, III, 60, defines a right as "an interest protected by the law." But law is only one way of expressing social regard for inviolability.

of the sentiment of justice is a phase of social psychology. Rights are democratized in proportion as society refuses to sanction the monopoly of advantages. But the first stage of such a process is a struggle for new rights — a struggle that has generally been marked by war and revolution.

1. Consider first the right of property. Men not only have property but they have what they believe is a right to hold property. When this sense of right appears, men feel they are backed by more than might or convention or social concession. Thus the Stoics justified a fundamental right by an appeal to the rational order of the universe. Roman thinkers like Cicero anticipating later thought maintained that every man had the principles of right — i. e., the recognition of others' rights — innate within himself. Following him the Roman jurists spoke of a *lex naturalis* — a law which was immanent in the very nature of things. Thus they could speak of rights which were more fundamental than any human law granted. This view which maintained itself throughout the history of the Middle Ages came to marked expression in the philosophy of Locke and later in that of Rousseau, while back of both lay the Covenant which served so admirably to express both the religious and the political thought of the days of Hooker. These writers with their fellows were not concerned in anthropological investigation or in the history of

the development of those attitudes of mind which they unconsciously assumed in their discussion. For instance, in discussing the state of nature the rights of men were not positively distinguished from those of women.

Yet if this thought was *a priori*, it none the less profoundly influenced the development of history. Property was a fundamental right—an inviolable advantage, "the periphery of one's person extended to things."¹ Men were moved to revolution not merely for the sake of their property, but for the defense of their right to manage their property. This I take it was one of the fundamental motives in the American Revolution.² Our national forefathers undoubtedly wished to organize a government that would give financial and industrial stability to the united colonies, and as democrats they may have looked with more favor upon agrarian than upon commercial property, but economic rights were not all they wanted when they rebelled from England. They had their property. They wanted the right to use it as they judged to be right. For this they fought and died. American democracy was assured when the colonists first began to question the inviolability of the advantages monopolized by the mother-country.

¹ Ihering, *The Struggle for Law*, p. 55.

² Burke, on *Conciliation with America*, states this explicitly as it relates to taxation.

The same attitude of belief in the inviolability of acquired economic advantage lies at the basis of capitalism. Just when and how this form of economic right developed we do not now undertake to discover. Capitalism has a long pedigree. In its present form it perpetuates economic advantages which, inherited from mediaeval and even ancient practice and laws, grew into amazing proportion with the invention of machines and the private exploitation of newly discovered natural resources in unoccupied continents. The inviolability of such economic control of the agents and the materials of production rests upon laws, royal charters, patents, concessions, and above all upon the inertia of the social mind. For generations the sanctity of property was extended without discrimination to conditions which were unlike those in which property rights were first evolved. Capitalism, though it has lost some of its inviolability through being subjected to limitations in present legislation, is yet a right and will so continue so long as our present economic order continues. For it embodies social sanction of the right to property.

2. The right to property is the prototype of other rights. In the course of history non-economic advantages are recognized by the various social groups as inviolable, and this estimate in the course of time becomes so habitual as to make any interference with such advantages liable to social punishment. In

general, these other rights have varied according to the complexity of a civilization. Thus the rights of women in a primitive civilization were narrowly individual, based on their biological and economic functions in the tribe, whereas the rights of men were not only personal, but political as well. Whatever weight we may give to the evidence of early matriarchal control, when social orders really began to develop, only in rare instances did the woman seem to have the right to head the state. Such queens as Semiramis, Alexandra and Cleopatra were certainly exceptional in ancient states. Even in such relatively high civilizations as those of Greece and Rome, the position of women was non-political and subject to the control of father or husband. In Athens the *hetairai* enjoyed freedom that married women were denied, but their position was anomalous in the state. True, in Rome the development of social life led to a tendency to abolish the *cum manu* position of married women,¹ but the Roman matron never enjoyed the full rights of citizenship, however in exceptional cases she might study, enter professions and even become a gladiator. And in Rome the new woman found satirists only too ready to misjudge or bemoan her new liberties. The status of Jewish women² as well as that of those of the

¹ See Fowler, *Social Life at Rome*, ch. 5; Marquardt, *Das Privatleben der Römer*, passim.

² See Mielziner, *Jewish Law of Marriage and Divorce*; Amram, *Jewish Law of Marriage and Divorce*; Oesterley and Box, *The Religion and Worship of the Synagogue*, pp. 284-303.

Graeco-Roman world is clearly implied in the letters of Paul. In Christ there was no male or female¹ but in the social order the woman was the weaker vessel, wearing a veil because of the angels, and in church she was to be silent, permitting the men to exercise the gifts of the Spirit and fill the church offices.²

Parents had rights over their children, custom permitting a parent to treat his children much as if they were his property.

Within certain limits also there was in ancient societies the right to worship, but according to the temper of various groups the right to perform magic was not recognized. The terror of the Witch of Endor lest her surreptitious dealing with the shades in Sheol should come to the attention of Saul is an illustration of activities which could not be carried on as rights because they lacked social sanction.³

Further, the movement in history has developed in addition to these individual rights, social advantages deemed inviolable, such as group rights or class rights. Slave-owning communities are notable for their insistence upon the prerogatives of the freeman as over against the slave. With the rise of large land-owning families, the tendency towards the enjoyment of special rights by certain groups became evident. Thus

¹ Gal. 3: 28.

² 1 Cor. 7; 11:1-16; 14:34-36; Eph. 5:22, 23.

³ 1 Sam. 28:3-25.

to the general group of rights which members of such classes possessed is to be added the particular right to enjoy the rights accorded to the class.

Illustrations of how individual rights vary according to the class to which the individual belongs will be found in the history of every country where political and social classes have existed. Thus in the ancient Frankish kingdom the Salic law shut out women from royal succession and the practice of composition clearly indicates the difference in "honor" or the right to share in the recognition accorded the class to which a man belonged. Under feudalism a people always tends to break up into strata superimposed upon each other with rights increasing in proportion to the removal of a class from the lowest social group or that of serfs. These have practically no rights which lift them above the condition of slaves except the fact that they are immovably attached to a given estate.

From this class of rights may have sprung the caste system, that of India being the most complete. In that vast country apparently successive waves of immigration superimposed themselves upon the native people and then, gradually subdividing themselves in industrial and other groups, so monopolized their rights as to make it impossible for the members born in one group to pass into another.¹ The caste

¹ A good brief account of the rise of the caste system in India will be found in Jones, *India, Its Life and Thought*, pp. 91-149.

system, with all its inequalities, and one might almost say insanity of rights, developed. The most perfect political contrast in history is not between democracy and some highly organized absolute monarchy, but between democracy and a society organized on the feudal or the caste system. For the fundamental conception of democracy is that such advantages monopolized by individuals or classes and so crystallized as rights cannot be regarded as inviolable; that so far as their relations with society are concerned men should have equality of rights.¹ That is to say, whatever may be true of nature and the aberrations of heredity, democracy protests that society shall play no favorites. How far we are from this condition of ideal democracy is easy to see, but the movement within history toward such an ideal is also traceable. To this we shall return later. At present I call attention only to the tendency of economic advantages to pass into rights and these rights to furnish norms for the recognition of non-economic advantages as inviolable. We shall see how the growing sense of the personal worth of individuals tended to modify or to destroy this social recognition of inviolability, and thereby to substitute justice for rights. The spiritual quality of such a readjustment of social attitudes is too evident to demand exposition.

¹ Napoleon recognized this with characteristic precision when he declared that Frenchmen of his day wanted liberty less than equality.

II

In considering this new stage in the historical process, we may well center our attention on the typical struggle for rights in English society which began with Magna Charta and has tended to develop the conception of justice as democratized rather than monopolized advantages. The course of this development we shall see has always involved the attack upon an existing or a threatened social assent to the inviolability of some monopoly of advantages. That is, it has been due to a growing recognition of spiritual values.

In calling attention to this particular development, I would not be understood to overlook the remarkable development which also took place within the Roman Empire. While checked by a variety of forces which the political theories and economic limitations made it impossible for the Roman Empire to overcome,¹ Roman law, as has already been pointed out, tended to conceive itself as based upon principles which, implied in the customs codified in *jus civile* and *lex gentium* or *lex naturalis*, could be extended to all fields of human activity. Such an extension of principles became in Rome as in England a basis for the extension of rights, that is the giving of justice; and this, the

¹ For a general account of the decline of the inner life of the Roman Empire, see *Cambridge Mediaeval History*, vol. 1, especially chs. 1, 2, 14, 15, 19; Davis, *The Influence of Wealth in Imperial Rome*, pp. 314-335.

Roman social mind conceived, was society's enforcement of the principle of *suum cuique*. That it did not reach even the present limit of socialized privilege is due to causes too complex for treatment here.

Magna Charta is now generally held to have been not a demand for new rights, but a recognition of the inviolability of those formerly enjoyed. It planned to resurrect and assure the conditions of the past rather than to force new concessions from King John. It was a correction of royal abuses in the field of long established customs and prerogatives rather than a philosophy of rights of the subject as an individual.

This first expression of a united desire of the church, the barons and the commons, summed up the traditional liberties of these three classes of the nation as distinguished from the king. The church was guaranteed liberty in elections to church offices; the barons and their sub-vassals were given limitation and safeguards in the fulfilling of their feudal duties of scutage and aids, reliefs, wardships and marriages, and prevented from too general alienation of fiefs; the commons, that is, all freemen, both townspeople and landowners below baronial rank, were protected against unjust increase of rents and customs and forcible seizure of certain property in times of war, and were given influence upon taxation through representation in the national council. Other provisions assured the maintenance of judicial processes threatened by

Norman oppression. These and other rights were guaranteed by a recognition of the right of rebellion in case the king failed to keep his share of the compact.¹

The list of rights set forth in Magna Charta shows clearly that the rights guaranteed were already fundamentally those of Englishmen, rather than those of men as such; that they concerned the relation of Englishmen of different grades to the king; that they concerned very largely the economic privileges including the rights of property and taxation. It would be, therefore, a mistake to consider English constitutional history either as beginning with Magna Charta or as interested primarily in abstract rights. The rights which were to be preserved were practices actually enjoyed in the past, and which were liable to repudiation on the part of English kings until the confirmation of the charters by Edward I eighty years after the historic meeting on Runnymede.

The subsequent history of the conception of rights in England proceeds, though by no means without breaks and reactions, along the lines thus laid down. Parliament gradually gained power, particularly in the way of granting supplies, and these powers soon became a part of the English constitution and so con-

¹ The charter is printed in full in Stubbs, *Select Charters*. Among the many discussions of its significance see Gneist, *Englische Verfassungsgeschichte*, pp. 240–255; Taylor, *Origin and Growth of the English Constitution*, I, pp. 380–391; Stubbs, *Constitutional History of England*, I, 569–583.

stitute the rights of Englishmen. Such a development is of particular significance to the student of history as indicating the actual way in which the idea of rights developed out from concrete situations rather than from abstract *a priori* doctrine. Rights in England with the noteworthy exception of the recognition of the rights of foreign merchants in time of war were rights of Englishmen.¹ Nor is this statement to be changed in any marked degree by the literature of later political theorists like Locke. With them, it is true, there is a very considerable recognition of the rights of an individual as over against the state, and in fact as antecedent to the state. The state was held to be composed of those who assented to certain limitations of their own rights. As a matter of fact, however, it would be difficult to show that these views had any deep influence upon the course of events of the seventeenth century. Concrete history is here of more

¹ Thus Burke in his speech on *Conciliation with America* in describing the colonists' love of liberty says, "They are not only devoted to liberty, but to liberty according to English ideas and on English principles. Abstract liberty, like other mere abstractions, is not to be found." He closes his speech with these words: "Let us get an American revenue as we have got an American empire. English privileges have made it all that it is; English privileges alone will make it all it can be." But as Jellinek (*The Declaration of the Rights of Men and Citizens*) has shown, the American colonists had advanced in theory from devotion to the rights of Englishmen to those of men (or rather of male citizens). We have yet to see clearly that patriotism in a nationalistic sense is still to be taught a similar lesson.

importance than literary theories. Even Locke himself, when he came to draw up a constitution for North Carolina, seems not to have attempted to put his theory of absolute right into operation. Writers on law, however, did take the matter up, and there began to develop a certain philosophy of rights which later was to have value in furnishing a theoretical basis for actual practice. At this point, therefore, we see the transformation in theory of the rights of Englishmen based upon English economic and political practice to rights of men enjoyed by Englishmen. What led to this partial transformation of rights into justice?

The answer is to be found in history rather than in political philosophy. True, such philosophy furnishes the new process phrases and justifications. Man was conceived of as having in a state of nature — that is to say, in an imagined state prior to government — certain rights which were his simply by virtue of the fact that he was a man. But suppose we undertake to list their rights as claimed by the men of the eighteenth century. There were, first of all, the right to the enjoyment of life and liberty, the acquisition and possession of property, pursuit of happiness and safety. These were held to include the right to be protected by government in his enjoyment of his life, liberty and property according to laws. Every freeman also was entitled to appeal to the courts, could participate in legislation and elections and was at liberty from other

laws than those to which he had given his consent; he was to be regarded as innocent until proved guilty, and could not be dispossessed of property or estate, life or liberty, without due course of law; he could worship God according to the dictate of his own conscience without interference, and was not liable to taxation except by his own consent.

In this list of rights drawn from those claimed in the various Bills of Rights of the American colonies, it will seem as if the most specific and strictly political are drawn from the fundamental rights which were held to belong to a man in the state of nature, but that is only superficially the case. Their real origin is not in literary speculation on politics or deductive logic, but in a concrete historical process set up by various conditions both in England and in the American colonies. And these conditions were not fundamentally economic but religious — the rise of religious Independency.¹

There were, of course, economic conditions which made this attitude of mind possible. From one point of view rights might almost be regarded as a sort of transcendental extension of the conception of property — what one is “to have and to hold.” Calvinism and capitalism march into history hand in hand. But economic causes by no means account for the very

¹ See Jellinek, *The Declaration of the Rights of Men and Citizens*. My obligation to Professor Jellinek at this point is great.

remarkable development within the group of men that held that every religious congregation should have the right to maintain its own affairs. This became a matter of conscience which was substantiated by texts from the Bible.¹ The Separatists of England driven out by the established church went first to Holland and then to America with the ideal of a self-administering congregation. That they belonged to the same economic class was less potent than that they wished the right to worship according to their own conscience.

But Independency at this stage was a struggle to acquire and enjoy rights. Within these congregations there was no recognition of the right of others to religious liberty as such. Individuals in the Massachusetts Bay colonies were not granted the right to freedom of conscience and worship. In the struggle with the New World the sense of rights settled into intolerance. Yet the new stage was close at hand. Roger Williams, exiled from Massachusetts, founded at Providence the first government with absolute freedom of conscience. Maryland and Pennsylvania, though with limitations, also granted similar rights to others than their original colonists and this new social ideal was finally embodied in royal charters.

Thus the idea of rights which had been first those of Englishmen, and then those of the individual, became

¹ See, for instance, the illustrations given by Von Dobschütz, *The Influence of the Bible on Civilization*, pp. 153-163.

those inherent in a social order. In their speeches and tractates, James Otis and Samuel Adams agitate for the rights of the colonists as "men, Christians and citizens." In 1765 a Declaration of Rights was issued by the so-called Stamp Act Congress. In 1774 the Continental Congress published its Declaration of Rights, and in 1776 the Virginia Bill of Rights gave them epochal formulation and became the model of Bills of Rights prefacing the constitutions of most of the states of the new union. And, so mighty is idealism, this process of extending rights in actual society reached over to France and found expression in the Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen, prefixed to the constitution published in 1791 by the French Constituent Assembly. But with this new view of rights as belonging to all men, the inviolability of monopolized advantage in so far was denied. Privilege had been democratized. Religious idealism had given birth to an incipient political justice.

But the giving of justice was none the less induced by the struggle to get rights.

This new sensitiveness to injustice and this worldwide struggle for rights gave birth to the century of revolution. The inner motive of this struggle is to be sought, not in the philosophy in which it expressed and justified itself, but in a new spiritual attitude toward the world. How else could we explain the amazing popularity of Rousseau in France? This new attitude

arose from the perception that the inherited rights enjoyed by representatives of state and church had really ceased to be rights and had become privileges. That is, their owners had lost the sense of social obligation once implied by recognized monopolized advantages—let us say of feudal control and constitutional absolutism—and were champions of an inviolability of advantages which no longer were commensurate with the power of the less privileged, like the *bourgeoisie* of France, or the ideals of the state, as in the case of the American colonies. The call to "rights" became, therefore, a call to free or enforced repudiation of monopoly hitherto unquestioned. The tragedies of the eighteenth century were the outcome of the clash between those who wished to maintain their privileges and those who claimed them as their own rights, i. e., as advantages to be shared by those in revolt against an existing but outgrown social order. The new advance toward democracy was not altogether but largely by way of bloody conquest.

It is to be noticed, however, that this demand for the democratizing of privileges, now seen to be no longer rights assured to their possessors, was by no means unlimited. Slavery was permitted and in some cases full freedom was given only to those citizens who were actual church members.¹ But by the time of the out-

¹ An instructive illustration of this fact is to be seen in the legislation of the American colonies as to the effect of the acceptance of

break of the French Revolution the conception of rights which pertained to individuals as members of a state was a revolutionary force. Men fought enthusiastically for their rights as elements of a world order. Nor was this demand for rights limited to politics. Heaven itself was not permitted to practise absolutism. This sense of rights lay back of the spiritual movements in the latter part of the eighteenth and early part of the nineteenth centuries. John Wesley taught that the common people should claim their religious rights of salvation undeterred by foreordination, election and divine decrees. In Unitarianism humanity dared stand before a sovereign God and proclaim its rights in much the same spirit as the revolutionists in France and America had faced their earthly sovereigns.¹ The doctrine of the total depravity of human nature because of original sin was the object of attack, and men, particularly in New England, regarded themselves as possessed of inherent natural rights which God himself must needs in justice recognize.

At this point the struggle to get rights was to lead to an effort to extend rights and so give justice.

Christianity and baptism by negro slaves, as well as the unwillingness of many if not most slave-holders in the eighteenth century to have their slaves become church members. References to contemporary sources will be found in Jernegan, "Slavery and Conversion in the American Colonies," *Am. Hist. Review*, xxi (1916), 504-527.

¹ See the works of Channing, especially his essay on "The Moral Argument against Calvinism," *Works*, i, 217-242. See also Emerton, *Unitarian Thought*, ch. 3.

The philosophical explication of this struggle for individual rights which naturally followed became in the long life of Jeremy Bentham a revolutionary political gospel in that utilitarian political theory which had so great a power in England during the first half of the nineteenth century. The individual was to go to the courts not merely to gain an advantage for himself, but in the interest of personal dignity, freedom. To be indifferent to his rights as a property-holder or citizen was to endanger property rights and citizenship in general. "The greatest good for the greatest number" was not only a phrase easy to remember; it became a means of transition to the giving of justice. For when examined closely, the real significance of the Benthamite philosophy is seen to lie not so much in its insistence upon rights as upon the extension of rights. This is a new attitude of mind and may very well serve in theory, as it proved in fact, as a connecting link between the belligerent demand for rights in the eighteenth century and the collectivist extension of rights in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.

III

If it be granted that when rights are democratized even in terms of the "greatest number" a new attitude of mind arises, it appears that rights are no longer strictly final. There has emerged duty, the correlate of rights. To give justice — i. e., to recognize rights

as social, the property of others — supplements the gaining of individual rights. This social obligation of the individual appeared indeed in the highly idealistic constitution which the Legislative Assembly in France drew up in 1793. That constitution was preceded by a series of principles entitled "The Declaration of the Rights and Duties of the Man and Citizen," and these duties were there said to be summed up in the Golden Rule. But the times were not ripe for such idealism and the constitution was never put into operation.

In England, to continue the course of our illustration, this new sense of rights which were not to be monopolized by select classes became a ferment in the new social mind. In the field of religion it worked out into a new sense of responsibility, not for social reconstruction, it is true, but for social amelioration. The Evangelicals in the Church of England with their emphasis upon the sacrificial atoning work of the incarnate God gave the needed religious dynamic for all sorts of social reforms in England. The abolition of slavery, the better care of the insane, the reorganizing of poor relief, the extension of political privilege, the extension of foreign missions, the founding of the Young Men's Christian Association, all date from this new sense of the worth of the individual as enjoying rights which should be recognized by others. Professor Dicey¹ has elaborated the parallel between Evangel-

¹ *Law and Public Opinion in England*, pp. 399-409.

calism and the Benthamite philosophy as an element in the public opinion which lay back of and was conditioned by the legislative opinion of England. By it the democratic movement itself was to be ennobled.

From this point of view we can understand the fact also mentioned by Professor Dicey that the enthusiasm for democracy, which marked the early half of the nineteenth century, has very seriously diminished because of lack of belief in its finality. That seems to me to be, however, a very imperfect statement of the case. What has happened is a change in social attitudes as yet not fully appreciated. This change was born not so much of a lack of political passion as of a new conception of the relation of the individual to the state. Democracy is being transformed from an effort to acquire to an effort to share rights. In the various Bills of Rights almost as truly, although in a different manner, as in the case of Magna Charta, there was a sharp distinction between the individual and the state, so that each was regarded as more or less the enemy of the other.¹ That is to say, what the one obtained the other had to give up. Such a con-

¹ Thus James Otis asserted in his argument in the writs of assistance that "every man, merely natural, was an independent sovereign, subject to no law, but the law written on his heart, and revealed to him by his Maker, in the constitution of his nature, the inspiration of his understanding and his conscience." Quoted in McLaughlin, *The Courts, the Constitution and Parties*, p. 190.

ception leads readily to a struggle between the two, and democracy becomes an aggregation of individuals who have banded together to fight to regain theoretical rights lost in the organization of the state. The decay of enthusiasm for such a theory is not strange. The actual operation of human life discloses its fallacy. History did not begin and cannot re-begin with natural men on desert islands; rights are evolved not deduced. There is a genetic relationship in every forward movement connecting reforms with conditions which they seek to supersede. In that process we always are aware of the fact that the past holds us still in mortmain. This fact, the outgrowth not of theory but of the actual operation of life in its collective expression, brings us to the most recent tendencies in the socializing of rights. The individual is now seen to be by no means independent in origin from the society in which he lives, for economic and political rights are born of social experience. Such a conception of the basis of democracy is far enough from being that of the replevin of stolen rights and does not so easily stimulate the enthusiasm of acquisition which characterized the early stages of the democratic movement. It may be more blessed to give than to receive; but there is not generally so much enthusiasm about the larger blessing. Sacrifice for the good of society requires a loyalty to idealist values not so evident as the immediate gratification of self-interest. It is still

easier to arouse men to fight for rights than to lead them by sacrifice to give justice.

Modern democracy is not the theoretical state of the Bills of Rights, neither is it the appallingly efficient state of a military monarchy. It is rather a condition in the making. The processes of which we ourselves are a part and which we ourselves must still further spiritualize may be best described as involving, first, a new conception of the individual as social, and second, a new conception of rights as collective justice.

The individual is now no longer considered as over against society but as in society.¹ He has personal

¹ The biological origin of individuals is discussed by Child, *Individuality in Organisms*. According to Professor Child (p. 202), the organism is "fundamentally a specific reaction system in which quantitative differences initiate physiological individuation, development, and differentiation" in which it acts essentially as a unit in inheritance. "Development is not a distribution of the different qualities to different regions, but simply the realization of possibilities, of capacities of the reaction system. The process of realization differs in different regions because the conditions are different. Neither characters nor factors as distinct entities are inherited, but rather possibilities, which are given in the physico-chemical constitution of the fundamental reaction system, but not necessarily localized in this or that part of it. . . . If the organism is a unit in inheritance and development we must expect to find that so-called 'acquired characters' may be impressed on the organism to such a degree that sooner or later the reaction system may give rise to these characters without the action of the particular external factor which originally produced them." This description of a process in the elementary forms of life may well give us the point of departure for the conception of human individuality presented in the text. For a discussion of the human individual see Shaler, *The Individual*; Kirkpatrick, *The Individual in the Making*,

welfare only as a part of a society which itself has personal values. The test by which we estimate rights is, therefore, personal but socially personal. We ask not whether this or that law is good for the individual or society as it is, but whether it is good in that it conduces to action on the part of the individual in society which leads him to become somewhat more personal than he now is. That is to say, we must look at personal values as more than individualistic; not as static, but as dynamic; not as economic, but as social. The individual does not have a mass of rights by birth or creation, some of which are surrendered as the colonies surrendered various rights of sovereignty to form the federal government. He and society are contemporaneous in origin and both have been and ever will be involved in a process, the value of which must be judged from its personal outcomes in the individual and society alike. When rights thus conceived are attacked, the duty to contest even with force against the oppressor can be justified, only it should be borne in mind that such justification lies not in that rights as such are attacked, but in the fact that danger threatens rights, the loss of which would mean an injury to personal progress.¹

especially ch. 6. See also Royce, *The World and the Individual*; Bradley, *Principle of Individuality and Value*; Smyth, *The Meaning of Personal Life*, chs. 5, 6; Jones, *Social Law in the Spiritual World*, pp. 47-84.

¹ Ihering, *op. cit.*, does not make this distinction clear although he repeatedly uses language which implies such a position, and in a

This leads naturally to the other conception of rights as not so many fixed goods already existing to be apportioned or recognized, but as inherited conditions in which not only the individual will develop more personally, but in which society changes for the sake of helping on that development. At this point we can best decide just what rights really imply. The tendency to recognize individuals as personal gives us the clue. A man's rights are ultimately set by his capacity, in view of his biological, physical and moral inheritances, to realize his full personal possibilities in the midst of his social relations. More briefly, the worth of an individual is measured by his spiritual possibilities in society. To this worth consciously recognized rights like honor, physical protection, and property must be, and to a very considerable extent are, subordinated by much modern legislation. Rights are to be expressed in terms of equity rather than of equality. The formula of justice is not to each according to his needs, but to each according to his personal possibilities.¹ The rights as a social person, for example, of a normal man capable of large self-expression and of service to his kind must be measured by such capacity.

footnote on p. 32 defends himself against the contrary interpretation. He argues at length (55 sq.) that the connection of law with the person invests all rights with "ideal value."

¹ "Philosophy . . . must absolutely oppose all glorification of the natural, spiritually destitute individual." — Eucken, *Life's Basis and Life's Ideal*, p. 364.

So measured they will be very different from those which belong to a moron or a degenerate. There is vast difference between that which can be expected from and that which can be permitted to the strong man and the moron respectively. Each has a different worth in terms of future self-realization in social life.

IV

Clearly at this point we have passed from the eighteenth century's struggle to gain our own rights to a more genuinely social idealism in which we seek to recognize the rights of other persons in society. Therein lies justice. And "justice" rather than "rights" is the watchword of a coming democracy.

True, the one term is not altogether free from the uncertainties of definition that beset the other, but it is richer in social content. It also calls for sacrifice on the part of those who possess rights the inviolability of which a more intelligent and ethical social mind refuses longer to recognize.¹ Obviously personal values must here be the supreme end of social reconstruction if the general tendency of history is to persist.

¹ Mechem, "An Inquiry Concerning Justice," *Michigan Law Review* (xiv), March, 1916, has made an interesting collection of various attempts at defining "justice." Professor Mechem himself, after admitting that we have "no precise and definite conception of justice," and that "whatever may be our ideal we are unable to frame any formula of justice which shall be at once concise and definite, and, at the same time, accurately inclusive and exclusive" holds that it is

Therein lies the justification of democracy with its present imperfect social efficiency as over against the more immediate efficiency of imperialistic states. An empire with a philosopher as absolute ruler can more promptly arrange social welfare; it can make a state a better prepared military power; it can establish commercial and other forms of group efficiency. But, as the Empire of the Antonines proved, this efficiency is short-lived because it is gained at the expense of the self-directed energies of the individual. In a state as in a family, paternalism means restrained individuality. And, whatever be its advantages, paternalism if more than a passing stage, is a reform against the course of social evolution. A nation's ultimate worth may be in reverse proportion to the ease of its preparedness to wage successful war. Preparedness in the midst of an unethical internationalism may be the less of two evils, but it is no more an expression of ultimate social forces than quarantine against yellow fever is superior to proper methods of sanitation.

Face to face with so many arguments to the contrary, I appeal again for justification of this faith in democracy to historical tendencies.

i. This socializing of rights in the way of attempting to enable others to express more fully their per-possible in many cases to form a concept of justice " which will furnish us with at least a general principle of conduct." This concept, however, he would find by a study of individuals rather than of society as such. They change in and are created by social process.

sonal powers in social life is the determination to give justice. Though as yet only incipient it is already one of the marked characteristics of our day. Even after we have made the necessary reductions, history shows this tendency to be more marked since the collapse of the Benthamite individualism as a basis of state organization. We are no longer limited to state action in the extension of rights. Take for example the great development of free associations engaged in ameliorating the condition of the poor, the growth of charity, the organization of reforms of various sorts. In a number of instances such as the Juvenile Court and various municipal centers, park systems and playgrounds, the initiative has come from those who have been particularly susceptible to the sense of rights of other people. Private initiative has thus broken the way for collective activity of more political nature and the entire conception of the state as that of an institution which undertakes not only to protect, but to socialize rights, is growing more dominant. We begin to hear now of rights which the programs of the German peasants, Charters, Petitions, and Declarations do not mention: the right to work, to own land, to be compensated for injuries suffered in labor, to marry, to enjoy leisure, to be protected from industrial competition, to support in widowhood and in old age. These certainly indicate how rapidly public sentiment is moving away from the formal and abstract concep-

tions of natural rights into a recognition of the obligation of society as a whole to care for the individuals who are in and of it.

2. An interesting illustration of the passage from a sense of possessing rights to a recognition of mutual personal obligation is to be seen in the relations of the sexes. The classical world was lacking in romance. Love was not far removed from the desire for the possession of a woman by a man. Helen was the occasion of the Trojan War, but she was a married woman, and the Trojan War might be regarded as an elaborate appeal to the higher law which even today permits the injured husband to seek satisfaction for violence done marital property rights. The sequestered position of women of good social standing in the Greek states may account for the fact that famous love affairs of the Greek world are, like those of Damon and Pythias, Socrates and Alcibiades, between men and men, possibly quite as often as, in the case of Hero and Leander, between men and women. The oldest Greek romance at our disposal deals with a series of rather melodramatic adventures of a boy and a girl during their separation from each other in which the element of love is not very prominent after the rather startling first chapters.¹ Plutarch's discussion of love throws only a too vivid light upon the lack of any clear sense of sex morality.

¹ *Greek Romances.*

The very modern society of Rome was, as is shown in the cynical advice of Ovid, not unacquainted with love affairs as well as with less respectable relations between the sexes, and in the later Latin literature romance plays no inconsiderable rôle; but even here the ghost of sensuality will not be laid. True, the Roman world was not the sex-orgy apologists have sometimes pictured it. One has only to recall the numerous inscriptions on the graves of husbands and wives, or the charming story of Pliny and his young wife to see that in an age commonly held to be without such redeeming characteristics, the course of true love often ran clean and winsome. Further, in a world like Rome where personal values were beginning to dominate many social situations and to be recognized by law, it is not surprising to find that the proprietary rights of the husband in his wife represented by the *cum manu* form of marriage steadily disappeared in the more equitable and equal relationship in which the woman maintained her own self-direction, and did not come into the actual control of the husband. It was a far cry from the Blonde Beast carrying off his woman to the highly conventionalized marriage relation in which the wife passed from the control of her father to that of her husband; but it was no unimportant journey from that position to the freedom of the matron and the independence of the maid of the Roman Empire. But even in the light of these facts the relations of men

and women of the Roman world were not free from economic traditions.

The Middle Ages are commonly regarded as the very climax of romantic love and this description is certainly not altogether untrue to the stories of the *Minnesinger*. The attitude of the knight toward his lady-love was in the highest romantic. For her he risked his life in adventures, taught himself music and poetry as well as feats of arms, and if by any chance the lady-love was unkindly he was liable to weep and even become insane — a calamity which is said to have happened three times to Launcelot.

The flaw in this romantic love of chivalry was that it was not scrupulous in regard to the rights of others, particularly of husbands. Many of the most celebrated affairs were unlawful and the total effect of this romantic elevation of women does not seem to have had any marked influence upon their actual status in society or before the law.¹ Yet when one considers the other tendencies of the Middle Ages this new romantic love is certainly in the general line of a recognition of something more than the traditional relations between men and women. The idealizing tendencies of courtship which have become one of the most precious elements in our modern world are due in no small measure to the chivalric loves of the Middle Ages.

¹ For well-balanced discussion see Taylor, *The Mediaeval Mind*, II, chs. 23-26.

When one considers the love affairs of the eighteenth century as depicted in the novels of the time, not to mention the more serious treatises on morals, it at first appears as if the attitude of men toward women perpetuated the worst of the days of romantic chivalry. The woman, unless she belonged to a social class equal or superior to the man — and even then not always — was never free from temptation. The unmarried man was granted a license which is a sad commentary upon the morals of the community at large. The ideas of duty to womanhood were thus to him all but overcome in his right to sensual enjoyment. For woman was yet without full personal rights. The heroines of the great novels of the eighteenth century are, it must be confessed, rather insipid when compared with the heroes. If they really represent the ideal of true womanhood it is not difficult to understand the repressed position of respectable women in England during the eighteenth and the early part of the nineteenth centuries.

The gradual tendency, however, to view individuals collectively and thus make the recognition of mutual rights a prompting to doing justice has had a very decided influence on the relation of the sexes. Economic reorganization has here been of undoubted influence. Not only has the position of women as economic individuals been recognized but their rights both within and without the marriage bond are being rapidly extended as a phase of justice necessitated by

both industrial and personal conditions. Whether the institution of the family, as it has existed, is compatible with the growing conception of men and women as free spirits may well be an element of anxiety, but the general tendency in our modern world is towards a recognition of social obligation to women, not only those who are married and others who are respectable, but to their more unfortunate sisters. Prostitution itself can not obscure women's personal place in society.¹

Thus in a field where physical control over individuals has persisted perhaps as long as in any other, we can see at the present time the emergence of a romanticism, no longer essentially selfish as in the days of chivalry or licentious as in the eighteenth century, but determined to see in sex no bar to reciprocal rights; that is to say, to establish justice in sex relations. St. Paul undoubtedly brought to the home elements of spiritual value which were not present in the non-Christian civilization of the Roman Empire, but even St. Paul did not undertake to free the Graeco-Roman wife from the control of her husband. Yet in our day, just where the task is particularly difficult, we can see in sex morality the growing movement towards giving justice rather than insisting upon inherited rights.

¹ See Thomas, *Sex and Society*. Radical views will be found in socialistic views summarized by Walling, *Larger Aspects of Socialism*, ch. 13 and in a new feminist literature of which the writings of Ellen Key are typical.

3. As another illustration of this same tendency, I need only briefly recur again to developments within the industrial world.

When capitalism first came into existence, both in theory and in practice the question of economic rights was answered in a one-sided fashion. As to the rights of the employer and the capitalist there was little or no question; but that the workingman had definite economic rights there was no such assurance. Theoretically, of course, he had freedom of movement, but practically he was at the mercy of a relentless competition which was steadily driving him toward a state of economic slavery. The so-called "Iron Law of Wages" was by no means so final as Lassalle found in his interpretation of the wage theory of Ricardo, but the early stages of our present industrial order furnished not a few facts with which such a view as Lassalle's might be argued.

The history of the labor conflict since the beginning of the so-called industrial revolution, has been marked by much the same characteristics both as a whole and as it has emerged between particular groups. There has been, first, the attempt of the trades to form unions for self-protection; then the opposition of this attempt on the part of employers; in consequence when the unions have struck the employers have endeavored to carry the fight to a finish. Sometimes this has resulted in favor of the one party and sometimes of the other,

but antagonism has gradually led to an intelligent understanding between the two parties. Collective bargaining on the part of the laborer as well as of the owners of machines has followed. Contemporaneously with the development of this stage there has also been the development of some degree of enforced arbitration on the part of the state. Thus in a general way the struggle for industrial rights is running the same course as that for political rights. Already, the stage of giving justice is in sight.

Actual economic operations are no longer based upon the supposition that labor is strictly a commodity but it is becoming more evident that laborers are partners in the productive process, and as such must be recognized as possessing personal rights. This new attitude of justice, as yet only in experimental stage, appears in the industrial reorganization of some of the great clothing houses of Chicago and in such plans as the Protocol of New York which though technically dead yet continues to live in other forms. As one of the most effective labor mediators in the United States has said, the new type of labor union which embodies this new tendency, differs from the older type in that it seeks to coöperate with rather than fight the employer. Therein is the giving of industrial justice based on personal values.

The efforts of certain great corporations which still hesitate to trust trades unionism to reach a personal,

although of necessity collective relationship with their employees,¹ has caused no small amount of discussion, but the principles which have been enunciated by Mr. John D. Rockefeller, Jr.,² make it evident that whatever may be the success of this particular scheme there has come into the industrial order a new sense of the rights of the laboring man. In other words, we have already entered upon a type of industrial relationship in which the struggle which was at first one of strength between labor and capital, later becoming a struggle between laborers and capitalist employers, is now leading to a coöperation between two parties, each having rights and consequent mutual duties. When one contrasts these most recent developments in the industrial order with the machine-breaking of the eighteenth century and the "direct action" of the more radical modern syndicalists, the hopefulness of the tendency becomes apparent. In the light of the entire movement for the last one hundred and fifty years, and without idealizing conditions which are intolerable to one or the other of the opposing parties, I am convinced that this tendency toward coöperation represents the general current of industrial development. The giving of justice is supplementing and little by little is making

¹ The most striking instance is that of the Colorado Fuel & Iron Company. The details of the plan of this company are published and widely circulated. Opinion as to their practicability is as yet divided.

² *Atlantic Monthly*, January, 1916.

unnecessary the struggle for rights. Personal values are becoming the legitimate goal of economic striving.¹

4. The change in penology is equally significant. Because the criminal is regarded as an individual possessed of personal worth, the aim of punishment is rapidly shifting from a blind demand for retribution — a sort of legitimatized lynch-law — to a serious attempt to develop the personal values of the criminal individual. The more we study the various classes of criminals, women as well as men, do we see that they are as a rule physically defective and in need of proper medical care. Our new type of penal institution is now attempting to provide this care for the criminal and to prepare him for such accretion of personal worth in society as his physical, mental and moral power make possible.

¹ An important illustration of the growing power of this conception of the workingman's right to personal recognition in the productive process is to be seen in the history of the rise of social democracy in Germany notwithstanding the early opposition of Bismarck. A similar struggle is already beginning in Japan where industrialism has developed with great rapidity during the past twenty years. Many of the older leaders of Japanese thought are loath to substitute legal for the old feudal relations of laborer and employer. Yet legislation is already in process and a labor movement in the modern sense of the term can hardly be long postponed.

V

These facts point towards a very important social principle which we are slow to see and concerning which facts permit hardly more than prophetic conclusions. The principle is this: Permanent social welfare comes more certainly from giving justice than from the fight for rights.¹ No progress has come from struggle for the sake of gaining rights that could not have been accomplished more effectively and permanently had the possessors of rights that had degenerated to legal privileges freely surrendered — or better, democratized — them. The failure to meet obligations to those without privilege leads to revolution. When a privilege is seen to be a monopolized social right, to democratize it is elemental good sense.

Those who care to test this thesis as it concerns war will find a mass of material well worth consideration, whatever may be one's attitude toward pacifism,

¹ Recall the noble words of Burke in his speech on *Conciliation with America*. "I mean to give peace. Peace implies reconciliation; and where there has been a material dispute, reconciliation does in a manner always imply concession on the one part or the other. In this state of things I make no difficulty in affirming that the proposal ought to originate from us. . . . The superior power may offer peace with honour and with safety. Such an offer from such a power will be attributed to magnanimity." Burke had good arguments at his command in the outburst of loyalty in the colonies which followed the repeal of the Stamp Act in 1766.

in the volume by Norman Angell, *The Great Illusion*.¹ I wish, however, to call attention to three historical illustrations of another sort which I believe are particularly significant.

The first is the surrender of feudal rights on the 4th of August, 1789, in the States-General of France. Students of the period immediately preceding the French Revolution have been much impressed by the insistence of the *cahiers* upon the need of abolishing the abuse of rights and privileges which had survived from older periods. The complaints of these *cahiers* when organized and brought before the States-General evoked not only indignation but self-sacrifice among the liberal *noblesse*. In what Mirabeau called "an orgy of self-sacrifice" the *noblesse* voted to surrender privilege after privilege, right after right. Their attitude of mind was the outgrowth of the spiritual development in France during the preceding half generation. The liberal members of the *noblesse*, some of whom were to lose their lives in the course of the Revolution, felt the injustice that was done the peasantry and were ready to sacrifice rights in order to give justice to others.²

¹ One can only speculate as to what would have been the fruit of Great Britain's adoption of the policy set forth so eloquently by Burke in his speech on *Conciliation with America*.

² See for a rather unusual treatment of "the spirit of 1789" as seen in the *cahiers*, Robinson, *The New History*, ch. 7.

Now the significant fact is that when the permanent advance accomplished by the French Revolution is estimated, it will be seen that it was little more than what was done freely on the 4th of August before any serious violence had appeared. What is popularly known as the French Revolution might almost be described as a struggle on the part of the *bourgeoisie* and, for a time, the proletariat of France to preserve the rights which the feudal nobles had thus freely surrendered but which were threatened by the attempt of Europe to force back the old *régime* upon the Republic.

A similar illustration was given by Japan during the storm and stress period which followed the opening of the empire to the world and the reëstablishment of the power of the Mikado. It would have been easy for the *Shogun* (who died only recently) to have organized many of his nobles about him in a civil war. He, however, saw that such a course would mean only disaster for his nation and he therefore voluntarily surrendered the rights which his family had held for generations and retired to private life. The civil chaos which was threatened was thus avoided and Japan entered upon its remarkable career of adjustment to the modern world order.

The third instance is not so distinct. I refer to the entire course of our international relations with Great Britain for the last hundred years. The state of mind

in the United States after the Revolution and the War of 1812 was not one of complete friendliness toward the mother-country, and yet for a hundred years there has been peace between the two countries. In part, of course, this has been due to economic interest, partly to the racial similarities, common language and community of traditions. But as a matter of fact the hundred years of peace have not been years of peaceableness. There is not a foot of land on our frontier over which we have not quarreled. There is not a codfish on the Banks that has not been submitted to arbitration. But notwithstanding their quarrels each nation has been willing to sacrifice something for the benefit of the other. And down to the present administration, which has brought about the revocation of a law alleged to violate treaty agreements relative to the Panama Canal, the two nations have maintained peace and friendship.

These three illustrations will, I hope, serve to point out what may fairly well be said to be an incipient movement that has been disturbed but not destroyed by the outbreak of war. Both within society and between nations the acquisition and defense of rights are being supplemented by a recognition of a social solidarity which leads to a recognition of social justice. The creative power of this solidarity is as yet in the making, but it is even now a prophecy of a better day when men shall see the good sense of the teaching long

ago given by Jesus that it is better to love than to quarrel, to forgive than to avenge, to give justice than to fight for rights a sense of human brotherhood has come to regard as the possession of all rather than of a party or a class.

We have not arrived at Utopia but we are beginning to think in terms of a human solidarity in which the giving of justice shall replace a competitive struggle for economic supremacy.

LECTURE VI

THE SPIRITUAL OPPORTUNITY IN A PERIOD OF RECONSTRUCTION

IN the preceding lectures we have considered history as an actual process which involves both individuals and society as a whole, and we have proposed the question as to what sort of interpretation is to be placed upon it in view of the facts at our disposal. We found that no single interpretation is possible, but that at least two interpretations are demanded: the one impersonal, involving the operations of geographic and economic forces; and the other personal. This latter finds the significance of human history in neither the environment or the human race itself, but in the total situation of man-in-nature. In order to understand the actual movements of history, we first roughly classified the materials which seemed to lie properly both within and without the range of an impersonal materialistic interpretation of history. The number of those which implied personal elements we found to be by no means small. With these at our disposal we proceeded to examine history as an actual process, a concrete socio-psychological movement of life. In this we found a uniformly present characteristic,

namely, that as social life grows it becomes decreasingly impersonal. That is to say, history when examined in the long perspective tends to move away from those conditions primarily induced by geographic and economic forces. We then proceeded to ask whether this general tendency away from the impersonal contained within itself positive characteristics. These we found to be three: the tendency to substitute inner sanctions and inhibitions for outward authority based on force either human or divine; to recognize the worth of the individual as personal rather than as merely economic; and to substitute through social action, itself increasingly democratic, the giving of justice for the insistence upon rights. In the course of the development of each of these spiritual values we saw the advance from physical to economic tensions give rise to customs which in turn proceeded onward toward free choice on the part of both individuals and groups and of rational action in the light of the more personal values. In this evidence of process is also a key to its understanding — to use Lamprecht's words, the discovery of a "psychic energy."¹

Whether or not this treatment has brought conviction in every detail, I trust that it has adduced reasons for believing that in the totality of history there are forces at work which are personal as well as those

¹ *What is History*, p. 27. Cf. his words (p. 29) "History in itself is nothing but applied psychology."

which are economic. History I venture to hope has appeared to be not only, as Herbert Spencer would say, an evolution in the sense of a passage from homogeneous conditions to highly multiple and heterogeneous states by successive self-differentiations, but also as something more. If Tennyson's belief that through the ages one increasing purpose runs may seem too precisely teleological, Spencer's formula is too impersonal. The one view must supplement and control the other.

It may seem to some that there remains the decision as to which of the two groups of forces is really ultimate for the understanding of social experience. Personally I am suspicious of questions as to relative importance of social forces. If there is any habit of thought more dangerous than that of antithetical exposition — for who of us really knows enough to set reality in contradictions? — it is that of constantly questioning whether this or that fact is the more important. To ask whether the individual or society is more important is like asking whether the oak or the acorn is primary. Historical situations must be viewed synthetically, not analytically. I would again repeat the caution that no simply monistic interpretation of history is satisfactory. We must recognize the existence of numberless forces in human life any one of which may at times appear to be overcoming the other. The practical situation, however, is that few historians

seem capable of holding firmly to more than one interpretative hypothesis. The habit of analyzing history into minute problems capable of highly intensive treatment serves to detract attention from the historical process itself. Naturally this mental attitude tends to emphasize that force which for the moment seems dominant, particularly if it is immediately emphasized in events and documents. As a result the nexus of historical events is most easily found in economic conditions. Too often the impression made by such a view of history, even when it admits its limitations, is that the only really appreciable forces in history are geographic and economic. For these rather than the spiritual forces are in the front rank of attention. The effect of such an over-emphasis is far more than a failure in scientific accuracy. It induces an attitude of mind which tends to belittle anything except economic forces, however much ideological forces — to use the word of Marx — may be theoretically admitted. As a consequence, the study of history is, I fear, too often lacking in moral inspiration and deadening from its atmosphere of materialistic determinism.

There is, of course, also the similar danger already mentioned, that an over-emphasis of the non-economic forces of history may neglect concrete and intelligible economic causes. Yet, even in view of the danger of such an over-emphasis of the spiritual life,

one cannot overlook the general tendency which characterizes the past to elevate spiritual values. Now a general tendency is not to be identified with the various forces of which it is the resultant. Any one of these may repeatedly seem to overpower the other. If we neglect this general tendency it is by no means difficult so to accumulate the triumph of economic forces as to see in them predominance. But as we have seen, when one comes to compare our present situation with that of the dim past, we see the operation of many forces but only one tendency. And that is spiritual. Such a fact is certainly conducive to rational optimism. True, when we take shorter views, this tendency becomes less apparent, and special currents of change obtrude themselves. Particularly in a period of reconstruction like our own, when the elements of disharmony and consequent struggle are so prominent, is it easy to doubt the trustworthiness of any idealistic conclusion based upon general tendencies. We are always subject to the influence of Schopenhauer and his fellow-pessimists. Or, in place of this type of pessimism, we are led to distrust history because of the hyper-individualism of Nietzsche which would teach us to look at the forces of social evolution as lacking in moral qualities, and at the long struggle by which we have gained our present ideals as threatening the triumph of a slave-morality. But such pessimism or even distrust of spiritual realities in

human experience, the real tendency in history denies. I am not interested to pass moral judgments upon the past, but the tendency away from the economic to the personal which is operative in the net result of forces making history as a whole, cannot be neglected by an historian with any regard for scientific completeness.

I

Whatever vocabulary we adopt, the steadiness of tendency towards the ever increase of personal values inevitably suggests if not a strictly teleological interpretation of history, at least the conviction of Flint, that in history we can "obtain a veritable increase of our knowledge of God's character and ways." To analyze processes into efficient and final causes is in my opinion hopelessly to misrepresent the movement itself. The only interpretation possible is a description of the general resultant of the co-working of various forces from the first observable *terminus a quo* to the last observable *terminus ad quem*. If in this resultant there can be found anything analogous to the operations of reason, we cannot fairly deny Divine direction; not, it is true, in the sense of the older theological interpretations of history, but in the sense that we see evidence of creative rationality in the laws of nature. Indeed may we not expect even clearer vision of such Reason? For in a world of persons who of necessity have sprung from and embody the forces of the

universe, should we not expect that the immanent God would express himself in general personal progress?

This is just what we find. The words of Professor Robinson¹ seem to me to furnish an appropriate description of this tendency—"Even those of us who have little taste for mysticism have to recognize a mysterious unconscious impulse which appears to be a concomitant of natural order. It would seem as if this impulse has always been unsettling the existing constitutions and pushing forward, groping after something more elaborate and intricate than what already existed. This vital impulse, *élan vital* as Bergson calls it, represents the inherent radicalism of nature herself. . . . At last, perhaps, the long disputed sin against the Holy Ghost has been found; it may be the refusal to coöperate with the vital principle of betterment." Such a statement, true as it is, leaves unsaid, however, a truth which seems to me exhibited by the general course of history, namely, that this *élan vital*, this vital principle can be described only as spiritual—the expression of a supreme Person. I find a similar interpretation of history suggested in the statement of Professor Giddings² that social evolution is but a phase of cosmic evolution. For, unless humanity is utterly detached from such evolution—a supposition impossible on its face—personalism is found in cosmic

¹ *New History*, p. 264.

² *Principles of Sociology*, p. 363.

evolution. Else whence emerged those activities to which we apply the term "personal"?

The Hegelian school of interpretation has suffered of late something of an eclipse of interest, but whoever would really get the full effect of idealism cannot neglect Hegel. No man has emphasized more clearly than he the antithesis between spirit and matter, and no one, unless possibly it be Nietzsche, has striven more vigorously to show that the essence of the spiritual life is freedom. The end of historical development he holds to be this freedom, and always represents the course of history as a series of stages in the development of freedom. It is true that the Hegelian view when rigorously urged leads in two opposite directions; on the one side, as viewed by Marx toward determinism, and on the other in the succession of Hegel, von Treitschke and the German state-philosophers generally to an identification of idealism with the German *Kultur*. Each of these conclusions seems an anti-climax, and may safely be left to the adjudication of time. That which to my mind is possibly the really permanent contribution made by Hegel to our understanding of history is not so much his unforgettable framework of thesis, antithesis and synthesis, but that of the World Spirit, the *Weltgeist*. With his opinion that this *Weltgeist* is migratory, working not in the world at large, but in individual states, we may well hesitate to agree. The march of

the Spirit from China to India, to Persia, Greece, Rome, at last to emerge most successfully in Germany is obviously artificial if not Chauvinistic. We cannot so readily justify Prussian ideals. But with all its Teutonic provincialism, Hegelianism is none the less an argument for the working of spiritual forces not to be identified with man in human development.

The idealistic philosophy as it appears in Lotze is more genuinely historical.¹ In the thought of Lotze there is no incompatibility between the mechanical and the teleological view of the world. With him there is no denial of the influence upon mankind of the physical forces in the midst of which they live. But the chief end of history he insists is that of affording mankind the opportunity for unselfish action and the enjoyment of consequent happiness. This is doubtless only another expression for the vital imperative of personality to seek to develop itself by proper exercise in the social whole. The process of Lotze like the *élan vital* of Bergson cannot be kept within the limits of non-personality. The mind inevitably sees in this tendency the operation of God, and while caution is necessary in any positive affirmations, some thought of World Spirit cannot be excluded from a conception of history in which so many elements of personal progress are to be seen. It is, I think, a most significant fact that philosophies of history are so commonly

¹ See especially *Microcosm*, bk. ix.

driven to a conclusion of this sort. There is indeed no better theistic argument than an observation of social progress. True it will not explain the misery of the passing experience, nor will it give us a super-monarch in heaven, but it will give us something more personal than a Power not ourselves that is making for righteousness.

We cannot create God by capitalizing "power." We must explain personal tendencies by supreme personal forces. It is only contradiction to say that "the spiritual life with its new world should be a product of mere man, and that that life should remain within man and at the same time lead in its essence beyond him. This contradiction cannot be overcome otherwise than by our recognizing and acknowledging in the spiritual life a universal life, which transcends man, is shared by him, and raises him to itself."¹ The God disclosed by the social evolution of man from dependence upon physical nature to an ever increasing spiritual freedom may not be individualistic personality of the human sort, but if He may be super-personal He cannot be impersonal. For personality is in the universe since men are men. And persons with a Super-person can meet.²

¹ Eucken, *Life's Basis and Life's Ideal*, p. 143.

² See Rashdall, *Philosophy and Religion*, chs. 1, 2, especially pp. 54-56; Martineau, *A Study of Religion*, I, 196-235, 254-313; Illingworth, *Personality Human and Divine*.

II

With this discovery of an inner spiritual force in history, dependent though its workings may be upon natural and economic forces, comes the call to become deliberate co-workers in the spiritual tendencies of our own day. History, let me once more insist, is not a mass of abstract principles but of men and women like ourselves seeking, often with precise consciousness of their efforts, to realize in the midst of the process from the impersonal to the personal, their own spiritual capacities in the adventure, not always simple or easy, of actual living. This imperative within human life is a phase of social psychology, a constant impulse of the spiritual to rise above the destructible materialistic forces of life. By the virtue of its very nature, human life, while having its activities called into operation by the struggle with nature and consequent economic tensions, invariably presses on to subject itself to ideals and motives which are personal and spiritual, moral rather than physical, socially minded to the point of sacrifice rather than insistent upon rights. In this human aspect of the cosmic process we evidently have a line of demarcation which cannot be overlooked by any person who seeks to make his life of really historical moment.

The fundamental moral distinction which men and women entering upon life should make is not a choice

of this or that profession or occupation. It is rather the choice as to whether they shall make their lives count as personally social or impersonally acquisitive agents. Shall they make the dominant aim of life increased personal worth in the midst of and for the sake of other persons as well as themselves, or will they, disregarding the personal element in others, seek to use them as tools for their own economic or other aggrandizement? In other words, will they seek to coöperate with the general movement in humanity toward larger personal values, or will they ally themselves with those who, discounting such values, look only to their immediate advantage as discovered in the acquisition of impersonal goods? Such a question as this I fear is not always faced by men and women who have their lives even partially in their own keeping. The struggle for "rights" important as it has been, too often obscures the higher values toward which humanity as a whole tends and to which as individuals we should constantly look. The issue is sharply drawn by Jesus. But it is easier to give a sort of aesthetic consent to moral idealism on the pages of the New Testament or of Epictetus and Marcus Aurelius than it is to make the same idealism operative in one's own life. The backward pull of inherited privilege and customs — often in the very process of being outgrown — is too often honored as conscience. For this reason too many men are content to be social

parasites, deriving such moral sanctions and inhibitions as they may have from the general environment in which they happen to find themselves. As the spiritual urge of environment is seldom intense, and as the appeal of the Will to Get is extremely individual, such men, while not avowedly abandoning the quest of spiritual ideals, tend to accommodate these ideals to the actual imperative of immediate pleasure or gain. Admitting that they cannot serve both God and Mammon, they organize, as it were, a sort of corporation, "God-Mammon & Co. Ltd.," and serve the corporation, hoping thus to get advantage from both its elements. A "practically" minded man once remarked, "the 'theoretical' man cannot see that there is a difference between business morality and moral morality."

Such half-hearted, compromising spirituality is sadly indifferent to the crisis in which we really find ourselves. The pressure of materialistic thought and interests was never greater than today. He who is not for materialism must be against it as the dominant influence in our modern life. Anything less than heroic devotion to the spiritual values of life is incomparably dangerous today. Even respectability is too often the worst enemy of justice.

But this call to coöperation with the spiritual forces within history is no call to a forlorn hope. If our interpretation of history as a whole is correct, the man

who chooses the vicarious life has not chosen the losing side. He is coöperating with the unquestionable tendency of human progress. He is not concerned in having God on his side, but, to use the striking words of Abraham Lincoln, can be "sure that he is on God's side." And he will see that what Jesus Christ meant by sacrifice is simply such an ordering of the relative values of life as to make the spiritual most valuable, and therefore to surrender something, which though it be life itself, is of less value. The kingdom of God, according to Jesus, must be gained by sacrifice, but it is the sort of sacrifice which a merchant makes who, finding a pearl which is worth more than all his possessions, exchanges all for that incomparably valuable jewel.

III

Loyalty to spiritual values as the goal of human struggle under the influence of physical and economic forces is particularly needed in our modern world where so much history is in the making.

1. One particularly loud call for spiritual reinforcement comes from democracy, history's supreme experiment in the self-administered coöperation of those who mutually recognize personal values.

How frequently during the past months have we reexamined our democratic idealism! How apprehensively have we searched our minds lest we should

discover within us a fundamental distrust of that political ideal which our fathers organized and bequeathed to us. That we are not a nation in the sense that Prussia is a nation is apparent to us all. The high governmental efficiency which would make the nation itself rather than the personal worth of the individual supreme has stirred our wonder and then our anxiety. Are our own democratic ideals to collapse? Obviously we have a conception of the direction of history radically different from that of those who can think of the state only as a self-centered unity protected by a free trade within and by protective tariff and force of arms from without. For such patriots the nation is supreme and the individual has no value to be set in defiance to the welfare of the state. Is this a truer ideal than that of democracy?

We yet maintain our ideal of the individual as one who has a right to know about government, the right to express an unfavorable opinion about state policies; whose mind and lips are his own and whose individual worth through development are ends which the state must serve. In our estimate of democracy there has been a divine idealism which has refused to conceive of wealth as our ultimate goal. Dollar diplomacy has never become with us dollar individualism. We have looked to the fathers of our Republic and have seen in them men who dared sacrifice for something more than economic advantage.

But at this point we of late have been called to halt by those who challenge our faith in democracy by insisting that little is to be found in early American history other than the influence of economic forces. Thus Professor Beard rather summarily disposes of the social mind that found governmental expression in the election of Jefferson as President, and still furnishes a term with which to conjure:¹ "Jeffersonian democracy simply meant the possession of the Federal Government by the agrarian masses led by an aristocracy of slave-owning planters, and the theoretical repudiation of the right to use the government for the benefit of any capitalistic groups, fiscal, banking or manufacturing." It is idle to deny a large element of fact in these words, although it is hard to believe that they are the chief goods for which our forefathers fought and bled and died. True, Jeffersonian democracy as it developed in the struggle with Federalism is a phase of practical as well as theoretical politics. But an historical fallacy born of too exclusive selection of data is in Professor Beard's word "simply." As a matter of fact, even though Jeffersonian democracy as a movement that gathered about Jefferson's personality and policies was probably not the transcendental affair some of his admirers have believed, it meant more than what is contained in Professor Beard's formula. Back of it we find personal values.

¹ *Economic Origins of Jeffersonian Democracy*, p. 467.

Even as early as the directions given by various colonies to their delegates to the Stamp Act Congress of 1765, we can see a growing sense of political self-reliance and seriousness among the colonists. There was something more at stake in that precursor of the Continental Congress than the Stamp Act, just as there was something more at stake in the revolt of the colonies ten years later. Democracy at that time had not been placed on a philosophical basis, and it was by no means as mature as today.¹ In the generation that followed the Stamp Act Congress were not only a determination to safeguard the right to property and property itself, but also a new sense of the worth of human life, a new ideal of political equality, and a stern resolve to maintain these in the interest of the future of the new world. However much weight is given to Jeffersonian distrust of the commercial and financial classes and his over-estimate of agriculture, Jefferson's democracy as a political creed was more than his democracy as a policy of practical politics. To doubt this is to overlook the sense of human equality enforced by pioneer American life, the idealizing of such experience through the sturdy Protestantism of German settlers in the western regions of Virginia and Pennsylvania, the preaching of a

¹ Even in the Constitutional Convention of 1787 there was practically no reference to the democracies of the ancient world, although James Madison had made most elaborate studies in preparation for the event.

democratic Christianity by Robinson and other "New Light" and Baptist, Presbyterian and Methodist preachers, the mingling of Calvinism with the three R's in backwood schools. All these induced a social mind which Patrick Henry embodied and to which Jefferson, with or without the influence of French philosophy, gave allegiance.¹ To this social mind it was self-evident, not only that national politics must exalt agriculture above commerce, but also that all men were created equal and that each had the inalienable right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.

That such absolute idealism was to be tempered by experience and that economic interests found expression in the Constitution and in the legislation set up by the Federalists, and that the political conflict which placed Jefferson and later Jackson in the Presidency concerned commercial, agrarian and financial policies and vested interests, no student of American history would be apt to deny. It may even be admitted that the theory as to the nature of the Union so urged in the storm and stress period preceding the Civil War was possibly more apologetic than really historical.²

¹ I am indebted to an unpublished lecture by my colleague W. E. Dodd for suggestions at this point.

² Yet this concession is by no means beyond question. See the admirable discussion of McLaughlin, *The Courts, the Constitution and Parties*, especially 198 sq. in which it is argued that "as far as one can find a consistent principle [in making the Constitution] it is this, that by compact of the most solemn and original kind a new political

But our national forefathers, while less truly democratic than are we, were quite as much concerned to protect the right to hold property as property itself. Ideals as well as economic interests were represented in the Constitutional Convention of 1787. One cannot judge the temper of the new American people by simply classifying votes upon the acceptance of the Constitution that Convention evolved. Attention must be paid also to the more general discussion of the new state constitutions and in particular the Bills of Rights of the various states. Other elements than financial appear in Jefferson's opposition to the Jay treaty which so solidified the Republican party he led. And this spiritual inheritance is as truly ours as was the conflict embodied in the compromises of the Constitution the tragical inheritance of our fathers. Political ideals formulated both in the Declaration of Independence and in the Constitution have once and again reappeared in our history as social impulses. They will still appear. Men may be misled by them, but they believe them. If need be they will die for them. And what is even harder they will pay taxes to support them.

I cannot believe that our present suspicion of the faith in the supreme worth of democracy and even of organization and a new indissoluble unit was being reared in America." This "compact" theory was abandoned in the arguments of anti-slavery interpreters of the Constitution. They insisted that the "people" was older than the states.

individuals in which we once gloried can ultimately sink into a worship of a state organized for economic and military efficiency. The entire evolution of our national life has rested on hopes which get their justification not only in the necessary control of banks and trusts, but in the conviction that in some way we are organizing a human society in which individuals shall have the opportunity to develop themselves according to their own direction, where children shall have larger equality of opportunity than their parents, and where economic determinism shall be offset by a public will which, properly enlightened, shall fit more equitably the law of the land upon the economic conditions which help shape individual life. Though we may be at times over-eager to believe that what ought to be really is, we are seeking to organize a democracy in which rights shall be democratized, the individual shall be given full opportunity for self-development, and the struggle for rights shall be superseded by the collective giving of justice. It is an ideal to which neither we nor humanity at large have yet attained, but to which society is coming much nearer than some apparently imagine. We need only again to take account of stock of our spiritual assets and uncompromisingly set ourselves against being forced into idealistic bankruptcy. At all events democracy has not fallen to the state from which it lifted aristocracy. Democracy of this newer age is well worth a struggle!

Nor is it impracticable optimism to which we summon generous and sacrificially social minds. In the struggle for democracy in which we are now involved we are not combatting but coöperating with the prevailing tendency of social evolution. Political origins are not social goals. In the growing venture of the past to rely on the giving of justice rather than on the fight for rights, we find the prophecy of real democracy. In it alone can we hope to embody the forces that have repeatedly lifted history from the pressure of impersonal nature and economic needs and external authority based on force, to a reliance upon moral persons gradually being taught the final worth of individuals and the even more difficult lesson that it shall profit nothing if they or their nations gain the whole world and yet lose their own souls.

2. Such a call to renewed loyalty to democracy is an echo of the louder call to loyalty to the fundamental principles of life embodied in the religion of Jesus.

Here again there is no appeal to join a forlorn hope. The recognition of spiritual values and forces in history confirms the sanity and, if the expression may be used, the good sense of Jesus. It is a pity that our sympathies and prejudices weaken our appreciation of Jesus as an historical force. But such he must be considered by any historian of modern culture. If we could rid ourselves of all conventional attitudes and professional language with its suggestion of cant, our appreciation

of Jesus would be seen to be no expression of ecclesiastical bigotry, but a thoroughly objective estimate of his place in the process of human life from the physical to the spiritual. Theology, important as it is to religion, must ultimately shape itself within the limits set by religious-social experience in which faith in personal values ever more perfectly revealed in history and the cosmos has its indispensable office.

When we thus approach the spiritual history of modern times we are at once struck with the failure of professed Christian thought and idealism to appreciate Jesus as a teacher or, better, revealer of elemental spiritual laws. Christians have been very keen to believe the gospel *about* Jesus, but they have not been so eager to receive the gospel *of* Jesus. Even a superficial examination of Christian thought and dogma will make this plain. It is certainly most remarkable that only within the last century while democracy has really been in the making have men seriously begun to study the words and life of the Jesus of the Gospels. It is the ignorance of his words, or rather, the failure to build them into the constructive elements of our creeds and doctrines that accounts for so much of the reliance upon force which has passed itself off as Christian. We are not yet removed from that admiration of the Greek militaristic courage which so blazes forth in that most unlovely of masterpieces, Michael Angelo's Last Judgment. We have thought of Jesus

as standing for his own rights, as driving out the cattle from the temple area, as casting a sword into the earth. It is true the proper interpretation of the Scriptural passages upon which this so-called virile Christianity has been built serves to question its final value. But men of "virility" are not eager to listen to those who would teach them that virility, if it be not touched by a willingness to give justice to others, may be easily turned into mere bellicosity. He who really understands Jesus can see that his philosophy of life is corroborated by an inductive study of the actual progress of human experience. To give justice rather than to insist upon rights, to rely upon inner rather than outward moral control, to have every element of life expressive of the same spirit of love that God himself exhibits, and to regard love as not a desire to gain popular approval or even to get friends, but as a sacrificial determination to do to others as one would like to have others do to one's self — all this can be found as truly in any catholic reading of the facts of human history as in the words of Jesus. As has been repeatedly said, social evolution conditioned as it is by the impersonal and economic world is yet superior to that world. It is a spiritual movement which, if it be prolonged, will bring the world under the sway of the ideals of Jesus himself.

IV

We can already see this advance of Christian idealism in three important fields of our modern world. It is possible only to mention particular phases of the matter which would easily lend itself to extended treatment.

First, spiritual forces are already having their influence upon the intellectual transformation through which the world has passed, particularly since the days of Darwin. The influence of the *Origin of Species* upon thought has been repeatedly emphasized of late and with justice. But it is impossible to attribute our entire change of logical method to the influence of the *Origin of Species*. A new mind has developed, and the scientific world has been affected by political and social movements as well as contributing to their progress. At the start the intellectual revolution was unfriendly to religion because of the unfriendliness of theologians to it. All readers of Huxley and of the literature of the second half of the nineteenth century know clearly enough how bitter the discussion was. And it has by no means passed. Obscurantism and reaction are still in operation to a degree almost unbelievable by those unacquainted with the matter, for the thinking of many religious people is unaffected by the progress of recent intellectual thought. In consequence the baldest literalism is sometimes identified with the truly reli-

gious spirit by which it is accompanied. Yet a divorce between the thought and the religion of the world would be disastrous to our social order. The call of the day is as strongly for the influence of religion upon science as of science upon theology. If the church has much at stake in the success of scientific research, the scientist has much at stake in the success of the church. Living as we do in an age that is ever more emancipated in its thinking, we cannot safely ignore the sense of the Whole and the sanity which religion can bring into a world that is steadily repudiating confidence in authority based upon external force. If spiritual control is to be exerted from within, our intellectual life must itself be brought under such control. The rapidity with which this adjustment of facts and faith is progressing is a double assurance that ultimate failure cannot dog the steps of the man who attempts to show that the god of Love is the god of Law.

The second field in which spiritual influences operating through the church are seen is in the field of social reconstruction. Any period of reconstruction is, of course, subject to criticism, but that of which we ourselves partake has proceeded so rapidly as to disclose innumerable opportunities for those who wish really to build their spiritual impulses and powers into the course of social evolution. There is still abundant need, for example, for those who in the name of the

spiritual worth of the immortal individual should undertake to rectify industrial injustice. How rapidly we are proceeding in this particular is evident enough to those who can recall the attitude of organized Christianity toward industrialism and the labor conflict twenty years ago. Far better than could have been hoped in those days, we see organized Christianity undertaking to become the spiritual leaven of the labor conflict. The fact that the church does not yet see its way clearly is an argument for earnest and intellectual souls possessed of social sympathy to enter this highly important field of human interest. We do not expect the church to become the center of economic agitation, but we may fairly well demand that the church shall train the individual in social sympathy so that he may become the spiritual leaven of a growing industrial democracy. The minister of the church today is something more than a private chaplain coöperatively sustained. He is in a true sense the successor of the Apostles organizing spiritually-minded men and women into collective spiritual forces. Never since the history of the church began has there been such opportunity for the evangelizing of the reconstructing forces of society as now.¹

History, after all, is a record of how folks act, and it is the business of a church to make the ideals of folk-

¹ On this matter the literature within the last few years has become vast. Particular attention may well be called, however, to Peabody,

action those of Jesus Christ. The minister should see that the future grows out of the present and that perhaps the largest contribution that he can make to international morality, to industrial disputes, and to the entire course of social evolution will be a group of men and women who share in his spiritual enthusiasm and his confidence that Jesus has revealed how God is really at work in the world. The New Testament church gained its social significance, not because it had a program, but because its members had a Christian attitude of mind. For a variety of reasons it did not undertake social reconstruction, but it embodied ideals which inspired successive social minds. The church can render the same service today, provided that its leaders grasp the significance, not only of the gospel *about* Jesus, but the gospel *of* Jesus. Here is its supreme social task: not to draw up programs but to beget in men the sacrificial social-mindedness which God displays in Jesus Christ. In this moment of storm and stress when civilization is being tested and Christianity itself is challenged, the cry is ever more importunate for a religious leadership that shall take Jesus seriously and believe that it is better to give justice than it is to fight for rights, because of the revelation in him that God himself so acts.

Jesus Christ and the Social Question; Rauschenbusch, *The Church and the Social Crisis* and *Christianizing Social Order;* Cutting, *The Church and Society;* Mathews, *The Social Teaching of Jesus and The Church and the Changing Order.*

The third great field of opportunity for the man who would help spiritualize a world movement lies in foreign missions. The modern missionary movement is something vastly greater than even its progenitors could have foreseen. Starting as it did with rather limited religious outlook, it has become the effort of Western civilization to carry to the world which it is about to transform the fundamental principles of ethics and morality upon which it is itself — be it never so insecurely — based. No careful observer of modern international relations or of the non-Christian world can fail to see the stupendous importance of this movement. The change of attitude is already apparent in the treatment accorded the missionary even in our current literature. The foreign mission enterprise is now so vast both in organization and in expenditure of money as to demand serious treatment on the part of the historian. Even more does it demand attention on the part of those who are socially-minded. To have a share in the transformation of civilization does not come often to an entire generation, but this is the opportunity which now faces America and Europe. Japan has reached an independence of national life strikingly akin to that of our Western world. China is more in the making, but in both alike it is obvious to thoughtful observers that the new social, industrial and intellectual conditions have so undermined the basis of the older morality as to produce a profound

moral crisis. The thousands of students now gathered in the educational institutions of Asia are seeking with an earnestness that is pathetic as truly as inspiring, a moral basis for the civilization into which they are entering. There is no religion capable of sustaining the weight of a Western civilization except Christianity itself. To carry the Gospel to these hundreds of millions of men who are to have such a share in the shaping up of the history of tomorrow is an opportunity and an appeal. He who doubts the power of spiritual forces in history needs only to look at the history of foreign missions to be reassured.

V

The conviction thrust upon us by history that the Christian religion is in accord with the tendency of human progress is certainly a gospel for those of us who find ourselves crushed between the mechanism now preached by the biologist and the determinism that closely dogs genetic psychology. It teaches us that the deeper meanings of life are not to be found in the intensive study of separate phenomena any more than a railway system can be understood by counting the ties of its tracks. It compels us to see that in the tendencies of life, as truly as in the vast range of motive, impersonal forces are points of departure rather than goals. And believing thus, we dare call others to join with us in the adventure of bringing to the world the

spiritual blessings heralded in the message and the example of Jesus.

Religion when studied in the historical spirit ceases to be a mere survival of primitive customs personified into a God who never existed except in the courts of anthropomorphism. It is an ever developing attitude of mind which on rational grounds seeks further personal development by the appropriation of the personal forces of the cosmos from which has come so much of personality as we humans possess. It sees in the social order something more than forces making toward the satisfaction of economic wants. It sees in persons who not only *are* but are *becoming*, a possibility of something more personal than now appears. Immortality is no longer a rhetorical sentiment but a phase of the world-process. The efforts of prophets and poets, of religious leaders and religious institutions, are channels for the incoming of the divine Spirit immanent in the universe, who may reinforce and reinvigorate and regenerate the lives of those who choose the personal surplus which for all eternity cannot be taken from them by economic or impersonal pressure. If the interpretation of history had left us convinced that the real meaning of life is below the hopes of Jesus, we might well turn to the momentary struggles which constitute life and bow to that Will to Power which calls so loudly to any strong man. But any exclusively economic interpretation of his-

tory or even any so-called "ultimate" economic interpretation of history, is impossible when one considers the great forces and tendencies of actual human life. Though we may face life without any fully accepted system of philosophy or any complete understanding of the goal toward which we move, we none the less do possess a knowledge of a growing recognition of personal values and we can believe that if we do not know whither we are actually going, we certainly know the Way. Knowing Him, we may the more courageously and with joyous sacrifice throw our spiritual ambitions, our spiritual efforts, and our spiritual ideals into that great process in which we move, believing that our labor is not in vain in the Lord.

In an epoch of reconstruction like ours, the world stands at the cross-roads of history. A few brief years will fix the course of centuries. Great crises will come again but they will spring from the crisis of our day. New institutions, new nations, will be developed but we shall help determine whether they shall be subject to spiritual control.

No generation ever faced such possibilities of future weal or woe as does ours as it sees nations being reborn, civilizations looking to Christian people for guidance, and yet sees the forces of evil, of war, of materialism, growing more aggressive. The church of Jesus Christ

must grow sacrificial or it will grow feeble. Christians must sacrifice for their Master or see their Master put to an open shame. The opportunity is marvelous and appalling. It is a challenge to our generation to spiritualize world-history in the making.

Here lies the supreme opportunity for spiritual leaders. Social amelioration must be made to give way to social reconstruction on the basis of social justice to men and women and children who are to be aided in the realization and expression of personal worth as yet unrecognized. The makers of history in the grand manner will be those who, in the historical process which reveals the presence of a God immanent within itself, shall stand prepared to institutionalize their ideals in organizations which shall be the training school of the socially-minded. Such leaders will be the leaven of that better social order that shall make the world into the kingdom of brothers who, free spirits in the midst of physical forces and economic tensions, are the true children of God the Father Almighty.

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
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